Arms Control & Disarmament

A QUARTERLY BIBLIOGRAPHY WITH ABSTRACTS AND ANNOTATIONS



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WINTER 1969-70

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Prepared by the
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT BIBLIOGRAPHY SECTION
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PREFACE

Arms Control & Disarmament attempts to bring under bibliographic control a large and growing body of literature in an important subject area. It is prepared by the Arms Control and Disarmament Bibliography Section of the Library of Congress, through the support of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Each quarterly issue contains abstracts and annotations of current literature in the English, French, German, and Russian languages, as well as abstracts and annotations of current literature in all languages published in English translation. Author and subject indexes appear in the first three numbers of each volume, with the fourth number containing cumulative author and subject indexes.

To facilitate the use of this bibliography the title of each foreign language entry is preceded by its English translation in brackets. Titles in the Cyrillic alphabet are transliterated according to the Library of Congress system, but with ligatures omitted. For the convenience of readers in the Library of Congress, call numbers are given for all cataloged and classified materials. Uncataloged and unclassified materials are designated by symbols indicating the custodial divisions of the Library in which they can be found. A list of these symbols appears on the next page.

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The bibliography is compiled from a survey of the literature received by the Library of Congress that is likely to be available in the larger research and public libraries in the United States. Sources surveyed include trade books, monographs, selected government publications, publications of national and international organizations and societies, and approximately 1,700 periodicals. With the exception of materials delayed in arriving at the Library, the literature cited has usually been published in the 3 months preceding the month in which a number is sent to press. Entries are chosen under the assumption that arms control and disarmament is a subject area encompassing related topics such as weapons development and basic factors in world politics. The coverage is not exhaustive, however. It excludes articles in newspapers and the reporting of day-to-day events in newsmagazines.

The abstracts are written by the Arms Control and Disarmament Bibliography Section, except that abstracts or summaries published with the articles to which they relate are, with the permission of their copyright owners, sometimes used verbatim or in modified form and are designated as "abstract supplied" or "abstract supplied, modified."

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P&GP RR	Periodical and Government Publication Reading Room
Sci RR	Science Reading Room
Slav Rm	Slavic Room

XUM

CONTENTS

	Page
Preface	iii
I. The international political environment	1
Basic factors in world politics	1
Foreign policies	7
II. The strategic environment	23
Modern war	23
Modern weaponry and related technological developments	25
National security policies and military strategies	30
Consequences of national defense policies and war	49
Biological	49
Economic	52
Ethical and social	55
Other	56
III. Institutions and means for the maintenance of peace	59
International law	59
International organization	61
International peace and security forces	62
Other processes, plans, and proposals	62
IV. General analyses and comprehensive approaches	67
The historical background	67
General analyses	68
General and complete disarmament	70
V. Specific problems and limited measures	71
Negotiation	71
Reduction of the risk of war	74
Escalation	74
Conventional arms transfers	74
Nuclear proliferation	75
Other (accidental war, command and control of weapons, etc.)	79
Regional	79
Tension areas	79
Disengagement, neutralization, etc	85
Outer space	86
Violation of agreements and responses	87
Violation, inspection, verification	87
Enforcement	88
Consequences of arms control and disarmament measures	88
Other problems and measures	89
Author index	92
Subject index	96

XUM

I. THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

BASIC FACTORS IN WORLD POLITICS

1
Clare, Anthony W. IS AGGRESSION INSTINCTIVE? KONRAD LORENZ'S THEORIES RE-ASSESSED. Studies, v. 58, summer 1969: 153-165.
AP4.S78, v. 58

"The philosophy of tomorrow," writes a Sorbonne philosopher, "will be terrorist; not a philosophy of terror but a terrorist philosophy allied to an active policy of terror." Already, in the slogans espoused by student dissidents, political revolutionaries, and, to a lesser degree, civil rights activists, one can discern the outlines of this emerging creed. Lorenz' contribution to this creed is purely unintentional, and it is unfortunate indeed that his work appears at a time when discussions on the nature and uses of political violence have moved to the forefront of political debate. In On Aggression, Lorenz argues that intraspecific aggression among animal species, not excepting the human species, is instinctual, not cultural, and spontaneous, not reactive. Being an instinct, aggression cannot be eliminated from the species, but it can be redirected or sublimated, and this possibility gives man his one means of escaping from self-destruction. How much credence should be given to this argument? Very little. It is becoming more evident each day that Lorenz' work contains serious flaws. Yet, despite its methodological weaknesses, its pessimism, and its dependence upon assumptions about the nature of man that directly contradict those of liberalism, the book was acclaimed in the most immoderate terms and its data, methods, and conclusions accepted with scarcely a dissenting voice. The explanation for this is to be found in the prestige that the scientific expert has acquired in this century. Lorenz' reputation for expertise in ethology was enough to win widespread support for his ideas without their having been critically evaluated.

2
DeLamater, John, Daniel Katz, and Herbert C. Kelman. ON THE NATURE OF NATIONAL INVOLVEMENT: A PRELIMINARY STUDY. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 13, Sept. 1969: 320-357.
JX1901.J6, v. 13

As an alternative to the concept of "nationalism," a theory of national role involvement is presented which identifies three mechanisms by which an individual may be motivated to enact the role of a national. His involvement may be symbolic, an orientation to the nation's symbols and attendant emotional satisfactions; normative, an orientation toward norms and the associated rewards and sanctions; or functional, a concern with the material and other benefits derivable from membership in the national system. The results of a field survey indicate that individuals may be differentiated according to the importance of each of these orientations to them. The results also indicate clear differences in attitudes between persons characterized by different orientations, particularly in attitudes about "Americanism," defense policies and disarmament, foreign relations, and supranational organizations. (Abstract supplied, modified)

3
Eckhardt, William. THE FACTOR OF MILITARISM. Journal of peace research, no. 2, 1969: 123-132.
AS9.J6, 1969

To investigate the nature of militarism, two different but related questionnaires were administered to two different samples of adults and university students, N-122 and 261, respectively. Both questionnaires contained a variety of ideological and personality scales selected on the basis of a review of the literature. In both cases, the scale scores were standardized, correlated with each other, and factor analyzed by the principal components method. In both samples, a primary factor of militarism was among the first two factors extracted. The primary factor of militarism contained scales of militarism, nationalism, severe treatment of criminals, anti-Communism, anti-internationalism, conservatism, anti-democratic attitudes, authoritarianism, and anti-Semitism. The items in these scales were characterized by a readiness to use or threaten to use force and punishment to control the behavior of those believed to be deviating from the values of Western adult society, including the Communist 'enemy', children, Jews, Negroes, foreigners, lower-class people, sexual deviates, and mental patients. This need for compulsion and punishment was presumed to be a function of lack of faith in human nature. The primary factor of militarism was significantly correlated with the ideological factors of conservatism, nationalism, religiosity, lack of internationalism, lack of knowledge of foreign affairs, and political cynicism; and with the personality factors of extraversion, misanthropy, faulty childhood disciplines, lack of social responsibility, neuroticism, and lack of empathy. Some of these results (such as the correlation of militarism with conservatism and religiosity) are probably limited in their generalizability to the Western World, while the rest are probably more universal in their generalizability. However, cross-cultural studies will be required to

XUM

increase our understanding of militarism in general. This study implies the need for more freedom in human relations if we want more responsibility in human relations, including international relations. (Abstract supplied)

4
Elbrick, C. Burke. NATIONALISM IN EASTERN EUROPE. Atlantic community quarterly, v. 7, fall 1969: 414-420. D839.A85, v. 7
Address delivered at Hartwick College, Oneonta, N.Y.

Emphasizes the fluctuation of East European governments between the nation-state and empire-state principles. Elbrick shows that "Eastern European history falls into a discernible pattern which is as relevant to the Communist states of Eastern Europe today as it was to the medieval kingdoms of Eastern Europe half a millennium ago." Nationalism in Eastern Europe is becoming more intense, but it is not necessarily an anti-Communist nationalism nor will it produce a non-Communist Eastern Europe, even if it succeeds in ending the Soviet hegemony.

5
Fejtö, François. [THE CRISIS OF MARXIST INTERNATIONALISM] Die Krise des marxistischen Internationalismus. Frankfurter Hefte, Zeitschrift für Kultur und Politik, v. 24, Aug. 1969: 549-562. AP30.F555, v. 24

Attributes the disintegration of the Eurasian Communist strategic bloc and the current crisis of Marxist internationalism to the growing dislike of members of that bloc of the tendency toward hegemony of any individual member. Fejtö points out that the world sentiment against imperialism cannot now serve as a gathering point for Marxist internationalism. Even applying the principles of Marxist analysis, an inquiry into centrifugal tendencies and polycentrism within Marxist internationalism must lead to the conclusion that the process of disintegration is irreversible.

6
Hassner, Pierre. CHANGE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE. London, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1968. 35 p. (Adelphi papers, no. 49) U162.A3, no. 49
Bibliographical footnotes.
Pt. 1 was abstracted as item 938 in v. 5, no. 3, of this bibliography.

Contents.--pt. 2. In search of a system: The notion of a European security system. Germany and Europe; the political foundations of security. The European and the global balance; the security requirements of stability.

Discusses the various concepts of a European security system, the special problem of Germany, and the requirements for European security in view of the balance of power that prevails in Europe and in the world at large.

7
Ilfeld, Frederic W. OVERVIEW OF THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE. Archives of general psychiatry, v. 20, June 1969: 675-689. RC321.A66, v. 20

In an age of mass-destruction weapons and widespread social unrest, violence is a dangerous, maladaptive anachronism. Realizing this, growing numbers of scientists and scholars are turning their attention to a study of the causes of human violence with the hope of finding some clue to a strategy to reduce its incidence. Three different etiologies of violence have been proposed. Probably the best known is the theory that the impulse to do violence is innate in man. This contrasts sharply with the theories that aggressiveness is a consequence of social conditioning or that it results from the operation of various situational factors that frustrate individual and group expectations. Each of these explanations of human violence entails a characteristic strategy of prevention. Being committed to the view that violent impulses are innate, the first school is confined to seeking ways of diverting the "inevitable" into nondestructive channels of expression. Those who take the contrary view--viz, that violence is learned behavior--stress the need to alter child-rearing practices that breed over-aggressiveness and to modify or disperse subcultures that put a high value on violence. Those who see situational factors as the chief cause of violence recommend the two-pronged approach of removing obstacles that frustrate expectations and reducing expectations to fit reality. While many scholars cling to some one or another of the above views to the exclusion of the others, a better approach would be to attempt a multidimensional understanding. There is, in fact, no single cause of human violence; similarly, there is no single cure. Nevertheless, that there are means of relief may not be doubted.

8
AN INTERNATIONALIST DUTY [editorial] New times, no. 33, Aug. 20, 1969: 1-2. D839.N483, 1969

In its comments on the anniversary of the 1968 Bratislava settlement, the press of the Socialist countries emphasized that the development of the past year confirmed the correctness of the principle that the defense and consolidation of the gains of socialism are the common duty of the Socialist countries. The next important step to be taken by these countries is an agreed course on the international stage, for they can exert a great influence on future developments. They stand for peaceful coexistence among states with different social systems, oppose the imperialist policy of aggression and war, and work for the abolishment of all conflicts that might lead to war. The Soviet Union is always ready to help--it proved this readiness 30 years ago when it aided the Mongolians in their struggle against the Japanese imperialists. The coordinated aid of the Socialist countries to the Vietnamese people is a striking example of what such cooperation can do. It not only helps in the struggle against aggression but fosters the

XUM

class struggle in the capitalist states and is an inspiration to the national liberation movements, which in turn strengthen the Socialist world system in its struggle against imperialism. "This mutual support is a law of the world revolutionary process."

9
Ivanov, O. FOR UNITY OF THE ANTI-IMPERIALIST FORCES. Soviet military review, Aug. 1969: 52-53, 60-61.
U1.S7, 1969

Comments on the documents adopted by the International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties held in Moscow, June 5-17, 1969. The conference called for cooperation between all peoples to end such imperialist actions as the Vietnam War, the Middle East crisis, and the provocative sallies against Cuba, North Korea, and the undeveloped states. The conference appealed for a fight against the arms race, the creation of nuclear-free zones, the abolition of military bases on foreign territory, and the dismantling of military alliances. Since the United States has recently become more aggressive, all possibilities must be explored to ensure a favorable solution of these problems. Imperialism, although weaker, is still a serious danger, and to combat it the Socialist countries must develop their economies, strengthen their defenses, and surpass the capitalist states in science and technology. Ivanov asserts that the building of socialism is a complex process and that the documents adopted by the conference provide a clear-cut program of action not only for Communists but for all fighters against imperialist aggression and oppression.

10
Jahn, Hans E. [GLOBAL CHANGES] Globale Wandlungen. Wehrkunde, v. 18, May 1969: 228-230.
U3.W396, v. 18

Considers Soviet expansion toward the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean and discusses its potential influence on Western interests there. Jahn foresees global North-South tension between the developed nations and the Third World, which by the end of the century will replace the present tension between the West and the East.

11
Koestler, Arthur. MAN--ONE OF EVOLUTION'S MISTAKES? New York times magazine, Oct. 19, 1969: 28-29, 108, 112, 114, 116, 118, 121. illus.
AP2.N6575, 1969

Since the dawn of the nuclear era, man has been confronted with the death of not only individuals but the human species itself. The time bomb that mankind carries around its neck cannot be defused by disarmament conferences or "appeals to sweet reasonableness"; rather the evidence suggests that man "is the victim of some minute error in construction--perhaps in the circuitry of his nervous system--which makes him prone to delusions, and urges him toward self-destruction." Human history reflects a number of pathological symptoms all unique to man, which may be grouped under five main headings: the universal practice of human sacrifice, the lack of adequate inhibitions against the killing of conspecifics, "intraspecific warfare in permanence," the "quasi-schizophrenic split between reason and emotion," and the "disparity between the growth curves of technological achievement on the one hand and ethical behavior on the other." Five interrelated and necessarily speculative hypotheses may explain these facts. First, the Papez-MacLean theory of emotions, which postulates a schizophysiological nervous system, may explain the disparity between intellectual behavior, a function of the newest and most sophisticated part of the brain, and affective behavior, which is dominated by the older and more primitive parts. The protracted dependence of infants on their parents and the mutual dependence of early hominids when hunting faster and more powerful animals have fostered affection and sociability in the human species, but they also have encouraged the development of attitudes that lead to excessively strong identification with one's tribe or nation and its system of beliefs. Ironically. it has been "an excess of self-transcending devotion" rather than "an overdose of . . . aggression" that has caused men to wage war on each other. Language not only makes possible the formation of conflicting belief systems but provides a convenient means for pandering to the suggestibility of man through the use of emotion-arousing symbols. Finally, "man's simultaneous discovery and rejection of death"--the emotional wish to deny what the intellect knows to be true--has led to an irreconcilable dichotomy in the human mind that man has tried desperately to overcome, sometimes through music and art but all too often through holy wars and the burning of heretics.

12
Meier, Viktor E. [NEW NATIONALISM IN SOUTHEAST EUROPE] Neuer Nationalismus in Südosteuropa. Opladen, C. W. Leske, 1968. 154 p. map. (Aktuelle Aussenpolitik)
DR48.5.M43
Bibliography: p. 149-150.

Partial contents.--The problem.--The peoples and their states.--Cooperation efforts in the Balkans. --The remaining hearths of conflict.--Balkan cooperation and the outside world.

Describes the evolution and present state of nationalism in Rumania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece, Albania, and Turkey and considers the problem of national minorities in some of those countries. Meier states that these nations lack interest in all-Balkan cooperation, attaching a greater value to all-European cooperation. East-West détente in Europe has brought about greater political diversification among the Balkan States.

XUM

13
Miksche, Ferdinand O. SOVIET POLICY AND DÉTENTE. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 49, Oct. 1969: 77-81. illus. Z6723.U35, v. 49

The cold war is not over because the Soviet Union is not ready to make the necessary concessions for a durable peace in Europe. In fact, Moscow's leaders continue to seek a decisive victory in the East-West struggle, not by military force but by a peaceful coexistence strategy, which enables the Soviet Union to continue what it calls peaceful expansion while maintaining a strong grip on its spheres of influence. Western advocation of a détente policy in the face of Soviet expansion in the Mediterranean and the invasion of Czechoslovakia is an admission of the political impotence of the West. Instead of tolerating Moscow's encroachments on other continents, the Western bloc should recognize that the Soviet Union is pursuing its traditional policy of world domination. The free world needs a flexible military strategy that would incorporate a truly defensive military system--one that would include a greater number of conventional forces--and would present a credible offensive threat. If the West does not change its present strategy, it "will die a nuclear death--even if no bomb explodes--victim of a nuclear paralysis which immobilizes it on the political level."

14
Miller, J. D. B. POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL TRENDS OF UNDERDEVELOPED NATIONS. Atlantic community quarterly, v. 7, fall 1969: 421-431. D839.A85, v. 7

Address delivered at the Foreign Policy Association's convocation "Toward the Year 2018: The Challenge to United States Foreign Policy."

Analyzes the political and economic trends in the Third World that will affect its role in international relations. Miller describes how these trends restrict growth and concludes that plans for future Afro-Asian development will be ineffective until there is massive improvement in economic conditions.

15
Nieburg, H. L. VIOLENCE, LAW, AND THE INFORMAL POLITY. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 13, June 1969: 192-209. JX1901.J6, v. 13

This essay views the social process, its institutions, prevailing norms, and the circumstances of social disorder as related phenomena. Violence is not usefully viewed as strictly pathological, exceptional, and spasmodic; it has a role in creating and testing political legitimacy and conditioning the terms of all social bargaining and adjustments. Working definitions of "power," "violence," and "force" are offered and related to the informal polity which underlies and gives vitality to the formal institutions of the social process. A "legality" which views the formal system of law and order as sacred and inviolate is contrasted with "legitimacy," which must be won by the success of state institutions in cultivating and meeting expectations, in mediating interests, and aiding the process by which the values of individuals and groups are allocated in the making, enforcement, adjudication, and general observance of law. The paper proceeds to examine the major functions of the law from this viewpoint, and to show that both violence and ordinary politics are —in a sense--outside the legal process. The emergence of dissent may or may not herald major social change, depending on many complex factors. (Abstract supplied)

16
Nilson, Sten S. VALUATION: THE BASIS OF FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING. Cooperation and conflict, no. 2, 1969: 99-118. P&GP RR

Can the concept of the national interest be operationalized? It has been suggested that a balance sheet of foreign policy assets and liabilities could be used for this purpose, and, despite the inevitable problems of quantification, such a balance sheet can be drawn up and would certainly have its uses. It would need to be supplemented, however, by considerations of opportunity costs and by something in the nature of an operating statement to record changes in the nation's political balances over time. The use of these and other related devices borrowed from economic theory to study concrete examples of the temporal evolution of a nation's interests under the impact of a sequence of events in its international life not only demonstrates the usefulness of these concepts but also throws some light on the nature of foreign policy laws. Though the point has been challenged, it would appear that some sequences of events in international politics are of sufficient regularity to permit the observer to formulate invariant relational principles or laws to describe them. Furthermore, these laws can be expected to have predictive value. It is hardly necessary to add that not all international political realities can be so described, and the great difficulties to be encountered in dealing with these matters are well illustrated by the deficiencies discoverable in so much of the work that has been done in this field. Nevertheless, such regularities as have been discovered to date are interesting and certainly deserve the serious attention of political scientists.

17
Paterson, William E. SMALL STATES IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. Cooperation and conflict, no. 2, 1969: 119-123. P&GP RR

The most ambitious of the current flood of studies on the role of small states in international politics is David Vital's The Inequality of States. Unfortunately ambition is no defense against intellectual error. The book is badly marred by Vital's lack of clarity about what he means by smallness

XUM

and by his failure to prove the existence of a distinct class of small states. The analysis is further corrupted by the undue attention given to "the isolated, maverick, unaligned Power" at the expense of the normal case--the small, allied state. According to Vital, the quality of a state's performance in international relations can best be estimated by assessing its ability to withstand stress and to conduct a line of foreign policy of its own choosing. In regard to the first of these criteria, he concludes correctly that, in the age of the nuclear superpowers, resistance to stress has become increasingly difficult for most small states, but he fails to demonstrate that the difficulties encountered are common or peculiar to small states as such. Similarly, in relation to his second criteria, while his conclusion that small states must operate under great constraints can hardly be disputed, his failure to prove that these constraints are any more intractable or restrictive for small than for large states leaves his analysis open to criticism. The role of small countries in international politics is yet to be determined. Clearly, what is needed at this stage is not another general study such as Vital's but intensive investigations of the foreign policies of individual smaller states.

18
Rapoport, Anatol. GAMES WHICH SIMULATE DETERRENCE AND DISARMAMENT. [Clarkson, Ont., Canadian Peace Research Institute, 1967] 89 p.
JX1901.P395

Contents.--Introduction.--The 2 x 2 game.--Prisoner's dilemma.--The game of chicken.--Other 2 x 2 games.--The Deutsch-Krauss trucking game.--The SDC games.--Deutsch's differential strategy game.--The Michigan disarmament games.--The Pennsylvania games.--The full-dress inter-nation interaction game.--Computer simulation.--Assessment.--References.--Bibliography.--Biography.

Surveys recent research on the use of game simulations to study the dynamics of internation conflict. Rapoport suggests that the major contribution of game theory and other forms of peace research to the understanding and control of conflict will be the freeing of men's minds from harmful superstitions about the nature of war and violence and the redirecting of their attention "away from the questions which now overwhelmingly occupy them--questions concerned with the acquisition of mastery over nature and (increasingly) over people--to questions related to understanding the dynamics of conflict, its cataclysmic aspects as well as the strategic, its psychological aspects as well as the logical."

19
Rejai, Mostafa, and Cynthia H. Enloe. NATION-STATES AND STATE-NATIONS. International studies quarterly, v. 13, June 1969: 140-158.
D839.B2, v. 13

Examines the relationship between nations and states, compares the evolution of nation-states and state-nations in the West and non-West, and discusses the role of mobilization in different types of nationalism. Rejai and Enloe distinguish between formative and prestige nationalism, the former being concerned primarily with nation-building and the latter with nation-aggrandizing. The authors note the complexity of the relationship between nation and state in a review of the evolution of French and German nationalism, which they characterize as state-nation and nation-state, respectively. In both cases the union of nationalism and militarism expressed itself in expansionist drives. They find that non-Western nationalism has several distinctive features: an anti-Western bias, the importance of the role played by intellectuals, the attempt to attain political legitimacy and modernize at the same time, and the emergence--typically--of the state before the nation. One consequence of the pressures for mobilization in non-Western countries is a less evident tendency toward expansionism than in the West.

20
Sinai, I. Robert. IS MODERNIZATION POSSIBLE WITHOUT A REAL REVOLUTION? New Middle East, no. 13, Oct. 1969: 26-28. D863.1.N48, 1969

The widespread assumption that Egypt and the rest of the Arab world are undergoing modernization is based on the erroneous belief that relatively superficial changes--e.g., technological improvements, nationalization, increased literacy--constitute modernization. This view neglects vitally important qualitative changes and fails "to comprehend that the process of modernization is essentially a process of revolutionary change." A society can successfully modernize only by thoroughly destroying its traditional political, social, and economic institutions and by developing a new system of values favorable to radical change. The authentic "modernization revolution must be plebeian, passionately ideological, authoritarian if not totalitarian, and limitless in impulse to destroy and re-make society." Only such a revolution can overcome the natural conservatism of rich and poor alike and release the energies necessary for modernization. Two basic preconditions are essential for the modernization revolution: the formation of a revolutionary ideology and the formation of an elite to provide coherence and direction for the revolution. Modernization may be achieved by organic development within a pluralistic society, as in the West, or revolution under the leadership of a powerful party regime, which more nearly suits the needs of Third World countries. This does not imply that the Arab world must conform to any particular model of revolution--e.g., the Soviet model--but it does indicate the necessity for a radical critique of existing Arab society. External factors may play a marginal role, but modernization is fundamentally "a process of self-renewal and internal development." The Arabs can overcome their present incompetence and their "spirit of nihilism and self-destruction" only by undertaking this difficult task.

XUM

21
Stahnke, Paul K. THE NEW LEFT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR STRATEGY IN THE SEVENTIES. Naval War College review, v. 22, Sept. 1969: 20-42.
P&GP RR
Includes bibliographical footnotes.

The "new left" is composed of young people who have in common a "sense of 'existential humanism,'" --the antithesis of classical philosophy and the scientific method--which is a reaction to the scientific-technological age. While searching for a new ideology, they are content at present with anarchistic action as a substitute. Their anarchistic tendencies make difficult the organized action required for total confrontation of the established order. In international matters the "new left" has focused on specific issues like Vietnam rather than on complex issues like the reduction of mutual distrust among the major powers. While they are in agreement with the "establishment" in their distaste for war and aggression, they question official sincerity, and their foreign policy, based on goodness and trust, is unrealistic. The rise of the "new left" frustrates foreign policy directly by influencing Vietnam policy and indirectly by encouraging a new isolationism. In later years the young radical will retain some of his attitudes because "his commitment to a search for a more satisfying life style . . . is . . . deep and basic." The greatest problem is whether change can be rapid enough to avoid destruction of national unity and the values that are the American heritage.

22
Teplinskii, Boris. MILITARY BLOCS AND IMPERIALIST GLOBAL STRATEGY. New times, no. 35, Sept. 3, 1969: 12-15; no. 36, Sept. 10: 18-20.
D839.N483, 1969

Contends that the system of military alliances by which the United States has attempted to establish a "cordon sanitaire" around the Communist nations constitutes the primary obstacle to a stable and enduring peace.

23
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Commerce. Subcommittee on Communications. ANALYSIS OF THE CHARACTER OF VIOLENCE IN LITERATURE AND VIOLENCE AS EXPRESSED THROUGH TELEVISION. Staff report prepared for the Subcommittee on Communications of the Committee on Commerce, United States Senate, by the Library of Congress. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1969. 5 p. (91st Cong., 1st sess. Senate) P&GP RR

Draws distinctions between the treatment of violence in great literature and on American television to explain why the latter may be more productive of violent behavior in real life. The literary treatment of violence, as in Shakespeare's Macbeth, "serves to place the human condition in perspective" and provokes the audience "to reflect constructively upon the nature of man." Television violence, which is violence for its own sake, "serves no purpose but to desensitize the audience to which it is directed, to apotheosize aggression in such a way as to distort the truthful balance of life."

24
Vernon, Walter M. ANIMAL AGGRESSION: REVIEW OF RESEARCH. Genetic psychology monographs, v. 80, Aug. 1969: 3-28. LB1101.G4, v. 80

Though curiosity about the causes of aggression can be traced back to the dawn of history, it is only within the last few decades that investigators, using captive animals, laboratory settings, and modern research tools, have begun to put together a scientific etiology of aggression. A survey of the literature suggests that the causes of aggression can be grouped into three broad classes. The first of these is genetic endowment. The clearest evidence that there is a causal link between genetically determined structure and aggression has come from studies of animal sexuality, but also adduced are the greater aggressiveness of wild strains of animals in comparison to their domestic counterparts and the neurosurgical experimental findings that brain lesions or intracranial stimulation can alter an animal's aggressiveness. The second class of causes of aggression may be termed environmental. Experiments by a number of researchers have established that pain, food deprivation, electrical stimulation of the hypothalamus, the presence of a sexually receptive female, territorial encroachment or overcrowding, direct attack, and threatening displays commonly provoke aggressive responses. The aggression provoked by this second class of factors is called "unconditioned" to distinguish it from the case of an animal's having been conditioned by the repetition of a specific stimulus to adopt an aggressive pattern of behavior whenever that stimulus recurs. This conditioning of behavior is the third class of causes of aggression and may be of the operant or classical type. Two conclusions about aggression can be drawn from this survey. First, "aggression is the product of a number of interacting variables." Second, recent research has concentrated on the study of stimulus-defined causes of aggression, and these causes "imply methods of modifying and controlling aggressive behavior patterns."

25
Vukadinović, Radovan. ANALYSES, ESTIMATES AND PROSPECTS OF EAST EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT. Review of international affairs, v. 20, May 5, 1969: 7-9. D839.R4, v. 20

Summarizes some views expressed at a symposium of sovietologists entitled "The People's Democracies--after Prague," held from March 27 to 29, 1969, at the European College in Bruges.

26
Wallace, Donnel, and Paul Rothaus. COMMUNICATION, GROUP LOYALTY, AND TRUST IN THE PD GAME. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 13, Sept. 1969: 370-380.
JX1901.J6, v. 13

XUM

Studies the influence of reward conditions, group membership, and personality variables on communication, attitude ratings, and percent of cooperative choices in the Prisoner's Dilemma game. There were four major findings: (1) We found no impressive relationships between intelligence, personality, and game behavior. (2) Social-psychological relationships of the players proved to be a significant determinant of game behavior. (3) Initial attitude scores were more positive or favorable when S's played members of their own ward compared to when S's played members from another ward; this difference became even greater as the game developed. (4) The reward conditions used in this experiment were not sufficiently powerful to alter game behavior, but reward factors intensified the inclination of members to trusting and distrusting behaviors based on group membership characteristics. (Abstract supplied, modified)

27
Watter, Pierre. A NOTE ON MODERN IMPERIALISM. Contemporary issues, v. 13, July 1969: 226-233. AP4.C685, v. 13

The United States may be the leading imperialist power by virtue of its dominant economic position, but Russia, which forms part of the same capitalist system, is no less imperialistic in its foreign policy. The phenomenal increase in production since World War II, especially in the United States, which would be sufficient to meet many of the needs of underdeveloped countries, has been used instead to consolidate the rule of world capitalism. Capitalist aid programs are designed to discourage the development of independent production in the recipient countries so as to perpetuate their dependence on the advanced countries. The United States in particular has shown a willingness to use force to maintain its position of dominance whenever an exploited country has refused to cooperate. Support for the exploited must be supplemented by efforts to humanize advanced technology, however, if the struggle against imperialism is to succeed.

FOREIGN POLICIES

28
Abu-Jaber, Faiz S. THE SOVIETS AND THE ARABS, 1917-1955. Middle East forum, v. 45, no. 1, 1969: 13-44. DS41.M45, v. 45

Chronicles the growth of Soviet-Arab relations since 1917, ending with the Soviet-Egyptian arms deal of 1955, which set the stage for the 1956 Western intervention in Egypt and ushered in the "era of Soviet economic, military, psychological and political presence in the area of the Arab Middle East."

29
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. In Kirk, John G., ed. America now. New York, Atheneum, 1968. p. 57-139. E169.12.K5

Contents.--Myths and realities in American foreign policy, by Henry Steele Commager.--The objectives of American foreign policy, by Frank N. Trager.--The problem of motives, by William Pfaff. --The African example; American ritualistic liberalism in action, by Russell Kirk.--Today and tomorrow, by Senator George McGovern.

Analysis of present-day U.S. foreign policy. Commager thinks that U.S. foreign policy has evolved "from innocent origins to moral ambiguity" and that the misuse of power has cost the United States the respect of much of mankind. Trager maintains, however, that U.S. foreign policy has been both honorable and successful in supporting freedom and giving economic aid throughout the world. Pfaff foresees failure if the present policy of identifying national security with the liberation of mankind is continued. Kirk opposes the U.S. presence in Africa where "political patterns will not and cannot resemble those of the United States." McGovern sees U.S. foreign policy values as distorted by a preoccupation with national security and recommends that, instead of participating in frustrating guerrilla wars, the United States "take the lead in mobilizing the wealthy industrialized nations to make a major and sustained assault on world poverty."

30
Barrett, Raymond J. THE PROBLEM OF POWER. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 49, Sept. 1969: 73-79. illus. Z6723.U35, v. 49

The United States cannot escape the responsibilities that come with great power. It cannot withdraw from the world and sink quietly into passivity. What a great nation does not do may have as much of an impact beyond its borders as what it does do. What is America's true position in the world? Its concerns are global, but its power is not infinite. Its goal is peace, but there is no peace. What many Americans fail to realize is that this state of affairs is anything but an oddity; uncertainty and struggle are permanent features of international politics. The lesson of the Vietnam War is very different from what some have suggested. It is that the United States can expect to be faced with complex, frustrating, and unavoidable difficulties abroad for some time to come. The crux of the problem is to learn to use power with foresight and discrimination. What the United States needs are more sophisticated means to deal with its foreign problems--a better method of suppressing lower spectrum war, of distributing foreign aid, of telling America's side of the story to the public, of predicting the outbreak of destabilizing violence, and of convincing foreign governments of the urgency of social reform in their own countries. It is by these means, and these means alone, that America can avoid more Vietnams; it is by these means alone that it can fulfill its responsibilities as a world power.

31
Beloff, Max. THE FUTURE OF BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY. London, Secker & Warburg [1969] 154 p. (World realities series) DA592.B38

XUM

Partial contents.--The retreat from empire.--Defining the national interest.--The economic preconditions.--The defense policy of a medium power.--Permanent partners or unchanging interests?--Power and influence.--The making of British foreign policy.

Outlines the course of Great Britain's post-World War II foreign policy and assesses its prospects for the coming years. Beloff asserts that Great Britain must assume the position of leadership in Europe and advocate European unity and federalism. He concludes that the achievement of European union will be very difficult since the social, economic, political, and psychological foundations necessary for this objective do not exist among the European states.

32
Bessmenov, A. U.S. DIPLOMACY: A PRISONER OF MILITARY STRATEGY. International affairs (Moscow) no. 8, Aug. 1969: 57-62.
D839.I465, 1969

The close relationship between U.S. diplomatic and military policy is not accidental, as some bourgeois historians suggest, but the result of decisions deliberately taken by the highest policy-making bodies in the United States. Since World War II, military thinking and military solutions to foreign policy problems have increasingly gained ascendancy over diplomatic approaches. The State Department carefully coordinates its activities with the Pentagon, with which it maintains an extensive program of personnel exchange; it has become a major intelligence-gathering agency that very often works closely with the Central Intelligence Agency; and it performs an important propaganda function within the United States, the main purpose of which is to persuade the American public of the wisdom of its militaristic foreign policy.

33
Binder, Frederick A. AN END OF PAX AMERICANA. Social science, v. 44, summer 1969: 133-137.
H1.S55, v. 44

Address at the annual meeting of Pi Gamma Mu, New York City, April 1969.

Advocates a change in U.S. foreign policy. U.S. involvement for the past 20 years has been in marked contrast to the isolationism of the 1930's. Binder finds, however, that a new spirit of nationalism and of self-assertion in Europe and Asia now indicates a realinement of power. To meet this situation he proposes that the United States redeploy and learn to "recognize failure as distinct from disaster."

34
Blaney, Harry C. EUROPEAN YOUTH UNREST AND FOREIGN POLICY. Foreign service journal, v. 46, Sept. 1969: 37-40, 59.
JX1.A53, v. 46

The growing unrest among educated European youth has serious implications for European society and U.S. foreign policy. Activist young people have a wider knowledge of social phenomena than their elders and are committed to developing a society that would be free from hypocrisy and give "freedom to the individual as against the power of the state." The authorities have not yet learned how to deal with youth unrest except in the Scandinavian countries, where foreign policy has taken a left-wing course in response to the demands of youth. The way future generations will view cooperation with the United States is important for foreign policy. Assumptions about common interests can no longer be taken for granted. The U.S. Foreign Service needs new ways to analyze and evaluate changes and recommend relevant policies. Perhaps "youth officers" should be selected and trained for this purpose in the same way as economic and scientific attachés.

35
Boettiger, John R., comp. VIETNAM AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. Boston, Heath [1968] 150 p. (Problems in American civilization)
DS557.A63B6

Contents.--The evolution of American policy: Vietnam at war, by Joseph Buttinger. What we did there, by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. If Kennedy had lived? by Roger Hilsman. The orphan war, by Philip Geyelin.--The objects of containment: The Viet Cong; goals and mystique, by Douglas Pike. Hanoi on war and peace, by Melvin Gurtov. Moscow and Hanoi, by Raymond L. McGovern. The United States and Communist China, by William P. Bundy. Containment in Asia reconsidered, by David P. Mozingo. China in context, by Lucian W. Pye.--The future; Vietnam and beyond: We cannot accept a Communist seizure of Vietnam, by Robert A. Scalapino. The great transition; tasks of the first and second postwar generations, by W. W. Rostow. The moderate solution, by John Kenneth Galbraith. Counterrevolutionary America, by Robert L. Heilbroner.--Suggestions for additional reading.

36
Brandt, Willy. GERMANY NEEDS THE SPD. News from Germany, v. 24, May/July 1969: 4-8.
DD257.N518, v. 24

Excerpts from a speech given before the Social Democratic Party Extraordinary Party Congress in Bad Godesberg, April 1969.

Delineates the guidelines of West Germany's future policy, which will renounce force, normalize relations in Europe, and retain membership in NATO. Brandt appeals to all Germans for solidarity and mutual trust in settling the problems that divide the two Germanys.

37
Brezarić, Dr. NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS: TODAY OR TOMORROW? Review of international affairs, v. 20, Apr. 5, 1969: 9-10.
D839.R4, v. 20

There are several favorable signs in the international community that point to a possible Soviet-

XUM

American summit meeting. President Nixon has been given general support by the European allies for negotiations with the Soviet Union, while East European countries favor such an orientation and are continuing to encourage it. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has become more amenable to negotiations because of its conflict with Communist China; even the slightest oscillation in relations between Peking and Washington would cause anxiety in Moscow. America's decision to deploy an ABM system has hurt the prospects for negotiations, and it appears that other retrogressive steps will be taken. It is, however, clear that any negotiations must sooner or later include other countries, for, if the superpowers believe that they can solve the world's problems alone, "all kinds of unpleasant surprises may be in store."

38
Carmoy, Guy de. THE LAST YEAR OF DE GAULLE'S FOREIGN POLICY. International affairs (London) v. 45, July 1969: 424-435. JX1.I53, v. 45

Assesses De Gaulle's foreign policy in 1968 and its impact on the United States, nuclear strategy, the Middle East, and France's relations with the rest of Europe. Carmoy believes that Franco-American relations have improved since the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and that France's foreign policy changed noticeably during 1968 and may change further under Pompidou.

39
Carr, William K. WORLD STRATEGY OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC. World affairs, v. 131, Jan./Mar. 1969: 243-249. JX1901.W7, v. 131

The Chinese concept of international relations, which the Russians call "total strategy," assumes that thermonuclear war is inevitable and that only China will emerge from it undestroyed. As China's national objective for this epoch is world domination by the yellow race, it is not at all concerned about national goals within the framework of a community of nations. The Chinese are not isolationists; on the contrary they expect a vassalage relationship with the nations that they select for their international dealings. Since their adoption of communism, the acceptance of their interpretation of Marxism-Leninism by all nations is vital to them. Under these conditions the general objective of Chinese foreign policy must inevitably be the propagation of Chinese communism and the winning of the ideological war with the Soviet Union. Moreover, they must also win an ideological war with their other rival on the world scene, the United States. China's accusations against the Soviet Union benefit from the Vietnam War. The Soviet decision not to send troops to Vietnam is regarded as a proof that the Soviet Union has accepted coexistence with the capitalist countries and has thus betrayed the Communist dogma. However, China is not really concerned with principles; its greatest concern is its national interest. Thus in the pursuit of this interest the ideology might be modified to suit the needs of the Chinese policy. In the future China is likely to pursue its goal by continued employment of its programs of subversion. It is fairly obvious that most of China's ambitions are beyond its reach. Nevertheless, its goals remain unconventional, and, while its "'total strategy' is so ludicrous that it can be disregarded, the possible results of [its] trying to implement that strategy may not be disregarded."

40
CHINESE GOVERNMENT LODGES STRONG PROTEST WITH SOVIET GOVERNMENT. Peking review, v. 12, Aug. 22, 1969: 4-5. DS701.P42, v. 12

Full text of note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China to the Soviet Embassy in China, August 19, 1969, as regards the August 13 incident in the Tiehliekti area in Yumin County of the Sinkiang Uighur Automonous Region.

41
Church, Frank. TWO SENTINELS OF THE STATUS QUO. Vital speeches of the day, v. 35, Aug. 1, 1969: 614-618. PN6121.V52, v. 35

Speech delivered in the U.S. Senate, July 11, 1969.

The United States and the Soviet Union "suffer from a neurotic sense of insecurity" despite their immense power. Each fears that its own buffer states will be subverted by the other and accordingly rationalizes its intervention in their affairs as a defense of the status quo against externally inspired revolution. Vietnam is just the most striking example of the failure of a policy that only postpones the day of reckoning by suppressing all revolutions, including those that represent attempts to overthrow corrupt and reactionary regimes. This policy not only is shortsighted and immoral, but it betrays the most basic principles of American democracy. It is imperative that the United States accommodate itself to the reality of revolutionary change by adopting a policy of nonintervention except in cases where there is a clear and definite threat to the Nation's security. Such a policy may in some cases result in successful Communist revolutions but it will not lead to world-wide Communist domination, as many fear, because revolutions usually succeed only if they have popular support. Americans must be willing to place greater faith in their stated belief that freedom is a universally shared value or face the steady erosion of their own freedom.

42
COMMUNIST CHINA'S EXPLOITATION OF BORDER ISSUE. Peking informers, v. 18, June 16, 1969: 1-3. DS701.P38, v. 18

States that the Sino-Soviet border dispute is being used for political indoctrination to tighten control, counter growing disaffection, and unite army men and party cadres. The exploitation of military provocation is a cover for internal party conflict.

XUM

43
COMMUNIST SUMMIT CONFERENCE AND SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT. Peking informers, v. 19, July 1, 1969: 1-3.
DS701.P38, v. 19

Discusses the 1969 International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties and cites ways in which China attempts to undermine the Soviet Union's position as the recognized leader of international communism.

44
CONGRESS & U.S. MILITARY COMMITMENTS. Congressional digest, v. 48, Aug./Sept. 1969: 193-224.
JK1.C65, v. 48

Contents.--The foreword.--The U.S. Constitution and foreign policy.--Use of U.S. forces abroad since 1798.--Major U.S. foreign defense commitments.--Review of recent Senate action.--Pro and con discussion: the question of curtailing the Executive role in the making of foreign military commitments.

Discusses the roles of the President and Congress in military commitments. Arguments in favor of curtailment of the Executive role are by Senators Fulbright, Gore, Mansfield, and Church; Senators Dirksen, Jackson, Dodd, and McGee are opposed.

45
Davidov, Iurii. WASHINGTON'S EAST EUROPEAN DOCTRINES. New times, no. 31, Aug. 6, 1969: 8-10.
D839.N483, 1969

The action of the five Warsaw Pact members in Czechoslovakia dealt a crushing blow to the American "bridge-building" strategy and forced the new administration to reexamine U.S. East European policy. Many American ideologists realize that the Socialist system of the East European countries has been strengthened, that any change must come from within the system, that the Soviet Union is a guarantor of socialism in Eastern Europe, and that any attempt to undermine the system will be resisted by the Soviet Union. Thus talk now is mostly about "weakening bonds" between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe rather than about "wresting" the countries away from the Soviet Union. According to Henry A. Kissinger, all that Western policy can do at present is to take advantage of opportunities that may arise to promote a favorable evolution by the method of "engagement"--the support of nationalism, preferential trade agreements, and exploitation of the countries' desire for greater economic efficiency. However, the East European leaders, who know that their countries' very existence depends on the Soviet Union, are prepared to fight nationalism and "anti-Sovieteering"; the countries have sufficient intellectual and productive resources to solve their economic problems without foreign help. Thus the U.S. policy is doomed to failure.

46
Davidson, Eugene. THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE. Modern age, v. 13, summer 1969: 226-232.
AP2.M628, v. 13

"Condensed from a talk given in Washington in February 1969 to an audience of military and civil officers."

"The promise of sensible, rational, mutually advantageous developments . . . in American-European relations" is more superficial than real. Increasing nationalism, the feeling that U.S. military power is stretched as far as it will be allowed to go, and the tendency in European countries to accept the status quo indicate this. Crucial questions for European nations are: To what extent can they rely on the United States? Can they depend on the collective force that NATO calls for in an emergency? Europe has no alternative to this alliance. Though the United States is at the peak of its economic, technical, and military power, it does not pursue its goals consistently. There is wavering and self-doubt--a lack of the psychological, spiritual, and moral convictions that should accompany the status of a great power.

47
Dennon, A. R. POLITICAL SCIENCE AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT. Science and society, v. 33, summer/fall 1969: 285-298.
H1.S27, v. 33

Much of the scholarly research in the United States on the subject of modernization "is consciously or unconsciously prostituted to the goals of American foreign policy." David Apter, Edward Shils, and C. E. Black have all employed an ahistorical, static method that prevents them from placing the problems of modernization in a meaningful historical context. The attempts by Lucian Pye and S. N. Eisenstadt to construct apolitical theories of social change exemplify a similar bias in favor of the status quo. Most American political scientists appear to share a conviction that Western imperialism has had basically beneficial effects on the Third World, and some--e.g., Rupert Emerson and Karl Deutsch--even argue that America has a positive duty to intervene in the process of development to prevent either economic and political chaos or the spread of communism. The uncritical conservatism of the American political science community, which is based on subservience to the policies of Washington, includes not only those who have direct contact with the Government but also those liberals whose "intricate methods are powerless to pierce the veil of official lies which obscures political reality."

48
DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE. West Africa, no. 2723, Aug. 16, 1969: 945-946.
DT491.W4, 1969

Reviews the status of the Nigeria-Biafra hostilities with particular attention to diplomatic recognition, which Biafra wants more than relief or sympathy and has little hope of obtaining. Since international organizations are powerless, the attitude of the big powers is of major importance. Biafra cannot count on U.S. help; French help comes only through the French-speaking African states that have recognized Biafra; and Britain and the Soviet Union supply arms to Nigeria.

XUM

49
Findley, Paul. DOES AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY ENTAIL FREQUENT WARS?. In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. America's changing role as a world leader. Philadelphia, 1969. (Its Annals, v. 384, July 1969) p. 45-52.
H1.A4, v. 384

In the past, the United States has exhibited a lack of creative realism and instead has relied on mythology in the determination of its foreign policy. Single-mindedly, we have sought to foster a bipolar detente between the United States and Russia, and in the process we have eroded away the very security which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was designed to protect. As a consequence, European countries feel they must seek an individual nuclear defensive capability outside the framework of NATO as France has done, or, in the alternative, consider making their own political unified front. Our policy of bipolar detente does not contribute to the security of Europe or the world, or lessen the likelihood of war. Neither did it prevent the August invasion of Czechoslovakia. Lack of realism in our dealings with Russia is matched only by the mythology which governs our policy toward China. Despite bellicose language, the present military danger from China to the United States is minimal, and political disagreement exists only over the island of Formosa. The same cannot be said for Russia where the military danger is far greater and the disagreements more numerous. The United States should attempt to treat China on the same basis as the Soviet Union. Attempts to normalize relations with China and with Eastern Europe, the re-establishment of proper priorities for Western European interests, and the rejection of our Soviet and Chinese mythology will go far toward reducing the possibility of frequent wars. (Abstract supplied)

50
Fisher, Roger. INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT FOR BEGINNERS. Atlantic monthly, v. 223, June 1969: 47-52.
AP2.A8, v. 223

The effects of one government's attempt to influence another may be evaluated by means of a balance sheet that lists the presumed positive and negative choices available to both governments. In the case of North Korea's seizure of the Pueblo, this form of analysis indicates that the United States may have elicited the desired response from North Korea had it reacted differently to the vessel's seizure. There are several ways in which one government can radically influence the response of another by changing the "offer"; i.e., the consequences of a favorable response. The offer should appeal to those actually involved in deciding what response to make and should be made attractive in terms of the recipient's own values. The costs of a favorable response should be minimized, and the offer should be made as credible as possible, primarily by being specific as to what is offered. The benefits of the offer should be such as to materialize soon after a favorable response, with diminishing possibilities for such favorable terms in the future.

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51
Girling, J. L. S. THAILAND'S NEW COURSE. Pacific affairs, v. 42, fall 1969: 346-359.
DU1.P13, v. 42

Examines Thailand's new flexibility in its external and internal policies. Girling cites the replacement of the former rigid stand against Communist aggression by a more moderate and flexible position and talks early in 1969 with Communist China and North Vietnam on ways of living together in peace. He sees three possible and not mutually exclusive choices for Thai foreign policy: détente, regional cooperation, or international guarantee. Thailand's position could become precarious if there is a degeneration in the Communist China-Vietnam-United States situation.

52
Gittings, John. THE GREAT-POWER TRIANGLE AND CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY. China quarterly, no. 39, July/Sept. 1969: 41-54.
DS701.C472, 1969

Communist China's foreign policy has been determined in large measure by the policies of the Soviet Union and the United States. China was never a willing puppet of Moscow, as many Westerners once believed, but entered into an alliance with the Soviet Union as a matter of necessity. Following the Korean War, which hardened China's hostility toward the West, the Chinese began to pursue an increasingly independent foreign policy directed primarily toward extending their influence in the Third World. The policies of the superpowers, particularly with regard to Taiwan, made it clear that they considered their relationship with each other more important than the relationship of either with China, that China was "the odd man out in the great-power triangle."

53
Gittings, John. SURVEY OF THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE: A COMMENTARY AND EXTRACTS FROM THE RECENT POLEMICS 1963-1967. London, New York, issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs [by] Oxford University Press, 1968. xix, 410 p. DS740.5.R8G5
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Abbreviations.--Preface.--List of documentary extracts.--Introduction: the Sino-Soviet dispute in historical perspective.--The Soviet Union and the Chinese revolution.--The Sino-Soviet treaty, February 1950.--The Korean War.--After Stalin's death, 1953-5.--The 20th Congress of the CPSU, February 1956.--The crisis in Poland and Hungary, 1956.--The Moscow meeting, November 1957.--Mao's Moscow speech, 18 November 1957.--Yugoslavia becomes the 'Mirror' of revisionism, 1958.--The Taiwan straits crisis, August-October 1958.--The great leap forward, 1958-9.--Nuclear weapons and defence, 1958-9.--The Sino-Indian border dispute, 1959.--Khrushchev's 1959 visit to Peking.--The opening of polemics, 1960.--The Bucharest conference, June 1960.--The withdrawal of Soviet experts, August 1960, and Sino-

Soviet economic relations.--The Moscow conference, November 1960.--The 22nd Congress of the CPSU, October 1961.--The Sino-Soviet border, 1962-4.--Attempts at mediation, 1962.--The Cuban crisis and the Sino-Indian war, 1962-3.--The test-ban treaty and the open break, July 1963.--Conflict in the international organizations, 1963-6.--Conflict in the international parties, 1963-6.--Tactics of the dispute until Khrushchev's resignation, 1963-4.--Tactics of the dispute after Khrushchev's resignation, 1964-6.--The second Afro-Asian conference, 1965.--Vietnam and Sino-Soviet relations, 1965-7.--The cultural revolution and Sino-Soviet relations, 1966-7.--Appendices.--Checklist of major polemical documents, 1963-7.--Select booklist.--Index.

A documentary history of the Sino-Soviet dispute with an introduction and commentary by the author. The extracts, accompanied by commentary, are selected from Soviet and Chinese writings published during the years 1963-67, while the historical documents included in the appendix cover the years 1950-62.

54
Glaubitz, Joachim. [CHINESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS. SIGNS OF ABATEMENT IN THE CONFRONTATION?] Die chinesisch-amerikanischen Beziehungen. Anzeichen einer Lockerung der Konfrontation? Europa-Archiv, v. 24, June 10, 1969: 399-408.
D839.E86, v. 24

Since the Ninth Congress of the Communist Party of China, Peking has tried to bring its country out of the isolation to which it was driven by the cultural revolution and to activate its foreign policy. Despite the continued Sino-Soviet feud, which has already overshadowed Communist China's attacks on American imperialism, prospects for Sino-American accommodation are dim because of the inability of the two nations to compromise their respective positions on Formosa. The failure of Sino-American talks in Warsaw testifies to the difficulty of reaching any bilateral arrangement on Southeast Asia. However, certain modus vivendi between the United States and Red China may result from a multilateral settlement of the Vietnamese question, for instance, which cannot be resolved anyway without China. For Great Britain and France such a settlement could be an effective instrument to untie the bilateralism of the two superpowers and pave the way for multilateralism of the "great five."

55
Golob, Ignac. THE NINTH CONGRESS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY AND CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY--ON THE OCCASION OF LIN PIAO'S REPORT. Review of international affairs, v. 20, June 5, 1969: 19-21.
D839.R4, v. 20

Cites slight innovations in Chinese foreign policy in Lin Piao's report at the Ninth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. Lin emphasized relations with the U.S.S.R., India, and other neighboring countries; hinted at a desire for a thaw in relations with the West; and stated a policy of noninterference in the affairs of other nations.

56
Griffith, William E. THE AMERICAN STAKE IN THE RUSSIA-CHINA CONFRONTATION. Reader's digest, v. 95, Sept. 1969: 89-92.
AP2.R255, v. 95

Recent Chinese-Soviet border clashes may mark a turning point in history. It is to America's advantage that after more than 20 years of regarding the United States as its chief enemy, each country now sees the other as its principal foe. The present conflict dates back to 1960 when Russia took territory and trade concessions from a weakened China. Russia, with a policy of avoiding two-front wars, is now faced with enemies on two borders 5,000 miles apart--China on the east and NATO on the west. While the Russians have superior weapons, the Chinese have almost unlimited manpower, and neither country could subdue the other. For the Russians to use nuclear missiles against the Chinese would be a political catastrophe, destructive to Soviet prestige and the world Communist movement. The Chinese would probably continue guerrilla fighting; however, they have always been anxious to avoid confrontation. "Russia and China will probably wage strident cold war for some time to come, punctuated with recurrent border conflicts." Russia is more likely to be willing to come to agreement on arms control and other issues because it cannot afford to antagonize powerful enemies on two fronts. The United States in turn should be less willing to make one-sided concessions to the Russians. China's preoccupation with Russia may lessen tensions with Peking. The United States should now demonstrate its desire for détente with Peking, but Russia remains its immediate concern. As long as the U.S.S.R. remains "an expansionist, imperialist power basically hostile to the United States," crises are bound to occur. "What has changed is that, if we [the United States] maintain our military strength, we shall be in a better position to cope with these crises."

57
Hero, Alfred O. AMERICAN NEGROES AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: 1937-1967. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 13, June 1969: 220-251. illus.
JX1901.J6, v. 13

A large number of opinion-survey data have been collated for this study in order to obtain more accurate information about racial differences in foreign policy opinions in this country. Extensive tables are presented and discussed. Negro Americans have not differed consistently from whites during the 1960s in respect to resisting Communist aggression by force if necessary, nor in their recent sentiments about military service and the cost of armaments. In recent years they have been at most only slightly more supportive than whites of the United Nations. However, Negro Americans have been more favorably inclined recently

to foreign aid, negotiation and compromise to alleviate tensions with the Communist world, admission of mainland China to the UN, intercultural exchanges, and liberalized trade and immigration. The paper attempts to interpret the shift of Negro Americans from relative isolationism prior to the 1950s to relative liberalism on foreign polciy in the 1960s. Changes in demographic, social, and political factors may account for some of this shift. Possibly more important are changes in the substance of US relations with the rest of the world, the divergent connotations of those changes among the two races, and the differential significance of the domestic race issue. (Abstract supplied)

58
Hillringhaus, F. Herbert. [WHAT'S BEHIND THE NEW AMERICAN COURSE?] Was steht hinter der amerikanischen Neuorientierung? Die Kommenden, v. 23, Aug. 25, 1969: 3-4.
AP30.K64, v. 23

Communist China's emergence as the Soviet Union's rival in Asia and the deepened Sino-Soviet feud have weakened the possibility of a world-wide confrontation between the "capitalist West" and "Communist East." In the triangular power struggle in Asia, the scale-tipper role now belongs to America. Washington has a choice of siding with Moscow to block China's climb to world power, assuring China that it would not stand aside from a Sino-Soviet confrontation, or using the tension between the two Communist powers to create its prerequisites for achieving its own political goals without war. The new U.S. administration seems to have made the third choice, which is not now convenient for Moscow; it relieves China as well as America from the danger of a Sino-American confrontation. An American military disengagement in Vietnam could force the Soviet Union to fill the new military vacuum and thus aggravate Moscow's relations with China still further, because of China's fear of direct and indirect encirclement by the Soviet Union. Partial reasons for the change in U.S. policy were domestic problems and the inflationary impact of defense spending on the national economy. As for Europe, an American-Soviet consolidation of the status quo is possible, but a viable peace and security system cannot be based on this status.

59
Ito, Shigeru. SUMMING UP OF STRUGGLES FOR RETURN OF OKINAWA AND AGAINST ASPAC. Japan Socialist review, no. 183, July 15, 1969: 3-8.
HX9.J3, 1969

Rallying a "broad-based united action" against the Japan-U.S. security treaty, which is to expire in June 1970, is a major task of the Socialist Party of Japan. There was united action in the April 28, 1969, rally for the return of Okinawa to Japan, but efforts to organize a rally against the Asian and Pacific Council did not succeed. Although the Communist Party accuses the Socialist Party of responsibility for the split that has prevented a united front, Sino-Soviet antagonisms were a factor in the split as they made it necessary for Japan's democratic movements to follow their independent judgment. However, joint struggles were partially resumed with the 1-day demonstration opposing the war in Vietnam on June 9, 1965. The Socialist Party has the task of organizing a broad based joint struggle against the security treaty in the complex situation of diverse mass movements in all parts of the world. At such a time the Socialists must "clarify their own political stand," face new problems seriously, and consolidate their ranks. A national front that can show its power to deal with the situation is the only force that can bring change to "alienated masses living in the midst of social contradictions."

60
Kaiser, Karl. [GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY AFTER THE CZECHOSLOVAK CRISIS OF 1968] Deutsche Aussenpolitik nach der tschechoslowakischen Krise von 1968. Europa-Archiv, v. 24, May 25, 1969: 353-364.
D839.E86, v. 24

Points out that the Czechoslovak crisis has demonstrated the need for peaceful order in Europe, although it interrupted efforts aimed at that order and frustrated Bonn's new Eastern policy, which sought East-West accommodation in Europe. The paradox of West German policy is "to want to accept the status quo in order to change it." Plans to change the status quo necessarily undermine the credibility of the policy to accept it.

61
Kapur, Harish. CHINA'S RELATIONS WITH INDIA AND PAKISTAN. Current history, v. 57, Sept. 1969: 156-163. D410.C82, v. 57

Following their rise to power, the Chinese Communists, as a result of their revolutionary outlook and their experience with nationalism in China, adopted a cool if not hostile approach toward the nationalist governments of India and Pakistan. As it became increasingly evident that this dogmatic policy incited India and Pakistan to seek closer ties with the West, China began to pursue a more conciliatory policy toward both nations, notwithstanding Pakistan's decision to join SEATO. By the late 1950's China was again at odds with India and Pakistan, but Pakistan, disillusioned by the lack of Western support in the Kashmir dispute, opted for closer relations with China. Pakistan and China were negotiating their common border at the outbreak of the Sino-Indian war, which, together with the Indo-Pakistani war 3 years later, greatly reinforced the entente between China and Pakistan. Faced with this entente, India has been compelled to seek aid from both the United States and the Soviet Union despite its desire to remain neutral.

62
Kotsch, William. THE TANKS OF AUGUST 1968. In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings, v. 95, May 1969: 86-93. illus.
V1.U8, v. 95

XUM

Describes the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and its effect on East-West relations. Kotsch maintains that the invasion resulted from fear of the effects of a liberalized Czechoslovakia and was a confession of failure by the Russians. He concludes that the only way to help Czechoslovakia is to "create conditions in the world which will maintain peace while permitting political change."

63
Lavrov, K. SOVIET-FRENCH COOPERATION. International affairs (Moscow) Apr. 1969: 24-30.
D839.I465, 1969

Enumerates the most important advances in the last few years in Franco-Soviet cooperation. Lavrov emphasizes the unique character of French foreign policy vis-a-vis the United States and NATO and maintains that the Soviet Union's consistent policy toward the development of relations with France recognizes that future Franco-Soviet cooperation is an important factor of European and world peace and security.

64
Liadov, I. SECURITY FOR ASIA. Soviet Union, no. 10 (235) 1969: 1. DK266.A2S574, 1969

As long as the Vietnam War continues, peace in Asia is endangered, and hostilities may flare up in the areas where the Washington-made blocs operate or in the southwestern part of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, which are virtually occupied by the United States. The U.S. "new approach" and "new Asian doctrine" are a mere continuation of John Foster Dulles' policies and are remote from the sober view of the situation in Asia. They will prove ineffective because time is working against the aggressors in Vietnam, and Washington soon may realize that a discontinuation of the war and the removal of troops is in its own national interest. The new American "half-moon" doctrine is now taking shape in the Far East, with Japan and Australia forming the far ends of the half moon, and the countries of Southeast Asia and the Pacific Basin, the crescent. Secretary William Rogers intends to set up a new military bloc to replace the disintegrating SEATO, suppress national liberation movements, and paralyze the countries' efforts to pursue their own foreign policies and relations with other countries, including the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the objectives of the Soviet policy in Asia are peaceful. The Soviet Union proposes to set up a security system for the area and seeks acceptable approaches to the problem in discussions and consultations.

65
Linowitz, Sol M. TINDERBOX IN LATIN AMERICA. Saturday review, v. 52, Aug. 16, 1969: 10-13. illus.
Z1219.S25, v. 52

The United States cannot expect to contribute to the solution of Latin America's economic problems with occasional expressions of concern and "bargain-basement tactics." Change is inevitable in Latin America. The only question is whether it will come about peacefully or violently--through programs that appeal to those willing to work for orderly and democratic growth or in reaction to programs that are designed primarily to perpetuate the status quo. The Alliance for Progress, "a magnificent concept" in itself, nevertheless betrays an unrealistic sense of optimism on the part of those who imagine that basic change can be accomplished in a relatively short period of time. Above all it is important to recognize that any U.S. aid program to Latin America must be a partnership not a handout if it is to be effective. The desire for social justice and political democracy cannot be realized without the successful implementation of economic democracy. If the United States continues to take Latin America for granted, it may very well be endangering world peace.

66
Martindale, Don. AMERICA'S MORAL AND ETHICAL STATURE ABROAD. In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. America's changing role as a world leader. Philadelphia, 1969. (Its Annals, v. 384, July 1969) p. 96-103.
H1.A4, v. 384

The modern liberal is still inclined to inquire into the moral and ethical stature of nations in the manner of the eighteenth-century social critic who presupposed the rationalism of individuals and the progress of society. Such questions do not have much meaning in the relativized world of contemporary man. America's standing among the nations of the world is an endlessly varied equation determined by time, accident, and circumstance, but, in the long run, most affected by her standing as the foremost national power with the most highly developed scientific-technical plant in the world. Nationalism is the primary source of the internal and external problems of contemporary societies and is fraught with great risks when scientific-technical competition occurs in its framework. America tends always to act to preserve the international status quo, a tendency which is not only futile in the long run, but which also tends to prevent the development of a world community and the reconstruction of local society which could turn scientific-technical developments to positive account. (Abstract supplied)

67
Meier, Christian. [THE TRAUMA OF GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY. SOVIET EFFORTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC] Trauma deutscher Aussenpolitik. Die sowjetischen Bemühungen um die internationale Anerkennung der DDR. [Stuttgart-Degerloch] Seewald [1968] 104 p. (Zeitpolitische Schriftenreihe, 5)
DD261.4.M38
Bibliography: p. 100-102.

Partial contents.--Introduction.--Soviet efforts for the recognition of the German Democratic Republic (DDR) in the phase of coexistence diplomacy, 1954-1958.--Soviet efforts for the recognition of the DDR in the phase of offensive risk, 1958-1962.--Soviet efforts for the recognition of the DDR in the phase of détente, from the end of the Cuban crisis until the fall of Khrushchev, 1962-1964.--Soviet efforts for the recognition of the DDR since Khrushchev's fall.

Describes the motives and endeavors of Soviet foreign policy in its desire for recognition of the German Democratic Republic as a state by the free world nations. Meier discusses Soviet pressure on some of those countries to recognize the DDR and unsuccessful attempts to have the latter accepted in the United Nations. He also discusses Soviet international law arguments for the acceptance of the DDR in the world community of nations.

68
Meissner, Boris. [THE "BREZHNEV DOCTRINE"] Die "Breshnew-Doktrin." Osteuropa; Zeitschrift für Gegenwartsfragen des Ostens, v. 19, Sept. 1969: 621-641. DR1.08, v. 19

Points out the contradictory tendencies of hegemony and polycentrism within the "Socialist commonwealth" of states. Meissner considers "proletarian-Socialist internationalism" and the theory of "different roads toward socialism" as interpreted under Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev and the political and international law significance of the Brezhnev doctrine, which expounds the right of the Soviet Union to interfere in the domestic affairs of other "Socialist countries." New interpretations of "counterrevolution" and "international dictatorship of the proletariat" are also discussed.

69
Merzyn, Gerhard. THE SOVIET UNION AND THE "EASTERN POLICY" OF THE FEDERAL GERMAN REPUBLIC. Atlantic community quarterly, v. 7, summer 1969: 196-202. D839.A85, v. 7

The Soviet Union's almost pathological concern with security, which is attributable to Russia's long and bloody experience of foreign invasion and conquest, manifests itself today in a consistent and successful effort to achieve strategic parity with the United States, a stubborn refusal to permit independent development to the nations of Eastern Europe, and a deep anxiety over the problem of the two Germanys. This last problem--in essence, a conflict between the Federal Republic's policy of reünification and the Soviet Union's policy of the status quo--is above all a security problem, which can be solved only within an all-European framework that includes both the Soviet Union and the United States. In seeking a solution, the West must accept the status quo "as an a priori political framework," within which it must try, first, to defuse the situation in Berlin and, second, to reduce tensions in general and open up new channels of communication with the East. Conceivably, the upcoming Soviet-American talks on strategic arms limitations will offer an opportunity to discuss broader European security questions. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was unnerving to many Westerners, but it did not alter the military balance in Europe. Furthermore, since communism's progress toward liberalization is ineluctable, the Soviet action "was erroneous from the standpoint of the actual situation and senseless from the standpoint of history." The new difficulties raised by the invasion should not deter West Germany from continuing its policy of relaxation and negotiation. At the same time, however, Germany and the West must maintain their military strength, political firmness, and spiritual cohesion, for these too are essential to peace.

70
Michael, Franz. TWENTY YEARS OF SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS. Current history, v. 57, Sept. 1969: 150-155, 182. D410.C82, v. 57

The Chinese Communists, who came to power by applying the Soviet doctrine of revolutionary warfare, at first established close relations with the Soviet Union. Initially the Chinese acknowledged their position as junior partner in the Sino-Soviet alliance, but following Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin in 1956 the Chinese became increasingly disillusioned with Moscow's policies. Mao first challenged Soviet leadership of the Communist world by instituting the "Great Leap Forward" in an attempt to have the Chinese national economy surpass that of the Soviet Union. When this policy proved disastrous, Mao moved to consolidate his support within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and began to attack the Soviet Union for its revisionism, at first through criticism of the Yugoslavs and later in widely publicized letters. The Soviet call for unity in the wake of the U.S. intervention in Vietnam provoked a crisis in Chinese politics to which Mao responded by launching the cultural revolution and instigating a purge of pro-Soviet CCP members. China has thus returned to the original doctrine of revolutionary warfare, even though, as the Soviet leaders point out, this doctrine was intended only as a means of gaining power, not as a means of governing a Communist state.

71
Miksche, Ferdinand O. [MOSCOW CONTRA PEKING--AND WASHINGTON?] Moskau contra Peking--und Washington? Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 13, July 25, 1969: 383-384. U3.W38, v. 13

In a few years, after China acquires its medium-range missiles, Japan, South Korea, Okinawa, Taiwan, a greater part of the Philippines, Thailand, Burma, Pakistan, half of India, and all important target areas in Soviet Asia to the Urals will be open to the Chinese nuclear threat. As China's potential in nuclear weapons grows, the leeway of Soviet foreign policy in Asia must diminish. In time China's

military posture will put the Soviet Union in the politically and militarily unsolvable dilemma of either acquiescing to the Chinese nuclear threat to Soviet industrial regions in Asia or starting preventive conventional war against China. Nuclear confrontation with China may then prove prohibitive for the Soviet Union, given the damage Chinese nuclear weapons can inflict on Soviet industrial regions. Logistic, economic, geographic, and ethnological factors make it impossible for the Soviet Union either to build up an adequate conventional defense of its 7,200-kilometer-long boundary with China or overrun and occupy China completely. Although in classical military terms China would appear to be a weak enemy, it could conduct a formidable and endless guerrilla war against the Soviet Union. The paramount task of Soviet strategy is to prevent such a war from happening. China's anticipated military posture and its potential impact on the Soviet Union's position in the world presumably already influence Moscow's policy toward China and Western Europe. Therefore, the Soviet Union is pressing for a European security conference that would contractually sanction the Soviet Union's preponderance in Europe and the Mediterranean before a new "power constellation" arises in the world as a consequence of China's nuclear armaments.

72
Möller, Dietrich. [THE DREAM OF A DANUBE FEDERATION] Der Traum von einer Donauföderation. Aussenpolitik, v. 20, July 1969: 424-431.
D839.A885, v. 20

Appraises the tendencies of Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia toward close cooperation in foreign policy, which grew strong prior to the Soviet intervention of August 1968 in Czechoslovakia. That trend, which possibly could have developed in the direction of a "Danube Federation" that would have included Hungary, was stopped by the Soviet invasion.

73
Ninčić, Djura. RE-EXAMINATION AND FRICTION IN THE WEST. Review of international affairs, v. 20, Apr. 5, 1969: 8-9. D839.R4, v. 20

It has become necessary to reexamine the strategic and political doctrines that have underlain the concepts and structures of Western policies for the past decade. When the U.S. atomic monopoly and the cold war became obsolete, earlier ties between the United States and Western Europe could not be restored to what they once were. Further, Western Europe's desire to be independent of the United States and America's continued preoccupation with other areas of the world have changed the character of Western relations and generated a number of new problems. Only since the beginning of this year has a greater sense of realism been discerned "in the spreading awareness that Gaullist initiatives were not disruptive undertakings . . . but . . . the expression of real needs and emerging possibilities." Although the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia stimulated retrogressive tendencies among Western policymakers, "objective development and subjective perception had already reached a point which did not allow . . . a total reversal to the old ways." However, the invasion did disrupt this objective development, and time will tell if Western statesmen can utilize their new awareness to resolve the problems facing them and their allies.

74
Nixon, Richard M., Pres. U.S. STRENGTHENING THE TOTAL FABRIC OF PEACE. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 61, Oct. 6, 1969: 297-302. JX232.A33, v. 61
Address "made before the 24th session of the U.N. General Assembly at the United Nations, N.Y., on Sept. 18," 1969.

Outlines the U.S. approach to international peace and security. Nixon discusses the Vietnam War, U.S.-Soviet détente, strategic arms limitation talks, problems of underdevelopment, the benefits of space technology, and his conception of the role of the United States in world affairs.

75
Pan, Stephen C. Y. CHINA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA. Current history, v. 57, Sept. 1969: 164-167, 180.
D410.C82, v. 57

Reviews the impact of the cultural revolution on Communist China's relations with Southeast Asia. Pan finds that not only were many states friendly to Communist China repelled by the cultural revolution but many overseas Chinese became less sympathetic as well. He notes the widespread fears evoked by China's more militant policies and the consequent interest in the Soviet proposal for a collective security system in Asia.

76
PEKING SEEKS CLOSER MILITARY TIES WITH SYRIA. Peking informers, v. 18, June 1, 1969: 4-6.
DS701.P38, v. 18

Reports that a Syrian military delegation led by Maj. Gen. Moustapha Tlass arrived in Peking on May 13, 1969, for a friendly visit, on the invitation of Communist China's Chief of the General Staff, Huang Yung-sheng. The author sees this as part of Peking's attempt to exploit and aggravate the Arab-Israeli conflict, eliminate both U.S. and Soviet influence in the Middle East, and grab the area's resources.

77
PEKING'S ADVENTURIST COURSE [editorial] Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 21, Sept. 24, 1969: 3-5. D839.C87, v. 21
Translated from Pravda, Aug. 28, 1969, p. 2-3.
Slav Rm

Declares that the Maoist-staged armed provocation on the Sino-Soviet border and the accelerated

Chinese hate campaign against the Socialist countries are designed to divert the anger of the Chinese from the harm done by the Mao government.

78
PROGRAMME OF ACTION [editorial] New times, no. 27, July 9, 1969: 1-2. D839.N483, 1969

An action program for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Soviet people was included in the resolution adopted at the June 26, 1969, plenary meeting of the CPSU's Central Committee. The CPSU attaches the utmost importance to the creation of a worldwide anti-imperialist front and for this purpose will work consistently to cement the unity of the Communist movement on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. It will wage an uncompromising struggle against the anti-Leninist postulates, divisive politics, and great power foreign policy of the present leaders of China, while maintaining friendly relations with the Chinese people. To preserve the purity of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine the CPSU will combat any deviations to the Right or Left and nationalism. In foreign policy it will stress the peaceful coexistence of states irrespective of their social systems and try to solve international conflicts by peaceful means. The doctrine of peaceful coexistence does not, of course, apply to ideologies but may broaden the possibilities of economic, trade, scientific, technological, and cultural ties, which might lead to reducing the danger of war and easing international tension. At the same time, the CPSU will support the national liberation movements of people everywhere and thus combat imperialist schemes and preserve peace.

79
Quershi, Khalida. THE CZECHOSLOVAK CRISIS, 1968. Pakistan horizon, v. 22, no. 1, 1969: 39-53. DS376.P32, v. 22

Asserts that in the occupation of Czechoslovakia the Soviet Communist Party leadership has been effectively challenged for the first time; its prestige has declined, and it is no longer the sole interpreter of Communist ideology. Quershi points out that "a stage has been reached when the monolithic structure of the International Communist movement has collapsed and polycentrism has taken its place," which is shown by the defections of Yugoslavia and Albania, and Rumania's independent attitude. He believes that control was maintained over Czechoslovakia at great cost, since only seven of the 90 Communist Parties of the world supported the Soviet action.

80
Rarick, John R. SOVIET PENETRATION OF LATIN AMERICA; WHAT ARE U.S. PLANS? Vital speeches of the day, v. 35, Sept. 1, 1969: 699-704. PN6121.V52, v. 35

Speech delivered in the U.S. House of Representatives, June 12, 1969.

A number of reports have recently appeared in American newspapers indicating that Cuba has become less interested in instigating revolution in other Latin American countries. These reports are misleading, however, because the real adversary of the United States continues to be the Soviet Union, not Cuba, and the Soviet Union has intensified its efforts to extend Communist influence in Latin America. Prior to the triumph of the Communist revolution in Cuba, the Soviet Union was resigned to a policy of "geographic fatalism" with regard to Latin America because it did not believe it possible to successfully challenge American domination there. The new Soviet policy of "creeping revolution" encourages local Communist parties to cooperate with and give conditional support to nationalist reform movements of whatever political tendency, while the Soviet Union expands its diplomatic and trade relations with more and more Latin American countries. The Soviet Union has not ruled out support to guerrilla movements but is more concerned with exerting influence among intellectuals, peasant groups, and anti-American nationalists. The United States should respond to this threat by giving aid to the stabilizing forces in Latin America instead of attacking them as undemocratic and reactionary.

81
Rohleder, Claus D. USSR'S PARTNER, RUMANIA. Central Europe journal, v. 17, Oct. 1969: 287-291. DB200.7.S74, v. 17

Under Soviet influence Rumania has developed from an industrially underdeveloped and agriculturally overpopulated country, short of capital and dependent on raw materials exports, into a modern state with both the capacity and the desire to cooperate with Western industrial nations. Despite the Soviet Union's determined efforts to integrate Rumania economically and politically within the Eastern bloc, Rumania is the only Eastern bloc state to have successfully withdrawn itself from Soviet tutelage, turning a satellite into a partner. Still, any radical change in Rumania's "Eastern anchorage," which is both economically and politically motivated, is unlikely in the near future. While the country has attained her special position by exploiting the tensions between the U.S.S.R. and Red China, she is also skilled in making the best use of frictions within the Eastern bloc. (Abstract supplied, modified)

82
Rosenau, James N. INTERVENTION AS A SCIENTIFIC CONCEPT. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 13, June 1969: 149-171. JX1901.J6, v. 13

The predominance of moral, legal, and strategic emphases in the literature on intervention is both understandable and desirable. Still largely absent, however, is a fourth emphasis upon scientific explanation. The factors that foster, precipitate, sustain, channel, constrain, and/or curb intervention have not been scientifically explored. The

first part of this paper examines the problem of the "double standard," disagreements on defining intervention, strategic analysis and the concept of the national interest, and the problem of measuring influence. The paper then offers a basis for an operational definition of intervention. It is suggested that the study of intervention is the study of the unconventional in international politics and, since unconventionality becomes conventional the longer it persists, it is also the study of finite and temporary phenomena. Furthermore, the definition of intervention can be limited to those convention-breaking behaviors which are addressed to the authority structure of the target society. The advantages of using these two prime characteristics of interventions as a basis for operationalizing the concept are numerous: for instance, it distinguishes interventions from long-term, conventionalized colonialism, and it avoids the difficulties of inferring motivations. The paper concludes with a discussion of the problems and prospects of building a theory of intervention. (Abstract supplied)

83
Schmidt, Helmut. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE. Atlantic community quarterly, v. 7, summer 1969: 184-195.
D839.A85, v. 7

That most recent reassertion of "proletarian internationalism," the so-called Brezhnev doctrine, is in truth a scarcely concealed rationalization of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. As such, it constitutes a rejection of the claims of bourgeois international law as well as a violation of those principles that the Communist States themselves had set up to govern their mutual relations. It is not surprising then that the new doctrine has come under sharp attack from Communists in many countries or that Soviet credibiliby, among Socialist and non-Socialist states alike, has suffered a sharp decline. It is difficult, however, to predict practice from doctrine. Apparently, the Soviet version of coexistence is now restricted to coexistence between hegemonic powers, but it does not follow that the Soviet Union will become more aggressive in its relations with the states of Western Europe. Those most in danger are the Communist States of Eastern Europe, which are not protected from Soviet interference by the claims of a rival hegemony. For these states, polycentrism is dead. The implications for Western policy are clear. Political unity and strength at the front must be combined with continued efforts to reduce East-West tensions and increase East-West contacts, even though these efforts must now take place within the narrower limits set by the U.S.S.R. To falter at this stage would only encourage Soviet aggressiveness and bring disaster.

84
Schreiterer, Manfred. [FOREIGN SCIENCE POLICY--A YARDSTICK OF THE FUTURE] Aussen-Wissenschaftspolitik--Massstab der Zukunft. Aussenpolitik, v. 20, July 1969: 412-423. D839.A885, v. 20

Considers the possible interactions of science policy and foreign policy. Schreiterer underlines the importance of a nation's scientific progress to its international standing and suggests that the German Federal Republic develop a special "foreign science policy."

85
Sekely, M. C. CANADA'S BIG CHINA GAMBLE. Canada month, v. 9, July 1969: 10-11.
F1001.C1623, v. 9

Canada's diplomatic recognition of Communist China will win neither friendship nor gratitude because the Chinese have always had contempt for the alien. China will promise peace and concentrate its hostility on the "capitalist-imperialist" United States and "revisionist" Russia. However, assurances of peace and friendship from a country that has never renounced the Marxist program of world revolution by force are worthless. Abandonment of Nationalist China "is a dishonorable deal" with wide political and military implications, since it sanctions in advance the armed conquest of Nationalist China in a "war of liberation." Recognition would then commit Canada at least to friendly neutrality, while the United States would be committed to support Nationalist China. Moreover, Chinese agents and terrorists who enter Canada as members of the Embassy and technical staff, trade delegations, or cultural missions could cross the Canadian border to the United States; such infiltration could disrupt the defenses of North America.

86
Seton-Watson, Hugh. RUSSIA OVER CENTRAL EUROPE. Interplay, v. 3, Aug./Sept. 1969: 11-13.
P&GP RR

First article in a section entitled "World Politics."

The belief of many Western pseudo-liberals that "the United States and the Soviet Union are two potentially benevolent giants, whose social, cultural and even political systems are growing more and more alike" is not confirmed by the evidence. Soviet leaders repudiate America's spheres-of-influence, convergence theories, and "peaceful coexistence." The invasion of Czechoslovakia, which was undertaken in the name of ideological as well as political solidarity, erased all hopes for Czechoslovakia's movement toward "coexistence." Historically, spheres of influence have worked only when peoples have genuinely accepted the protection of a power or when they were terrorized into submission. Neither axiom applies to the current situation in Europe, which is becoming one of the most explosive areas in the world because the Soviets refuse to respect national identities and cultural traditions in Eastern Europe and continue their oppression, subjugation, and exploitation of this region. The United States must convince Soviet leaders that their East European policies are fraught with mortal danger, but it must do so by basing its contacts with Moscow on the knowledge that the present leadership in the Soviet

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Union is anything but friendly. A Soviet-American dialog based on any other assumption would "strengthen the bigots and the fundamentalists and harm those Russians . . . struggling for humane policies."

87
Shirk, Paul R. THAI-SOVIET RELATIONS. Asian survey, v. 9, Sept. 1969: 682-693.
DS1.A492, v. 9

Traces Thai-Soviet relations from the 18th century to the present and notes that, despite friction over Vietnam and Laos, Thailand respects the Soviet Union. Shirk concludes that Thailand's foreign policy has always been conditioned by the influence of a great power in Asia--first Japan and then the United States--and that, should the United States pull out from Asia, Thailand would probably increase its contacts with the Soviet Union as much as possible.

88
Sisco, Joseph J. THE UNITED STATES AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE. In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. America's changing role as a world leader. Philadelphia, 1969. (Its Annals, v. 384, July 1969) p. 66-72.
H1.A4, v. 384

The United States has sought to protect its vital interests in the Middle East by seeking to prevent hostilities, to maintain close relations with all nations of the area, to limit the arms race, and to promote a just and lasting peace. The framework for a just and lasting peace is the United Nations Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967. The administration of President Nixon has pursued this objective through an intensive series of meetings with representatives of the parties concerned, through bilateral discussions with the Soviet Union, and through four-power talks in the United Nations context. All of our efforts in the bilateral and multilateral context are designed to assist Ambassador Jarring in his mandate to promote agreement between the parties on the basis of the principles of the United Nations Resolution. The great-power talks are not a mechanism to impose peace. Rather, the views expressed by the great powers could serve to narrow the differences now dividing Israel and the Arab states. (Abstract supplied)

89
Smoker, Paul. A TIME SERIES ANALYSIS OF SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 13, June 1969: 172-191. illus.
JX1901.J6, v. 13

Time series analysis is not as well developed as time point analysis in the study of international relations. This paper reviews some of the time series studies that have been done, and then offers a time series analysis of communications between decisionmaking elites in the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China during the period from 1959 through 1964. Assumptions related to freedom of decision, interaction, and reaction are specified in the explication of approach and method, and an attempt is made to relate the findings to those of experimental gaming (e.g., the "lock-in" effect). The six-year period under study showed three distinct phases. During the first period, freedom of decision was never lost by both nations at once, "lock-in" was avoided, and information overload was not apparent. The crisis associated with the situation in Tibet did not break down into war. During the second period the profiles graphed were consistent with a "lock-in" situation with information overload and loss of freedom of decision by both groups; this crisis did break down into war. Better indicators and sets of indicators within the general research design used here would provide more accuracy for shorter time periods. (Abstract supplied)

90
Snow, Edgar. MAO AND THE NEW MANDATE. World today, v. 25, July 1969: 289-297.
D410.W63, v. 25

It is too early to predict what changes in domestic and foreign policy will result from the decisions of China's Ninth Communist Party Congress. Mao Tse-tung is now firmly in command and has succeeded in destroying forever the preexisting machinery of party government. What will be put in its place cannot be determined, but it seems assured that, no matter what materials are used to construct the new governing organs, the ideological cement will be Maoist. The new party constitution "firmly upholds proletarian internationalism" and "the interests of China and the overwhelming majority of the whole world." It also declares ideological war on "the Soviet renegade clique, and reactionaries in all countries," and announces the intention to "overthrow . . . imperialism headed by the United States." These are long-term ambitions, and Mao's immediate aims are more modest. His first task is to reestablish Chinese hegemony in East Asia, and, since this can be done only at the expense of rival imperiums, outside observers who are hoping for a more flexible Chinese diplomacy are going to be disappointed. A détente policy is incompatible with Mao's support for liberation movements and people's war and with his conviction that only intransigence can win respect for China in the modern world. Not until China has gained in power and the United States has learned to stop meddling in Asian continental affairs will conditions be right for genuine reconciliation. As for the United Nations, Mao would not accept membership in that body under its present charter, even if the Taiwan and Korean issues were resolved in his favor. There would seem to be a contradiction between the Cult of Mao and any opening-up of China to foreign visitors of a different opinion. Resolution of this contradiction "depends as much on the speedy removal of those roadblocks to two-way communication long erected on our side of the great misunderstanding as it does on how and when Chairman Mao 'goes to see God'."

91
SOVIET BLUEPRINT FOR ASIA'S COLLECTIVE SECURITY. Peking informers, v. 19, July 16, 1969: 5-7.
DS701.P38, v. 19

China and the Soviet Union are engaged in active rivalry to gain domination of Asia. The initial Soviet aid to the Communist takeover of the mainland has been followed by worsened relations, to the point where the Soviet Union is regarded as China's first enemy. Russia has sent more than 20 delegations to Asian countries in an effort to set up a system of "collective security," which China sees as an anti-China military alliance for political domination by "Soviet revisionist social imperialism." This Soviet program could serve "the dual purpose of isolating Communist China . . . and of eliminating American influence." It "may foreshadow a diplomatic confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States in Asia . . . which may pave the way for Soviet encroachment on Asia" under the guise of a collective security system.

92
STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON VIETNAM; EMERGENCY ACTION CONFERENCE (STOCKHOLM, MAY 16-18, 1969) In International Institute for Peace. Active co-existence, July/Sept. 1969: 1-40.
P&GP RR

Contents.--Introduction.--Opening speech by Professor Gunnar Myrdal.--Statement by Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh, Chief of the delegation of the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation.--Statement by the delegation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.--The Nixon administration and the Vietnam War, by Franz Schurmann (U.S.A.)--Appeal.--Report of working group on action.

Statements and papers from the third meeting of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam. Myrdal discusses the activities of the conference and urges the Nixon administration to abandon its futile attempt to maintain a client government in Saigon. Madame Binh contends that the Nixon administration has intensified the American war effort in behalf of an increasingly repressive regime; she outlines the basic requirements and means for bringing peace to Vietnam. The North Vietnamese delegation deplores Nixon's war policies and supports the peace proposal presented by the National Liberation Front. Schurmann warns against the growing power of the military in the United States.

93
Toronto International Teach-In, 2d, 1966. CHINA: CO-EXISTENCE OR CONTAINMENT? Edited by John M. Robson. Toronto, Anansi, 1968. 146 p.
DS777.55.T565 1966

Proceedings of the 2d International Teach-In, University of Toronto, Oct. 14-16, 1966.

Contents.--Introduction, by John M. Robson.--Session I; Inside China: Some aspects of the remaking of man and society in China, by Han Suyin. Ideology and the revolution, by Michael Lindsay. The cultural revolution, by David Crook.--Session II; China and the emerging nations: China looks at Asia, by David Mozingo. China and India, by Hirendranath Mukerjee. China and the wars of liberation, by Felix Greene.--Session III; Chinese foreign policy: Does China have a foreign policy? by John Gittings. China's attitudes towards her Asian neighbours, by Shinkichi Eto. Mao Tse-tung's image of the world and its implications for Chinese foreign policy, by Stuart Schram.--Session IV; World reaction to China: New policy alternatives, by John Mendelson. China: the cold war and containment, by Leo Mates. The United States and China, by Charles Burton Marshall. Canada and China, by Chester Ronning.--Notes on contributors.

Explains the origins and purposes of the cultural revolution in China and reviews Chinese foreign policy since 1949.

94
Triplett, George W. AMERICA'S STAKES IN THE MIDDLE EAST. SAIS review, summer 1969: 4-11.
JX1295.J6A3, 1969

The continuing stalemate in the Middle East undermines U.S. national interests. "While supporting 2,000,000 in a small enclave . . . [the United States has] lost the friendship of 100,000,000 people . . . in an area stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Persian Gulf." It has allowed political stability to be shaken, jeopardized U.S. economic, commercial, and military interests, failed to support its statements and pledges, and sacrificed its credibility with many Arab States. By supplying Israel with American military equipment, the United States adds to a dangerous arms race; fulfillment of the agreement to sell Phantom jets to Israel will lead to war and possibly to a Soviet-American confrontation. To avoid being the prime guarantor of Israel's security the United States must insist that Israel try to negotiate. Domestic political interests have dictated traditional American "evenhanded" policies, which favor Israel and are based on superficial premises. Israel is not the only anti-Communist ally in the Middle East; it is the U.S. support of Israel that makes Arab countries unable to cooperate with the United States. That U.S. military aid is essential to Israel is disproved by Israel's show of military superiority in the June war. Part of any settlement should be the return of the United States to the position it abandoned in 1962 of not supplying weapons to any Middle Eastern country.

95
Trudeau, Pierre E. DEFENCE POLICY AND FOREIGN POLICY. In Canada. Dept. of External Affairs. External affairs bulletin, v. 21, June 1969: 249-256. JX351.A3, v. 21

From a speech on April 12, 1969, to the Alberta Liberal Association.

Describes the changes in Canada's foreign and defense policies and emphasizes the need to become

independent in both. Trudeau believes the basic aim of Canadian foreign policy should be the preservation and protection of national interests and the furthering of international peace. He cites the changing strategic picture and the undue influence of NATO as the main reasons for Canada's shift in its foreign and defense policies but reiterates that Canada is not seeking a solution to international problems through isolationism.

96
Van der Kroef, Justus M. THE GORTON MANNER: AUSTRALIA, SOUTHEAST ASIA, AND THE U.S. Pacific affairs, v. 42, fall 1969: 311-333.
DU1.P13, v. 42

Commentary on Australian foreign and defense policy, especially in regard to future defense alliances in Southeast Asia. Van der Kroef sees the Gorton policy as seeking associations to promote joint regional security while awaiting clarification of U.S. policy and qualifying the commitment to fight Communist insurgency by an implicit request for assistance from allies. Any commitment of forces is dependent on a decision by the Australian Government, and they are to be used not against another country in the area but against "externally promoted" insurgency. Van der Kroef concludes that the trend in the area is for "de-internationalization," greater national and regional leadership, inter-regional balances, and freely developed bilateral agreements; the trend in Australia is away from "continuous confrontation with Communism, suffused by an unreal anxiety about People's China."

97
Wehner, Herbert. WE SEEK UNDERSTANDING. News from Germany, v. 24, May/July 1969: 8-12.
DD257.N518, v. 24

Abridged version of a speech given before the Social Democratic Party Extraordinary Party Congress in Bad Godesberg, April 1969.

Statement of West German policy concerning German relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Wehner proposes the eradication of the Munich agreement and maintains that the solution to the problems of Germany's division can be found not in the opposition of recognition and nonrecognition but in the "perseverance to reduce tensions through understanding."

98
Windsor, Philip, and Adam Roberts. CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1968; REFORM, REPRESSION AND RESISTANCE. New York, Columbia University Press, for the Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1969. 199 p. map.
DB215.6.W5 1969b

Bibliographical footnotes.

Partial contents.--Political crisis in the Soviet Union.--The timing of the Soviet decision.--The Czechoslovak response.--The course of the resistance.--The uneasy truce.--Appendices.

Examines the Soviet decision to invade Czechoslovakia and assesses its consequences for the détente between Western and Eastern Europe and between the superpowers. The authors conclude that, whatever the outcome of the Czechoslovak situation, European détente is still worth salvaging and that "civilian resistance as a defence weapon" will have broad implications outside Czechoslovakia as well as within it.

99
Winkelmann, Egon, and Werner Knöller. [FOR SECURITY AND PEACE IN NORTHERN EUROPE] Für Sicherheit und Frieden in Nordeuropa. Einheit, v. 24, no. 7, 1969: 859-870. HX6.E4, v. 24

Points out that West Germany's revisionist policy toward central and Eastern Europe endangers the security of NATO's North European members. Winkelmann argues that without recognition of the German Democratic Republic as a sovereign state by West Germany and the West no viable security system in Europe is possible.

100
Yodfat, A. Y. UNPREDICTABLE IRAQ POSES A RUSSIAN PROBLEM. New Middle East, no. 13, Oct. 1969: 17-20. illus. DS63.1.N48, 1969

Examines recent Soviet-Iraqi relations and the problems arising from the Iraqi Government's "revolutionary" foreign policy on the one hand and internal suppression of Iraqi Communists on the other. Yodfat reviews the growth of Soviet economic and military assistance to Iraq and notes the reluctance of the Soviet Union, at least until recently, to criticize the domestic policies of the ruling Baathist party.

101
Young, Kenneth T. ASIA AND AMERICA AT THE CROSSROADS. In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. America's changing role as a world leader. Philadelphia, 1969. (Its Annals, v. 384, July 1969) p. 53-65.
H1.A4, v. 384

Asia is entering an era of its own--youthful, urban, and dynamic. The dangers of chaos or collapse seem over, largely because of the instinct for survival of Asian nationalism, as well as of the American people's support of Asia during the past thirty years. The new Asian era will bring a resumption of Asian prerogatives, a renaissance of Asian styles, and a return to the basic Asian realities of synthesis, solidity, pragmatism, and plural diplomacy. No one nation--Asian or alien--will be able to dictate Asia's destiny or the key question of Asia's future organization. Asian primacy will, indeed, replace foreign predominance. A search for accommodation and convergence beyond containment, in new forms of regional co-operation, is becoming Asia's main thrust in the 1970's. For this, we need new policies. We should reduce our increasingly obsolete and much too visible over-

XUM

presence in Asia. Instead, we should develop a new kind of relevant and modest partnership suitable to the Asian framework of this new Asian era. Our immediate need is to put our relationships with, among others, Japan, Vietnam, Thailand, and the Philippines on a better basis, and to prepare ourselves to be ready to deal, eventually, with a new leadership on Mainland China. In the future, our style and our model may be more relevant to the Asians than our vast power and resources. The most extraordinary feature of this crossroads is that some aspects of Asian modernization are becoming more like ours while, paradoxically, we are becoming more unlike Asia and the rest of the world in other respects. (Abstract supplied)

XUM

II. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

MODERN WAR

102
Girling, J. L. S. PEOPLE'S WAR; CONDITIONS AND CONSEQUENCES IN CHINA AND SOUTH EAST ASIA. New York, Praeger [1969] 244 p. maps.
DS518.1.G53 1969b

Contents.--Introduction.--The scene: revolution and intervention in South East Asia.--The model: China; conditions for success.--Success: struggle for Vietnam.--Failure: China in Maphilindo. United States in Indo-China.--Annotated bibliography.--Index.

Examines the Chinese, Vietnamese, Malayan, Philippine, and Indonesian insurgencies in terms of the Chinese model of people's war. Girling proposes six conditions necessary for waging people's war successfully--peasant support, the ability to engage in a protracted war, a national appeal that transcends the interests of any particular class, capable leadership, organization, and the breakdown or serious weakening of the existing regime.

103
Holliday, Sam C. WARFARE OF THE FUTURE. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 49, Aug. 1969: 12-17. illus.
Z6723.U35, v. 49

Assesses the significance of guerrilla warfare in the nuclear age and evaluates the role of the U.S. military in internal defense and development, which will depend on the intensity of insurgency in a specific country and that country's military forces and stage of development. Holliday concludes that insurgency can be defeated through a series of nation-building tasks whose ultimate objective is to win the people's active support for the government by organizing programs that have more appeal than those of the insurgents.

104
MOZAMBIQUE: A COUNTRY AT WAR. Contemporary issues, v. 13, July 1969: 233-252.
AP4.C685, v. 13

Sets forth the program and history of the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo), discusses the nature of Portuguese colonial policy in Mozambique, and contends that Portugal is supported in its colonial war not only by South Africa and Rhodesia but also by Great Britain, the United States, and other NATO members. It is claimed that Frelimo forces now control the northern fifth of Mozambique and are steadily expanding southward and that Portugal is able to continue its efforts to suppress the liberation movement only because of aid from various Western states.

105
Norman, F. J. [PREVENTION OF WAR AND TIMELY INTERVENTION] Army quarterly, v. 98, July 1969: 168-182.
U1.A85, v. 98
The Bertrand Stewart prize essay, 1968.

The development of nuclear weapons has made victory an empty term when applied to modern warfare. Neither arms control nor disarmament offers a realistic answer to the basic problem of the nuclear age--finding a reliable means of preventing war. The only effective means of achieving this objective at present is to maintain a credible deterrent; i.e., one which does not rely solely on nuclear weapons but includes a capability for timely intervention to prevent escalation of smaller conflicts into general war. This requires a flexible force structure, great strategic mobility, and a broadening of the instruction of professional soldiers in the political aspects of warfare.

106
O'Brien, William V. WAR AND/OR SURVIVAL. Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, 1969. xvii, 289 p.
U21.2.026
Bibliographical footnotes.

Contents.--Introduction.--The moral problem of war.--War deterrence and revolution in contemporary Catholic teaching.--A realist approach to war.--Alternatives to war: state of the question.--Nuclear war and deterrence: the moral issues.--The prospects for arms control and disarmament.--Revolutionary war and intervention.--The laws of war.--War and the Christian conscience.

Examines the basic moral factors in war. O'Brien sees the legal-organizational approach to war as defective because it tries to change the international situation before participants to a confrontation show any desire for change, and the peace-research approach as too theoretical because it applies in very different situations the findings of a questionable scientific character obtained from work with individuals and small groups. He examines the U.S. and Soviet deterrence and defense policies and concludes that they are important as long as the nations of the world make constant, serious, and sincere efforts for arms control and disarmament, which are responsible for maintaining such world order as exists. O'Brien asserts that there are Communist and U.S. mystiques of insurgency for which South Vietnam has been the testing ground and

XUM

that this conflict teaches the moral irresponsibility of intervention unless the intervener will persevere as long as there is any reasonable hope of success.

107
Osgood, Robert E. THE REAPPRAISAL OF LIMITED WAR. In London. Institute for Strategic Studies. Problems of modern strategy. pt. 1. London, 1969. (Adelphi papers, no. 54) p. 41-54.
U162.A3, no. 54

The traditional concept of war--total warfare and military victory--has changed since 1945 through the rationale of limited war, which has gained widespread acceptance in the United States and in most parts of the free world. The concept of limited war remains valid on general moral grounds: Everyone wants to prevent a nuclear holocaust. However, there are problems in the area of the feasibility and utility of strategies in limiting a particular conflict because little about these factors can be deduced from the rationale of limited war. The problem is that, although man's political imagination is constrained, "his strategic imagination is relatively free to draw its inferences and design its plans until some unforeseen war tests its propositions." Of all limited-war strategies employed in the Vietnam War, the strategy of controlled response came closest to failure because of the "inherent deficiencies of bombing as a punitive device." This strategy would have worked if Hanoi had limited objectives or if there had been a convincing prospect for nuclear war. The important lessons of the war may be drawn from its "impact on the political premises that underlay American intervention." Vietnam has taught many Americans that the premises of America's containment policy are no longer valid and that the United States is not engaged in a zero-sum contest with the Soviet Union in which a gain for the latter means a shift in the balance of forces toward the Communist bloc. Although limited-war strategies will be affected by advances in military technology, they are unlikely to change in the coming decade because of the limited number of basic strategic ideas pertaining to this type of war.

108
Veale, Frederick J. P. ADVANCE TO BARBARISM: THE DEVELOPMENT OF TOTAL WARFARE FROM SERAJEVO TO HIROSHIMA. [New ed.] New York, Devin-Adair, 1968. 363 p. U21.2.V4 1968

Contents.--Foreword, by the Very Rev. William Ralph Inge.--Foreword, by the Rt. Hon. Lord Hankey.--Author's introduction.--Primeval simplicity.--Organized warfare.--Europe's civil wars.--"Civilized warfare" (the first phase).--"Civilized warfare" (the second phase).--The splendid decision.--The Nuremberg trials.--The last phase.--Postscript.--Bibliography.--Index.

History of warfare focusing on the revival in the 20th century of primitive and barbaric practices. Veale contends that the deliberate terror bombing of population centers, which was initiated by Great Britain in 1942 and reached its climax in the U.S. atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, marked a return to the primitive practice of weakening an enemy's will to fight by massacring his women and children. He condemns the Nuremberg trials as a mockery of justice, in which the Allies reasserted the ancient right of the victor to decide the fate of the conquered without regard to established principles of international and civil law.

109
Voevodsky, John. QUANTITATIVE BEHAVIOR OF WARRING NATIONS. Journal of psychology, v. 72, July 1969: 269-292. BF1.J67, v. 72

Available evidence tentatively confirms the hypothesis that warfare is "an orderly and repetitive behavioral event." The investigation was conducted on the assumption that the time-variant system variables of modern armed conflict would prove to have the characteristics of linear second-order feedback-control systems. The vital statistics for the United States, its allies, and its enemies in five major wars were collected and put in the form of accumulated totals over time. The relationships of primary interest were those linking battle deaths to battle casualties, battle strengths to battle casualties, battle strengths to time, and the vital statistics of one side to those of the other. The plot of battle deaths against battle casualties yielded a power function, $D=gC^d$, where D and C are battle deaths and battle casualties respectively at any time, t, and g and d are constants defining the net effectiveness of offensive weapons systems over defensive countermeasures. Similarly, the plot of battle strengths against battle casualties yielded a power function, $S=aC^b$, where S is battle strength at any time, t, and a and b are constants defining the intensity of conflict in the battle zone. The plots of the vital statistics of one side against those of the other yielded a third power function, $Y=jX^k$, where Y and X are the statistics of the opposing forces at any time, t, and j and k are coupling constants. Finally, the plot of battle strengths against time yielded the exponential function

$$\frac{S(t-t_o)}{S_\infty}=1-e^{-(t-t_o)/T}$$

where S_∞ is the upper numerical limit of the forces engaged by any one side in the contest, t_o is initial time, and T is a constant characterizing the change in troop strength in the battle zone with respect to time. These four equations may be termed simple, mathematical laws of warfare. They clearly establish the contention that "war forms a pattern over time and then history repeats each pattern."

110
Weisl, Wolfgang von. [TERROR AS A METHOD OF THE MODERN CONDUCT OF WAR] Terror als Methode moderner Kriegführung. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift, v. 135, Aug. 1969: 437-447.
U3.A43, v. 135

XUM

"Terror war" is a new phenomenon for our times. Unlike terror as an age-old method of political struggle, "terror war" is directed against the population as well as political authority and aims not just to overthrow the authority or make it receptive to demands but to wear out the political enemy by a prolonged struggle. There are, however, differences between the current "terror war" of the Palestinian Arabs against the Israelis and recent wars in Malaya, Cyprus, and Algeria or the "terror war" now conducted by the Vietcong. The most obvious distinction is geographic-logistic, but the most important differences pertain to the demography of a country, the geography of its front line, and the psychological aspect of the struggle. The Jews constitute the overwhelming majority of Israel's population. Jewish settlements are completely separated from Arab ones, except in Jerusalem, and are therefore not so exposed to attack as the French or the British were in Algeria or Cyprus. Finally, unlike the French or the British, the Jews in Israel have no place to go if they lose the war--hence their determination to win it. The Geneva Red Cross Conventions of 1949 recognize as partisans only persons who are uniformed, wear their weapons openly, and are under commission of a belligerent state. Since the Arab States disclaim responsibility for acts of terror by Fatah (a military organization of Palestinian Arabs), such acts, as private enterprises, are not a concern of the U.N. authorities, but the Israeli reprisals are. Conducted by Israel's regular forces on the territory of a neighboring Arab state, the reprisals almost automatically draw condemnation by the United Nations, despite the Arab States' support of terrorist activities against Israel. Drawing from their experience in underground fighting against the British, the Israelis have prepared themselves well against guerrilla war and have been quite successful in pacifying the Arabs in occupied territories as well as in checking the infiltration of Arab terrorists from neighboring countries. However, from a strictly military viewpoint, nothing indicates an early end of the "terror war" against Israel.

MODERN WEAPONRY AND RELATED TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS

111
AWACS HEADS INTO FINAL DEFINITION AMID DEMANDS FOR TACTICAL VERSION. Space/aeronautics, v. 51, Mar. 1969: 32, 34, 36, 38, 40, 42, 44-45. illus.
TL501.A8187, v. 51

Summarizes the efforts of the Air Force and the Department of Defense to develop a new airborne warning and control system (AWACS). Systems analysts believe that the AWACS, when matched with the F-106X interceptor, "could be justified in terms of pure economics alone."

112
Atomic Industrial Forum. Committee on the Nuclear Space Program. GUIDEBOOK FOR THE APPLICATION OF SPACE NUCLEAR POWER SYSTEMS; REPORT. New York, Atomic Industrial Forum, 1969. 144, 121 p. illus.
TL1102.N8A77

Includes bibliographies.

Compilation of technical data on radioisotope and reactor power systems intended for use in space, with emphasis on power system selection and integration rather than design.

113
Bauer, E. [ARMORED DIVISIONS 1969] Blindés 1969. Revue militaire suisse, v. 114, Aug. 1969: 368-375.
U2.R5, v. 114

Uses Ferdinand Maria von Senger und Etterlin's new edition of Taschenbuch der Panzer to compare Soviet and NATO tanks within the context of the reliability of the West's flexible response strategy. Bauer gives a detailed description of the Soviet T62, an amphibious tank that is equipped with an infrared light for night travel, and criticizes the manual for emphasizing Switzerland's front-line divisions rather than its large mechanized units.

114
Beasley, Robert D. THE ARAB AND ISRAELI AIR FORCES. New Middle East, no. 12, Sept. 1969: 44-46. illus.
DS63.1.N48, 1969

Inventory and comparative evaluation of jet fighters, jet bombers, and surface-to-air guided missiles in the Air Forces of Israel, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon, including aircraft on order at present.

115
Brennan, Donald G. WEAPONRY. In Foreign Policy Association. Toward the year 2018. New York, Cowles Education Corp. [c1968] p. 1-22.
CB161.T6

Though military technology is not a safe field for long-range forecasts, there is every reason to anticipate important advances in scientific weaponry. However, methods of warfare also depend on the prevailing views on admissible kinds and uses of weapons and on international relations and security arrangements. While technical possibilities influence diplomacy, the reverse is true--diplomacy has limited the use of weapons technology. International diplomacy may interfere with military applications of future scientific developments like weather control, deep-sea technology, use of outer space, means of unidentified attacks, wholly mechanized warfare, and production of "suitcase" nuclear bombs. There are some indications that international peace may become "fashionable," though it is "premature to think that military technology is becoming unfashionable." Technology will continue to invent weapons that challenge international diplomacy.

XUM

116
Breyer, Siegfried. [DEVELOPMENT OF NEW TYPES OF WARSHIPS FOR THE SOVIET NAVY] Über die neuere Kriegsschifftypen-Entwicklung der sowjetischen Kriegsmarine. Marine Rundschau, v. 66, Aug. 1969: 250-257. illus. V3.M3, v. 66

Points out the accelerated tempo at which the Soviet Navy is closing the gap between its strength and that of the West's naval forces. Breyer expects the Soviet Navy to acquire a counterpart to America's Polaris fleet in the near future. He describes new models of Soviet warships, including some that are nuclear powered, compares them with some NATO vessels, and outlines their weapons systems.

117
Butz, J. S. THE HARRIER; VTOL GETS OFF THE GROUND. Air Force and space digest, v. 52, Oct. 1969: 50-53. illus. UG633.A65, v. 52

Describes the Hawker Siddeley Harrier VTOL strike fighters, of which Great Britain has acquired a squadron. Butz states that the U.S. Marine Corps is including 12 Harriers in its new budget request and will ask for at least 35 for fiscal 1972 and 1973.

118
Croker, F. P. DEFENCE AGAINST AIR ATTACK AT SEA. In Royal United Service Institution, London. Journal, v. 114, Sept. 1969: 69-73. illus. U1.R8, v. 114

Outlines the future of manned aircraft as a defense against an air attack at sea, the main requirements for an effective and dependable warning system, and the implications of the vertical-takeoff aircraft.

119
DIFFUSION PLANTS' DESTINY WEIGHED. Nuclear news, v. 12, Aug. 1969: 16-19. illus. QC770.N75, v. 12

Examines Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman Glenn T. Seaborg's and Comptroller General Elmer B. Staats' recommendations to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy concerning how best to deal with the matter of who will own and operate the Government's gas diffusion uranium enrichment facilities. The AEC favors a Government-owned corporation "established on a business-type basis with authority to reapply revenues and to obtain financing by borrowing either from the Treasury or by issuing revenue bonds to the public, or both." Financial calculations made by the General Accounting Office support this recommendation.

120
Estes, Howell M. MODERN COMBAT AIRLIFT. Air University review, v. 20, Sept./Oct. 1969: 12-25. illus. TL501.A5574, v. 20

A modern combat airlift capability is essential for the United States to move combat forces and equipment rapidly, in sufficient quantity, to any area in which its strategic interests are threatened. Although the C-141 is a marked advancement over earlier cargo planes, a truly modern airlift capability will not be possible until the C-5 is operational. The numerous airlift exercises of the past decade have shown the inadequacies of the Nation's combat airlift capabilities and the need for the C-5. The Vietnam War, whose course might have been radically altered by massive intervention before 1965, further proves the importance of modern combat airlift.

121
Geisenheyner, Stefan. SAAB 105--VIGGEN'S LITTLE BROTHER. Air Force and space digest, v. 52, Oct. 1969: 65-68. illus. UG633.A65, v. 52

States that excellent procurement planning on a low budget has equipped Sweden with the right equipment in the proper amount and describes the capabilities of the SAAB 105 aircraft.

122
GOVERNMENT; SOLDIERS AND SPACEMEN. Electronics, v. 42, Sept. 15, 1969: 76, 79. TK7800.K4384, v. 42

Reports that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has found military interest in its space station and space shuttle projects. NASA and the Air Force have already been "test-ballooning" the possibility of sharing some facilities and NASA is planning to supplement Air Force research funds for the shuttle project, which is scheduled to receive less than $1 million in FY 1970. However, the exact nature of military involvement in the space station and shuttle projects is not yet clear.

123
Gunston, W. T. THE CONTROVERSIAL ABM. Science journal, v. 5A, July 1969: 69-74. illus. Q1.S57, v. 5A

Traces the development of ABM systems in the United States from 1945, when the Nike series was conceived, to the present and stresses the technical side of the ballistic missile defense problem.

124
Hargrave, James R. ANOTHER BERLIN AIRLIFT? NATO's fifteen nations, v. 14, Apr./May 1969: 52-54, 57-61. illus. UA646.F5, v. 14

Visualizes a new Berlin airlift to demonstrate in a concrete way the great strides that have been made in military air transport since 1948. The new C-5A, which has a payload 18 times that of the C-47, represents the greatest advance during the period. This aircraft would enable the West

XUM

to supply an isolated Berlin without disrupting normal air traffic into the city or drawing down NATO's airlift capability elsewhere.

125
Hartley, Christopher. THE FUTURE OF MANNED AIRCRAFT. In London. Institute for Strategic Studies. The implications of military technology in the 1970s. London, 1968. (Adelphi papers, no. 46) p. 28-37. U162.A3, no. 46

The manned aircraft is still very much a part of the military picture although the high-level strategic bomber appears to be on the decline owing to costs rather than to technology. Among the errors strategists committed in determining the usefulness of future manned aircraft were the consistent underestimations of the time scale of new weapons, the inadequate allowance for the development of manned aircraft systems and tactics, and the lack of feeling for the ultimate cost of new weapons and the rate at which nations could afford to rearm their front lines. These errors continue to apply to today's discussion of the future of manned aircraft. At present the development trend of combat aircraft seems to be toward the deployment of both relatively cheap strike-fighters such as the Jaguar and the American A-7 and F-5, which are adaptations of the modern Mach 2.5 strike-fighter, and more sophisticated strike-fighters, which will be able "to exclude [enemy] aircraft from the battle zone and his own rear areas." The most important development aims for future manned aircraft are maneuverability, range-payload, and takeoff and landing requirements. Apart from these performance parameters, other areas of major importance are the ability of an aircraft to survive and penetrate, to locate targets and hit them accurately, and to be maintainable at the lowest possible cost. Tactical aircraft will continue to be functional in conventional warfare, and protective measures such as duplication and separation of systems and improvements in materials will have to be considered. "Design proposals to reduce vulnerability . . . must then be assessed in relation to their effect on cost, weight, performance and reliability of the aircraft."

126
Hersh, Seymour M. 20,000 GUNS UNDER THE SEA. Ramparts, v. 8, Sept. 1969: 41-44. AP2.R19, v. 8

The growing U.S. interest in exploiting the oceans for military purposes is reflected in the increasing amounts allotted for the Navy's oceanographic programs and in the number of defense contracts awarded for oceanographic research. Although the Navy has publicly stressed the potential commercial benefits of its undersea programs, it is clearly interested primarily in their military value, which explains the U.S. rejection of the recent Russian proposal to prohibit the extraterritorial use of the ocean floor for military purposes. The most important undersea weapon under development by the Navy is the undersea long-range missile system (ULMS). A deep-diving submarine known as the NR-1 launched earlier this year may be a prototype of the submarines to be used in the ULMS. The Navy is also investigating the possibilities of constructing undersea facilities to service deep-diving submarines and to store nuclear weapons and other materials. It may be technologically feasible to establish such bases in the ocean's bedrock in the not too distant future--a prospect that is brought closer to realization by the Navy's Sealab program, which is designed to improve man's ability to work underwater.

127
JCAE RELEASES REPORT ON AEC FY-70 AUTHORIZATION BILL. Nuclear news, v. 12, Aug. 1969: 12-13. QC770.N75, v. 12

Highlights of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy's report on the FY 1970 authorization bill for the Atomic Energy Commission. Those parts of the report that cover nuclear weapons, naval and space propulsion systems, reactor design, Project Plowshare, high-energy physics, and isotope development are discussed and a tabular summary of the budget is presented.

128
James, Francis. CHINA'S H-BOMB ZONE--FIRST ON THE INSIDE. Atlas, v. 18, Aug. 1969: 19-23. illus. AP1.A83, v. 18
Reprinted from The Sunday Times, London. Newsp

Report on China's Sinkiang Province, its nuclear installations, and the Sino-Soviet border dispute. James maintains that China's "nuclear weapons program is decisively further advanced than is generally believed in the West" and cites as evidence the development of H-bombs rather than A-bombs, operation of a gas centrifuge plant, and production of a 6,000-mile-range missile. The tension on the Sino-Soviet border has resulted from erosion of "the political buffer of peoples--Kazakhs, Uighurs, Kirghiz and the rest--who have kept the two great Asia Powers apart for 200 years." The Chinese are winning over the nomad population by immigration and friendliness. If the Chinese are successful, the buffer will have worn away and the two "great powers will confront one another directly in a region that is already of the greatest strategic importance to them."

129
Mason, John F. S-3A TO GET TOTALLY INTEGRATED AVIONICS. Electronic design, v. 17, Sept. 1969: 38, 40. illus. TK7800.E437, v. 17

States that the S-3A, now being developed, will have a totally integrated avionics system and employ computer-operated sensors and advanced displays for detection and identification, making it the Navy's most advanced antisubmarine aircraft.

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XUM

130
Moss, Norman. MEN WHO PLAY GOD: THE STORY OF THE H-BOMB AND HOW THE WORLD CAME TO LIVE WITH IT. New York, Harper & Row [1968] 352 p.
UF767.M68 1968b

Contents.--Introduction.--Should man play God?--"Something technically sweet."--The scientist: the obsession of Edward Teller.--Eastward and onward from Bikini Atoll.--Men with a mission.--Third party: drifting into deterrence.--"Ban the bomb."--The protester: the conscience of Pat O'Connell.--Two-and-a-half beaches.--Thinking thermonuclear.--The strategist: the intellect of Herman Kahn.--The nuclear cool.--Tigers in the tent.--A permanent aspect of human culture.--A note on source material.--Index.

A history of the development of the hydrogen bomb and an examination of the effects of its development on international relations and individual and social behavior. Moss relates the manner in which the momentous decision to develop the bomb was made and describes the efforts of those responsible--scientists, politicians, the military--as well as the efforts of ordinary citizens to adjust to this new reality and its implications for the future of mankind.

131
NAVY TAKES NEW TACK ON SHIPBUILDING. Business week, Oct. 11, 1969: 172-174. illus.
HF5001.B89, 1969

Assesses the significance of U.S. Navy plans to contract for the design as well as the construction of its new DD-963 class destroyer and its production in series by a single company. This new approach to procurement is expected to yield substantial savings in construction and operating costs.

132
Perret-Gentil, Jacques. [THE FORCE DE FRAPPE; ITS STATE AND PROSPECTS AFTER THE LAST HYDROGEN BOMB TESTS] Die Force de Frappe; Stand und Aussichten nach den letzten Wasserstoffbomben-Versuchen [by] J. Pergent [pseud.] Wehrkunde, v. 18, June 1969: 297-302. U3.W396, v. 18

Describes three generations of French nuclear weapons, means of delivery, and their respective strategic roles in the country's national defense. The first generation marked France's haste to acquire nuclear-power status and the second represented a transition from atomic to hydrogen weapons. The third, which contains submarine-launched ballistic missiles and hydrogen bombs in quantity, promises to be of "essential help in times of crisis," even though their explosive power will not measure up to that of the superpowers' nuclear arsenals.

133
Pittet, O. [ANTITANK DEFENSE] La défense antichar. Revue militaire suisse, v. 114, June 1969: 266-271. U2.R5, v. 114

Evaluates various types of antitank weapons and the soldier's role in armored warfare.

134
Polskoi, G. BONN CBW SCHEMES. New times, no. 38, Sept. 24, 1969: 10-11.
D839.N483, 1969

Repudiates the West German statement to the United Nations and the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament that it does not produce or possess chemical and biological weapons. Polskoi asserts that the West German chemical industry has been rebuilt "with the help of American Big Business" and is actively working to develop toxic substances and biological weapons. It is "particularly monstrous," according to the author, that the means of killing millions are being developed in the heart of Europe under NATO auspices. He concludes that "it is the duty of all mankind to thwart the plans of these enemies of peace."

135
Powell, Craig. HARRIER: THE V/STOL FIGHTER. Armed Forces management, v. 15, Sept. 1969: 59-60. illus. UB153.A65, v. 15

Reviews the development and evaluates the expected performance characteristics of the Harrier vertical and short takeoff and landing aircraft, which will enter Marine Corps service in 1971. Powell agrees with Col. Thomas Miller, head of the Marine Corps weapons systems office, that the Harrier will "drastically improve the responsiveness of [U.S.] close air support."

136
Prasad, S. P., and Paul Anton. TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE. Atlantic community quarterly, v. 7, fall 1969: 401-404.
D839.A85, v. 7

Asserts that the technological gap between the United States and Western Europe has not hampered the latter's economic growth but has injured the national pride of the European countries. The authors propose ways to bridge the technological gap.

137
REASON MUST VANQUISH MADNESS! Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 21, June 4, 1969: 14.
D839.C87, v. 21
Translated from Pravda, May 16, 1969.
Slav Rm

Report on a press conference organized by the Soviet Peace Committee and the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. on the consequences of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological weapons and the struggle for their prohibition. Academician M. M. Dubinin expressed the concern of the Soviet public over the preparations carried out by several

countries for chemical and bacteriological war. A letter from Soviet scientists that exhorts all scientists in the world to expose the activities of those who propagandize chemical and biological warfare as "humane" or produce and stockpile chemical and biological weapons secretly is included. The letter also emphasizes the need for the scientists' cooperation in bringing about in the United Nations the adoption of a resolution to ban the development, manufacture, stockpiling, and transmission of any type of these weapons.

138
Rifkin, Susan B. THE DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. In International Research and Technology Corporation. IR&T nuclear journal, v. 1, no. 4, 1969: 1-24.
P&GP RR

Traces the basis of nuclear research in Communist China by examining the political and social contingencies that prompted the Chinese to undertake a nuclear program and by discussing the manpower, material, educational, and cost factors involved in this decision. Rifkin concludes that China's nuclear program has not only provided it with a valuable source of energy for both civilian and military purposes but has proved that a nonindustrial nation can be brought "to the threshold of a modern industrial and military capability in a short period of time."

139
Sartori, Leo. THE MYTH OF MIRV. Saturday review, v. 52, Aug. 30, 1969: 10-15, 32.
Z1219.S25, v. 52

While there can be no doubt about the military effectiveness of the multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV), it is equally clear that deployment of MIRV's by either superpower would lead to a radical escalation of the nuclear arms race. MIRV's would increase the advantage of an attacker and contribute to a potential first-strike capability, thereby threatening the present nuclear stalemate. The United States, whose diverse deterrent forces provide a reasonable guarantee against a Soviet first-strike capability in the near future, appears to be ahead of the Soviet Union in its testing of MIRV's. Since the Soviet Union is unlikely to agree to a ban on testing once it is convinced that the United States is ready to deploy MIRV's, it is imperative that the United States declare a temporary halt to its tests at once. This would not compromise the Nation's security and might create a favorable atmosphere for agreement on permanent nuclear arms limitations.

140
Schriever, Bernard A. TECHNOLOGY AND AEROSPACE POWER IN THE 1970'S. Air University review, v. 20, Sept./Oct. 1969: 51-57.
TL501.A5574, v. 20

Progress in U.S. military technology has been significantly slowed during the past 8 years by the attempt to reach a political détente with the Soviet Union by minimizing U.S. strategic superiority and inhibiting the development of new weapons systems. A 1963-64 Air Force study, Project Forecast, recommended that priority be assigned to research and development in materials, propulsion systems, aerodynamics, electronics, nuclear weapons, and lasers. These priorities remain valid today, and the U.S. potential for progress in these fields is enormous.

141
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. REVIEW OF ARMY TANK PROGRAM. Report of the Armed Services Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Ninety-first Congress, first session, under authority of H. Res. 105. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1969. 39 p.
UG446.5.U6556
At head of title: Committee print.

Contents.--Security clearance.--Background.--Findings and conclusions.--Recommendations.--The Sheridan weapon system.--Three key milestones.--A compromised design.--Why the Sheridan in Vietnam?--The Vietnam tests.--M60A1E1/E2 tanks.--The trainer, another miscalculation.

Investigates the causes of delays in the Army's tank modernization programs and evaluates the Sheridan/Shillelagh weapon system, which has become the foundation for other important tank improvement programs. The report states that serious doubts have been raised "as to the immediacy of any threat [from the Communist bloc] which would justify the development of the Sheridan/Shillelagh on a 'crash' basis" and that the Army ordered mass production of the Sheridan and M60A1E2 tanks before there was adequate assurance that their designs were suitable.

142
Ulsamer, Edgar E. V/STOL'S TIME HAS COME. Air Force and space digest, v. 52, Oct. 1969: 54-57. illus.
UG633.A65, v. 52

Since 70 percent of the world's airways are too short to accommodate conventional aircraft and in combat conditions helicopters and airdrops are costly in men, materiel, and supplies, the commercial and military need for the V/STOL (vertical/short takeoff and landing) aircraft is apparent. High development costs and low priority have caused delays, but the Air Force is developing a LIT (light intertheater transport) V/STOL with the capabilities of a fixed-wing aircraft or helicopter. If the program is approved the LIT will be put into production in 1973.

143
Wells, Robert D. SOVIET SURFACE COMBATANTS. In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings, v. 95, July 1969: 87-102. illus.
V1.U8, v. 95

XUM

Presents 16 of the most important types of Soviet warships--from the helicopter carrier Moskva to the Komar and Osa class missile boats.

144
WHO'LL OWN ATOM FUEL SUPPLY? Business week, June 14, 1969: 136, 138. illus.
HF5001.B89, 1969

What is to be done with the U.S. Government's uranium enrichment facilities? Some interests would like to see them transferred to private industry; others would prefer to have them put under a new Government corporation. The Government-owned plants now produce mostly for private firms, and some consumers are concerned that the civilian demand will outrun the Government's supply capacity long before a budget-minded Congress gets around to appropriating the funds needed to expand output. These fears help explain the demand from some quarters for a sale to private industry, though it is evident that the profit motive is also a factor. Those who would prefer a Government corporation are worried that sale of the enrichment facilities to private industry will lead to the establishment of a powerful oligopoly. Atomic Energy Commission member James T. Ramey, who leans toward the Government corporation idea, has argued that this is the wrong time for the Government to sell the plants. The sale price would be too low, and oligopoly would be encouraged. Furthermore, the classified information necessary to the operation of the plants would not be available to the commercial purchaser. The picture is complicated somewhat by the plans of some European states to construct their own enrichment facilities, the motive for this being their fear that the U.S. Government is on the verge of selling out to private industry. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy has scheduled hearings to thrash out the competing claims in this controversy.

145
Wohlstetter, Albert. STRENGTH, INTEREST AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES. In London. Institute for Strategic Studies. The implications of military technology in the 1970's. London, 1968. (Adelphi papers, no. 46) p. 1-14. U162.A3, no. 46

There is no static technological plateau in nuclear weaponry. Changes in basic elements of military systems--e.g., computers and solid state electronics and microelectronics--have reduced costs in addition to improving upon old techniques. These changes, which have several important implications for both nuclear and nonnuclear nations, have particularly affected the ability of nations to wage distant wars with conventional as well as nuclear weapons. Distant wars will become even less of a problem with the introduction and widespread use of communications satellites and long-range transports such as the C-5A. Moreover, cultural and economic ties are not necessarily a function of distance. New high-payload jets will further reduce the time and expense of passenger travel, and huge oil tankers and cargo aircraft will drastically lower the costs of transporting freight. These factors militate against arguments for economic autarky and cast doubt on both the new isolationism and attempts to foster a "mechanical regionalism." The most critical impact of improved technology will be in the area of national security. Since it will be possible to fight both conventional and nuclear wars at greater distances, the area regarded as vital to a nation's security will necessarily expand. The most effective means of maintaining peace in these circumstances will be long-distance commitments that protect nonnuclear states from nuclear coercion or attack. Such commitments are admittedly not ideal, since they impinge on the autonomy of both the protecting and protected states, but they are essential to preserve order and retain as many options as possible.

NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES AND MILITARY STRATEGIES

146
ASPAC CONFERENCE. Asian almanac, v. 7, Oct. 18, 1969: 3601-3604. DS1.A4752, v. 7

Report on the Fourth Ministerial Conference of the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC), held from July 9 to 11, 1969, in Japan. Agreement was reached to try to strengthen the political, economic, and social structures of ASPAC countries and reduce tension in the area.

147
Ashworth, George W. WHAT SECRETARY LAIRD IS DOING TO MCNAMARA'S PENTAGON. Navy, v. 12, July/Aug. 1969: 26-29. illus. VA49.N28, v. 12

Describes changes that Secretary Laird hopes to make in the U.S. Defense Department. Laird would like to institute more effective cost controls, modernize U.S. weapons systems, reduce U.S. force levels in Vietnam, set new strategic objectives and force levels, and restore military professionals to positions of influence in the Pentagon.

148
Bell, Coral. THE ASIAN BALANCE OF POWER: A COMPARISON WITH EUROPEAN PRECEDENTS. London. Institute for Strategic Studies, 1968. 14 p. (Adelphi papers, no. 44) U162.A3, no. 44

Although Communist China's central position, hugh population, imperial traditions, and revolutionary ideology raise doubts about the feasibility of constructing a workable balance of power in Asia, the alternatives are so uninviting that it is worthwhile to reexamine the merits of this transplanted European security concept. An Asian balance of power system would give Asians themselves primary responsibility for their security. It would have to be based on the concept of mainland "redoubts," which would consist of several of the more progressive and stable states of the

XUM

region. Clearly Asian states could not sustain this system alone, at least not without nuclear weapons; if nuclear proliferation is to be prevented and the region stabilized, some support must come from the outside. But outside power is also required for a reason that transcends regional problems and issues. There are limits to any approach to Asian security that sees China merely as a regional power with regional ambitions. The thoughts of Mao Tse-tung lay claim to universality; Chinese foreign policy attempts, within the limits set by the available means, to give substance to this claim in the realm of action. It would be unrealistic to suggest that the business of coping with Chinese ambitions can be left to a regional grouping; the problem involves all major powers, not the least of which is the United States. But does America have the political will to assume the burden? American involvements in Asian affairs often have seemed disproportionately large in relation to real U.S. interests there, but, "if the United States has involved herself so readily in the past against some rather shadowy threats, it is difficult to believe that she will cease to do so in the period when the threat has at last assumed substance."

149
Boll, Michael M. THE DILEMMA OF THE WARSAW PACT. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 49, July 1969: 89-95. illus. Z6723.U35, v. 49

East European members of the Warsaw Pact are pushing for greater equality in the Organization's military planning as evidenced in the differences between the Soviet Union and the pact countries that dominated a 2-hour meeting in Budapest, March 17, 1969. Rumania was the major barrier to pact solidarity until the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, which "introduced a new unknown into future pact activities" and proved that the alliance could be used against one of the signatory nations. Further, the Sino-Soviet conflict has caused Soviet troops to be diverted away from their European assignments, thus spreading rumors that pact forces might be used for garrison duty in the East. It appears that Soviet efforts to achieve pact integration and cooperation will continue, but it is questionable whether the current trends toward disunity can be stemmed.

150
BRITAIN'S ROYAL NAVY GETS NEW LEASE OF LIFE. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 14, Aug./Sept. 1969: 14-18. illus. UA646.F5, v. 14

Speculates about the future of the British Navy. The Labour government's program of reducing and redeploying Britain's naval forces is nearly completed so that the fleet as it is today represents the most probable pattern of the future. However, the Royal Navy's new "jump-jet," the Harrier, which promises to revolutionize naval aviation, may yet save the fleet air arm from extinction.

151
Brittain, Victoria. THE PENTAGON UNDER FIRE. New statesman, v. 78, Aug. 22, 1969: 240-241. AP4.N64, v. 78

The current disorganization and scandals within the U.S. military establishment have given rise to an antimilitary campaign among many members of Congress. The Green Beret case in Vietnam, the disclosure of an explosive racial situation in the Army, the alleged misuse of millions of dollars in noncommissioned-officers clubs, together with the secret pact with Thailand that could further involve American troops in Southeast Asia, have contributed to this movement. Congress no longer functions as a rubber stamp where military matters are concerned; congressional investigations into military spending and procurement have sent the four-star generals in the Pentagon "digging into their bunkers." However, as long as the President and the Department of Defense back each other, the votes in Congress regarding military matters will come out as President Nixon wants them to.

152
Brodie, Bernard. TECHNOLOGY, POLITICS, AND STRATEGY. In London. Institute for Strategic Studies. Problems of modern strategy. pt. 2. London, 1969. (Adelphi papers, no. 55) p. 21-29. U162.A3, no. 55

Systems analysis has failed to clarify the strategic and political implications of technological advances in weapons design and systems since World War II because the strategic questions that quantitative techniques help to solve are less important "than the questions which normally are answered out of the simplest kind of intuition and bias." In the case of the Vietnam experience, these techniques--war games, scenarios, and cost-effective analyses--failed to take into account the pitfalls that the United States has already encountered in this war. They failed to warn administration officials of the effect of frustration from denial of victory or of supporting through military action a "series of regimes which show a high common denominator of corruption and ineptitude." Quantitative studies are preoccupied with technology rather than strategy, and the result, in the Vietnam War, has been that strategists have concentrated on ways to utilize technological superiority instead of on methods for solving tactical problems. Another great weakness in U.S. military policy in Vietnam is that it is based on the draft. The United States should have a professional army in which the incentive to enlist is higher pay. The most important lessons of the war are that nations can learn from history whether or not to become involved in conflicts and that, while technology is very important, "it falls very short of being the name of the game which is strategy."

153
Brown, Neville. ANGLO-FRENCH NUCLEAR COLLABORATION? World today, v. 25, Aug. 1969: 351-357. D410.W63, v. 25

XUM

What is the outlook for Anglo-French nuclear collaboration since De Gaulle's retirement? On the negative side, there is the problem of fitting France into the U.S.-British "special relationship" as it applies to nuclear weapons, and the countries' nuclear weapons programs are at different stages of development. On the positive side are the Gaullist sympathy for some form of Anglo-French nuclear cooperation, the general symmetry of the two forces, particularly as reflected in future dependence on nuclear submarines, and the greater strategic effectiveness of a merged force over two separate ones. Besides other advantages, collaboration would increase the prospects for arms control. An Anglo-French force would eliminate the need for further French nuclear testing, make possible a security guarantee to the nonnuclear powers separate from that given by the superpowers, reduce the hazards of negotiated East-West army reductions in Europe, and serve as a tradeoff for acceptance of strategic arms limitations by the superpowers. A major hurdle to collaboration is institutional control, which raises the broader question of the political organization of Europe. What kind of institutional future do Europeans want? If Anglo-French nuclear collaboration is to be tried, these questions cannot be avoided.

154
Buchan, Alastair. NATO AND EUROPEAN SECURITY. Orbis, v. 13, spring 1969: 68-75.
D839.068, v. 13

Considers the principal problems that NATO will have to confront in the next decade. Buchan states that, although NATO's future appears more assured than it was 2 years ago, the alliance will become increasingly difficult to manage unless it has a coherent political objective that is acceptable to the postwar generation. He concludes that the two alliance systems in Europe are permanent and that they should be used as systems of crisis management "until the point is reached when a bridge can be built between them." This bridge could take the shape of a European security council that would have certain explicit functions but would not destroy the residual security provided by the two organizations.

155
Canstein, Raban, Freiherr von. [AN INDIRECT THREAT] Indirekte Bedrohung. Wehrkunde, v. 18, July 1969: 342-344. U3.W396, v. 18

Points out that NATO can be endangered by the effects of repressive Soviet measures within the Warsaw Treaty Organization and Soviet intervention in uncommitted nations and distant areas like the Mediterranean. Canstein examines NATO's Yugoslavian and Mediterranean policies and stresses the importance of deescalating the Near East crisis.

156
Cherniavskii, V. "UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE" IN EUROPE. New times, no. 39, Sept. 30, 1969: 13-15. illus.
D839.N483, 1969

A top-secret Pentagon plan entitled "Command of Support Operations Task Force Europe (COMSOTFE) Operational Plan Nr. 10-1," which is patterned after Nazi strategy, designates centers for unconventional warfare by sabotage, acts of terrorism, subversive propaganda, and psychological warfare to support conventional warfare by U.S. military forces. These centers are to be established not only in neutral and Socialist countries but in the countries of the NATO Allies as well. Disclosure of this plan proves the need for adoption of the proposals to secure lasting peace on all continents that the U.S.S.R. has presented to the U.N. General Assembly.

157
Chilton, A. B. FALLOUT AND WEAPONS RADIATION SHIELDING. International civil defence, v. 16, May 1969: 1-4. UA926.I488, v. 16
Reprinted from Nuclear News, Feb. 1969. QC770.N75

Examines fallout- and initial-radiation-shielding and the progress technology has made in protecting population centers against radioactive fallout caused by a nuclear explosion. Chilton concentrates on fallout protection since the Office of Civil Defense "does not . . . have any definite program of providing public protection against the initial radiation emissions" the way in which the shielding capabilities of structures are gaged to determine the "protection factor" of a shelter. The most disconcerting facts regarding fallout technology are the steady decline of government-sponsored research and development programs and the lack of qualified and certified analysts.

158
Cippico, Aldo. CIVIL EMERGENCY PLANNING IN NATO. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 14, June/July 1969: 26-28. UA646.F5, v. 14

Describes and evaluates NATO's civil emergency planning program. Civil emergency planning encompasses the problems of civil defense, post-attack recovery, and peacetime and wartime civil support of the operating military forces. NATO's role in these matters is purely advisory; decisionmaking authority remains with the separate governments, and, while much progress has been made in some areas, most states, for reasons of their own, have been laggard in providing civil defense protection for their populations.

159
Cleveland, Harlan. [NATO'S FUTURE] L'avenir de l'OTAN. Revue des deux mondes, July 1, 1969: 3-9. AP20.R3, 1969

Discusses NATO's role in achieving European peace and security and outlines the differences between the alliance and the Warsaw Pact. Cleveland asserts that, before there can be any international conference to deal with the problems that separate Eastern and Western Europe, several

XUM

preliminary steps must be taken by both sides to ensure that such a conference will not degenerate into a propaganda forum. He notes that without NATO the equilibrium of forces that now exists in Europe would be upset in favor of the East but that, if the pact were to be dissolved, which is highly improbable in view of Czechoslovakia, there would no longer be any need for NATO. He concludes that the future direction of NATO will be that of Western Europe.

160
THE CON GAME OF "WITHDRAWAL" FROM VIETNAM. I. F. Stone's weekly, v. 17, Sept. 22, 1969: 1, 4.
E740.I2, v. 17

The primary objective of the Nixon administration's Vietnam policy is neither a negotiated settlement nor "Vietnamization" of the war but rather the appeasement of American public opinion so that the United States can maintain a sizable though reduced military presence in Vietnam indefinitely. Herman Kahn suggested such a strategy over a year ago, and Secretary of Defense Laird spoke recently of retaining some 250,000 U.S. troops in Vietnam "for an extended period." Senate critics such as Albert Gore and J. W. Fulbright have already pointed out that this policy makes a negotiated settlement of the war impossible, and the American peace movement also appears to have become more aware of the policy's implications in recent weeks.

161
CONTRADICTIONS BETWEEN THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE AND THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY. Peking informers, v. 18, Mar. 1, 1969: 1-5.
DS701.P38, v. 18

Describes indications that a new kind of power struggle is developing in Communist China between the two arms of the Maoist power structure--the armed forces and the Revolutionary Committee. The target of the military is the Revolutionary Committee's promotion of army withdrawal "as soon as the political power is established."

162
Davis, John E. SO THAT MILLIONS CAN SURVIVE; CIVIL DEFENSE IN 1969. Army, v. 19, July 1969: 48-55. illus.
U1.A893, v. 19

Examines the need for a civil defense program and summarizes the plans of the Office of Civil Defense. Davis points to the necessity of civil defense in an age when nuclear weapons that can be delivered accurately as far as 10,000 miles are being or can be developed by a growing number of countries. While a nuclear attack is not probable, it is possible. The civil defense program is aimed primarily at saving as many lives as possible, and the law also provides that it is to deal with emergency conditions and effect emergency repairs to vital utilities and facilities. Since no place can be certain of escaping exposure to fallout, the emphasis is on the development of a nation-wide fallout shelter system, which focuses on using existing structures. Davis concludes that a nation-wide fallout-shelter system is vital to defense against nuclear attack "regardless of what other decisions are made with respect to strategic defense."

163
Dayan, Moshe. JEWISH-ARAB COEXISTENCE. Midstream, v. 15, June/July 1969: 26-39.
DS149.A336, v. 15

An address to students in Haifa delivered Mar. 19, 1969. Discussion included.

Examines the military, economic, and social situation in Israel and urges closer cooperation with Arabs living in Israeli-occupied territory. Dayan is confident that Israel can maintain its present military position indefinitely provided it pursues a humane and tolerant policy designed to win the confidence of the Arab population.

164
DOCUMENTS [OF THE TENTH NATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE KUOMINTANG] Free China review, v. 19, May 1969: 71-76.
DS701.F74, v. 19

Contents.--The Kuomintang political platform, adopted by the Tenth National Congress of the Kuomintang.--Declaration of the 10th National Congress of the Kuomintang.

A pronouncement of the basic policies of the Kuomintang and an indication of the methods by which the party intends to establish a secure base on Taiwan in preparation for an eventual attack on the mainland and the overthrow of the Maoists. The declaration asserts that the Maoists constitute only a small ruling elite that currently seeks to divert intense internal discontent by provoking border conflicts with the Soviet Union. The party declares that the Maoist regime threatens not only the peace of Asia but the very existence of mankind. It calls for the "construction of the bastion of national recovery" on Taiwan, "promotion of warfare behind the enemy frontline," and "acceleration of the overseas anti-Communist struggle."

165
Eichstädt, Ulrich. CIVIL EMERGENCY PLANNING IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY. NATO letter, v. 17, July/Aug. 1969: 2-7. illus.
D845.2.A44, v. 17

Examines West Germany's civil emergency and overall defense plans, which have both national and NATO sectors.

166
Ellsworth, Robert. THE FUTURE OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. Atlantic community quarterly, v. 7, fall 1969: 315-320. D839.A85, v. 7

XUM

Address at Westminster College, Fulton, Mo., May 10, 1969.

Looks at the future role of the Atlantic alliance, stressing the need for greater political consultation among NATO members to enlarge the organization's role in resolving educational, social, and environmental problems. Ellsworth concludes that NATO should help the Western nations better to understand the effects of man's industrial society on his environment.

167
Engelien, Fritz. [EFFECTS OF THE FRONTLINE DEFENSE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE] Auswirkungen der Vorneverteidigung auf die nationale Verteidigung. Wehrkunde, v. 18, July 1969: 345-349.
U3.W396, v. 18

Considers NATO's forward defense strategy, designed to prevent the Soviet front line from moving deep into NATO territory from the East-West German demarcation line. Engelien discusses the problems of refugees, survival, manpower, and logistics in terms of this strategy, which was adopted by NATO after the Federal Republic joined the alliance. The strategy makes optimal use of West German material and human resources and poses a greater risk of escalation to the aggressor.

168
Fant, Joseph L. US OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE STRATEGY. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 49, Sept. 1969: 31-42. illus.
Z6723.U35, v. 49

Gages the adequacy of U.S. strategic offensive and defensive forces in relation to the Soviet and Communist Chinese nuclear threats. From a survey of the mix of weapons systems that are now, or soon will be, available to each side, Fant concludes that, unless the United States takes immediate steps to improve both its offensive and defensive capability in nuclear war, the strategic balance will shift decisively in favor of the Soviet Union within the next decade.

169
Fetov, V. IS THE ARMY A RELIABLE SUPPORT FOR MAO? Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 21, July 30, 1969: 19-21. D839.C87, v. 21
Translated from Literaturnaia gazeta, no. 27, July 2, 1969, p. 13.
Slav Rm

Internal strife in the Chinese Army, which has gone through several critical periods, contradicts the claim that it is "the finest instrument in Chairman Mao's hands." The Maoist leaders have extended the political check of officers to the ranks, instituted political screening of draftees, and established special forces to reeducate the troops and eliminate civilian anti-Maoism. Meanwhile anti-Maoists in leadership positions take advantage of the confusion caused by bewildering, contradictory instructions and the reactions of illiterate peasant soldiers to constant drilling and propaganda. Difficulties between the Army and the people have reached the point of daily Maoist appeals not to attack Army detachments.

170
Fourquet, Michel. [THE USE OF DIFFERENT RETALIATORY SYSTEMS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF STRATEGIC DETERRENCE] Emploi des différents systèmes de forces dans le cadre de la stratégie de dissuasion. Revue de défense nationale, v. 25, May 1969: 757-767.
D410.R45, v. 25
Lecture delivered on March 3, 1969, at the Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale.
See also item 198 in this bibliography.

Rejects the strategic doctrine that had been upheld by his predecessor, General Ailleret, at the end of 1967. Fourquet asserts that France should abandon its "all-points defense" in favor of a strategy of flexible response in cooperation with its NATO allies. He admits that a graduated response to moves by an adversary could precede and prepare for a strategic strike and clearly refers to the "enemy coming from the East" against whom France's conventional forces would be engaged in coordination with those of its allies.

171
FOURTEENTH MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY. Report of the United States Delegation to the Fourteenth Meeting of Members of Parliaments from the North Atlantic Assembly countries, held in Brussels, November 11 through November 15, 1968, pursuant to Public law 689--84th Congress, March 28, 1969. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1969. 104 p. P&GP RR
At head of title: 91st Congress, 1st Session. Committee print.
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations. P&GP RR

Contents: The U.S. delegation.--Assembly action.--Assembly officers.--Appendix I. Financial statement.--Appendix II. Reports, recommendations, and an order adopted by the Assembly.

Report of the U.S. delegation to the 14th meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly, formerly known as the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference.

172
Freund, Ludwig. [CASUS FOEDERIS AND THE "RIMLANDS" THEORY] Der Casus foederis und die "Randländer"-Theorie. Wehrkunde, v. 18, June 1969: 292-297.
U3.W396, v. 18

NATO's casus foederis is to a great extent open to arbitrary interpretations, which may well determine the fate of the alliance. So far NATO has proved to be remarkably durable for a military alliance, despite some centrifugal forces. Still, its satisfactory performance in deterring Soviet

aggression may lead to a feeling of false security among the Allies. Above all the continuation of the alliance depends on their perception of their vital national interests. To America and the other Allies, the German Federal Republic is worthy of defense because of Germany's key geographical position. This becomes apparent upon examining Nicholas J. Spykman's "rimlands theory," which asserts that concentric control of Eurasia's shore countries ("the rimlands") determines domination over the Eurasian heartland and the world. Many influential Americans believe that such control in the hands of a potential or actual enemy would isolate the United States strategically, economically, and politically and reduce it to vassalage. Some aspects of the rimlands theory should be "diplomatically utilized in [West] German relations with the United States and other allies" to underpin the German Federal Republic's defense posture and policy, for only a combination of "adequate armaments with an adequate and psychologically effective modality of the alliance policy and foreign policy" can produce adequate security. The development of ICBM's and nuclear weaponry and the growth of the Soviet naval power have invalidated Spykman's thesis only for those situations in which the use of "ultimate weapons" or the nuclear ultimatum comes into play. Such a situation in Europe is improbable for the time being, provided that public opinion in NATO countries does not fall prey to its own illusions and Soviet détente maneuvers.

173
Genda, Minoru [interview] "JAPAN RELIES UPON THE U.S. TOO MUCH FOR HER DEFENSE." U.S. news & world report, v. 67, Oct. 27, 1969: 93-94.
JK1.U65, v. 67

Responds to questions on Japanese defense policy. Genda believes that Japan should assume more responsibility for its own security but that an alliance with the United States remains indispensable. He opposes the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Japan and strongly favors strengthening the Japanese Self-Defense Force.

174
Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. Center for Strategic and International Studies. NATO AFTER CZECHOSLOVAKIA. Washington, 1969. 98 p. (Its Special report series, no. 9)
UA646.3.G35

Contents.--Preface.--Members of the panel.--pt. 1. Policy findings and recommendations: Introduction, by Livingston T. Merchant. Political policy findings and recommendations. Findings and recommendations on strategy. Economic findings and recommendations.--pt. 2. The background report: The mood of Europe. Strategy for the alliance. The economics of the alliance. Europe's drift--and America's.--pt. 3. Additional statements by individual panelists.

Report by an 18-member panel on the status of NATO after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. While acknowledging the seriousness of the problems confronting NATO, the panel was optimistic that the problems can be resolved satisfactorily if NATO members have the will.

175
Glaubitz, Joachim. [THE NINTH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA] Der neunte Parteitag der Kommunistischen Partei Chinas. Europa-Archiv, v. 24, Aug. 10, 1969: 541-552.
D839.E86, v. 24

Outlines, among other things, Communist China's war doctrine as propounded by Lin Piao at that country's Communist Party Congress, held in April 1969, in Peking. The aggravation of "contradictions" between "world city" and "world village" must eventually lead, according to Lin, to world revolution. China will not try to start the third world war, but, should such a war be launched by "imperialists, revisionists and reactionaries," it would only speed up the world revolution to which China will contribute. Although Lin sees American imperialism and "Soviet revisionism and renegades" as paper tigers, they should not be dismissed as harmless for the time being at least. As to the Sino-Soviet boundary problem, Lin contends that the confrontation between the two countries should be avoided; until the final settlement of the issue the status quo should be maintained.

176
Görlich, Joachim G. [POLAND'S DEFENSE POTENTIAL] Polens Rüstungspotential. Wehrkunde, v. 18, Aug. 1969: 416-417. U3.W396, v. 18

Outlines the Polish defense industry's development since 1949, its main lines of production, and export markets. Görlich discusses the education of new Polish officers and points out the heavy infiltration of Poland's missile and artillery units by Soviet military "advisers."

177
Gordon, R. W., and H. J. Porter. DEPLOYMENT STUDIES --A MODERN APPROACH. In Royal United Service Institution, London. Journal, v. 114, Sept. 1969: 67-69. U1.R8, v. 114

Illustrates the computer-analysis technique of linear programming used by Britain's Defense Operational Analysis Establishment to study the most effective and economical combination of ships, aircraft, and stockpiles for a military deployment program.

178
Gouré, Leon. SOVIET EMERGENCY PLANNING. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 14, June/July 1969: 30-33, 36-37. illus. UA646.F5, v. 14

Describes and evaluates the Soviet Union's civil defense program. The Soviet Union is committed to

the view that "civil defense is an important strategic capability which helps to ensure national survival and victory in a nuclear war." While it is impossible to determine from peacetime observations how effective the Soviet program would prove to be in war, there is no gainsaying that the U.S.S.R. has had active civil defense programs for many years and has expended a considerable amount of time, resources, and imagination in devising countermeasures to nuclear, chemical, and biological attack.

179
Gretton, Peter. SEA POWER IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND SOUTHERN ATLANTIC. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 14, June/July 1969: 10-13. illus.
UA646.F5, v. 14

Discusses the implications of the shift in the balance of power in the Indian Ocean brought about by the British withdrawal East of Suez. Gretton notes the increase of Soviet naval activity in the Indian Ocean and adjacent seas and recommends that NATO counter this Soviet penetration by maintaining a naval capability of its own in the area and by strengthening the naval forces of the states of the South Atlantic and Indian Ocean littoral. He also points out that, since the southern routes to the East have increased in importance many times over with the closing of the Suez Canal, NATO ought to persuade the Union of South Africa to modify its apartheid policy in order to strengthen Western influence in southern Africa.

180
Guitton, Jean. [THOUGHT AND WAR] La pensée et la guerre. [Paris] Desclée, De Brouwer [1969] 228 p.
U162.G8
Includes bibliographical footnotes.

Partial contents.--Hitler, revolution, and war. --The art of thought and the conduct of war.--Hegelian thought and the conduct of war.--The philosophy of deterrence in the nuclear age.

Analyzes the interaction between thought and the conduct of war by studying philosophers and military tacticians like Hegel, Marx, Foch and Joffre. Guitton maintains that thought must take precedence over action during wartime. He concludes with a metaphysical study of the philosophy of deterrence in the nuclear age.

181
Gutteridge, William F. THE MILITARY IN AFRICAN POLITICS. London, Methuen [1969] 166 p. map. (Studies in African history, 4)
DT31.G87

Contents.--Preface.--The origins and nature of African armies.--The social structure of African armies.--Political and social adaptation.--The nature of the East African mutinies 1964.--Examples from Francophone Africa.--The tragedy of Nigeria. --The case of Ghana.--Foreign military assistance and the political rôle of African armed forces.--The political rôle and motivation of the military in Africa: an assessment.--Short bibliography.--Index.

Examines the role of the military in the politics of former French and British colonies in Africa. Gutteridge compares the policies of France and Britain in recruiting, training, and organizing colonial armies and discusses their relationships with these armies since granting independence to their colonies.

182
Hackett, Sir John W. BRITISH ARMS AND STRATEGY 1970-1980. In Royal United Service Institution, London. Journal, v. 114, Sept. 1969: 55-58.
U1.R8, v. 114

Reviews Neville Brown's British Arms and Strategy 1970-1980, a study of Britain's future defense role in and outside Europe in light of its withdrawal East of Suez. Hackett concludes that Great Britain, despite its military cutbacks, will retain an important role in international affairs if its economy improves.

183
Harrison, Stanley L. AMERICA'S 1969 OPTION. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 14, Apr./May 1969: 14-16.
UA646.F5, v. 14

What are the chances that the United States will withdraw from NATO and retreat into a new isolationism during 1969? There are persuasive arguments to support an isolationist posture for the United States. For one thing, a U.S. withdrawal from Europe would permit a substantial improvement in the U.S. balance of payments. For another, there is nothing sacrosanct about force levels in NATO, a point that the Europeans themselves tacitly admit when they avoid meeting their own commitments to European defense. Furthermore, the fading of the Soviet threat has reduced considerably the need for a military alliance in Europe, and one may even argue that in the age of strategic deterrence such an alliance has become an anachronism. Add to this the persistence over the last few years of serious strains in America's relations with several of the European countries, and the result is a good case for withdrawal. It is worth recalling, however, that after World War II the United States committed itself to Europe for political as well as military and economic reasons, and, while the Atlantic partnership has met with outstanding success in its military and economic enterprises, the political work remains to be done. Building bridges to the East, managing the détente, negotiating arms limitation agreements--these tasks define the future role of NATO and justify a continuing American presence in Europe. America should not and will not dissolve the Atlantic alliance, for Europe is still the "indispensable collaborator" of the United States in the defense of the West.

XUM

184
Harrison, Stanley L. NATO'S ROLE AFTER CZECHOSLOVAKIA. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 49, July 1969: 12-23. illus. Z6723.U35, v. 49

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia dashed hopes for a true détente in Europe, thwarted NATO's political objectives of European cooperation and security, revived fears of an activist Soviet Union bent on conquest, disrupted reunification efforts between the two Germanys, and increased doubts among West Europeans, especially the French, of the effectiveness of America's flexible response strategy. The current NATO unrest has allowed France to seek the cooperation it needs with West Germany for hegemony over the rest of Europe. Great Britain will also benefit from the invasion by being able to play a more significant role in Europe. Despite the invasion both Norway and Denmark want a continued détente with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, while in the Low Countries pacifist elements are gathering strength in the face of mounting defense costs. If NATO is to remain an effective instrument for collective security, it must give its European members more responsibility and develop genuine cooperation and consultation to increase the Organization's role in establishing European security.

185
Healey, Denis W. NATO, BRITAIN AND SOVIET MILITARY POLICY. Orbis, v. 13, spring 1969: 48-58. D839.068, v. 13

NATO should not forgo reliance on nuclear escalation in favor of building up its conventional forces to a level equal to or greater than that of Soviet forces. For 20 years nuclear deterrence has worked to prevent a Soviet attack against Western Europe and has created a relative stability on the Continent. NATO's building of a maginot line of conventional forces would be tactically unsound in view of Soviet military strategy, which is based on a full-scale attack involving tactical nuclear and chemical weapons. The integration of European military forces and consultation on plans for the use of nuclear weapons can also contribute to ensuring continued security against a Soviet attack. The Soviet threat in the Mediterranean and the growing strength of China should encourage the European members of the alliance to establish a European identity within NATO. This would induce the United States to maintain its military commitment to Europe and would place Europe in a better position to influence the course of Soviet-American discussions on the future of the superpower nuclear balance. In view of current Soviet military policy and its implications for the West, Great Britain, whose contribution to NATO is already substantial, has made additional contributions to help fill the most serious gaps in the alliance's present capabilities.

186
Heiman, Grover. SAC AND THE ABM. Armed Forces management, v. 15, Aug. 1969: 35-38. illus. UB153.A65, v. 15

Examines the needs of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) regarding its future role in U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy. The potential Soviet first-strike capability and the survivability of U.S. strategic retaliatory forces are emphasized. Heiman notes that the ABM will ensure the viability of these forces but asserts that SAC will need more sophisticated aircraft to remain an effective component of U.S. nuclear deterrent forces.

187
Heiman, Leo. SOVIET INVASION WEAKNESSES. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 49, Aug. 1969: 38-45. illus. Z6723.U35, v. 49

Although the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia appeared to be handled with precision, the occupation was marred by shortcomings in organization, administration, and logistics. The "Soviet Operational Group" from Hungary failed to capture two important railroad stations while its airborne troops landed on the wrong mountain tops. The "Soviet Operational Group" from Poland created mile-long traffic jams when armored personnel carriers and light trucks "poured through the narrow bottlenecks at Zilina and Makov." Except for the Air Force, other supply services exposed a major weakness of Soviet logistics: Armored and mechanized divisions lacked many basic supplies on the third day of the occupation. During the Czechoslovak invasion the Soviet Army devoted little effort to upgrading food, uniforms, office equipment, and hospitalization, which has changed little since the Second World War.

188
Herrington, Arthur C. U.S. NAVAL POLICY. Naval War College review, v. 22, Sept. 1969: 4-13. P&GP RR

Lecture delivered at the Naval War College, Mar. 18, 1969.

Two key issues that are often omitted in naval policy debate are possible alternatives and cost; discussions of policy must consider the use of competitive and complementary military forces. Costs are rising, and money, material, people, and critical skills are limited. It would be impossible to implement the Joint Strategic Objective Plan (JSOP) developed each year at the Naval War College without giving up something else. The answer to the argument that the United States must not compromise on defense is that it has always had to and always will. The United States now faces an entirely different policy situation from that of the past: its fundamental concern is not control of the seas, but access to other peoples to the extent that it is committed to their protection. Economic pressures will change the size and composition of U.S. naval forces, which must be flexible and responsive to the implementation of national policy.

XUM

189
Hilborn, Kenneth. BALANCE OF TERROR; A CANADIAN VIEWS THE COLD-WAR WORLD. Canadian month, v. 9, June 1969: 18. F1001.C1623, v. 9

In the ABM controversy, "first-strike" capability and "second-strike" capability must be distinguished. "First-strike" capability means the ability to rationally start a nuclear war; "second-strike," the ability to respond so effectively as to deter attack. Mutual deterrence is based on the assumption that no country has or imagines it has first-strike capability and that each possesses and believes the other possesses second-strike capability. A country can upset the balance of terror to its advantage by improving its missile striking force, deploying an ABM system to protect cities, and establishing civil defense measures--all of which the Soviet Union has done. A potential victim can improve its second-strike capability by the concealment and mobility of retaliatory forces, the deployment of more ICBM's, and the protection of existing ICBM sites with ABM weapons, as proposed by the Nixon administration. "Talk about danger from ABM fallout is merely puerile," since the fallout from enemy ICBM's would be immensely greater. "The Trudeau Government should have given prompt public endorsement to President Nixon's wise proposal."

190
Hinterhoff, Eugène. THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. Orbis, v. 13, spring 1969: 261-269. D839.068, v. 13
Special issue devoted to NATO and European security.

1964 marked the end of Stalin's policy of maintaining the "inner front"--the territorial borders of the Soviet bloc in Europe and Asia--and the beginning of a new push into the eastern Mediterranean under the dynamic leadership of Adm. Sergei Gorshkov. By the spring of 1967 the Soviet Fleet in the Mediterranean was made up "of a heavy cruiser as flagship, two missile destroyers, a few frigates and submarines." After the June 1967 war, however, the Soviet naval presence increased and now consists of a heavy cruiser, one or two light cruisers with missile launchers, three or four destroyers, and an assorted number of landing craft, frigates, submarines, and supporting logistical ships. In addition, there is the helicopter carrier Moskva, which will soon be joined by its sister ship Leningrad. This fleet has an offensive capability that threatens not only Israel but Albania and Yugoslavia as well. The Soviet presence in the Mediterranean has created a new regional balance that is fraught with the potential danger of escalation. Its presence can enable "Soviet leaders to take advantage of changes in the political climate in the area." Further, should the United States lose its bases in Spain, the Soviet position in the Mediterranean would change drastically. The Soviet Union could extend its influence into the Red Sea and supply long-range guns to the pro-Soviet states in the Arab peninsula to hamper Israeli shipping, but the closure of the Suez Canal has made such a plan difficult and expensive for the time being. From a military point of view the Soviet naval presence acts as a deterrent to any preventive Israeli attack against Egyptian ports placed at the disposal of the Soviet Fleet. Moreover, the Soviet Navy could attack or blockade Albania or Yugoslavia in conjunction with its Warsaw Pact forces, and this would threaten NATO's already vulnerable southern flank and endanger the peace and security of the world as well as the area.

191
Holloway, Bruce K. SAC: DYNAMIC DETERRENT. Vital speeches of the day, v. 35, Sept. 15, 1969: 706-709. PN6121.V52, v. 35
Speech delivered before the Chicago Rotary Club, Chicago, Ill., July 29, 1969.

Just as British seapower formerly served as the basis of a Pax Britannica, so today the strength of America's strategic airpower reduces the likelihood of another major war. The Strategic Air Command (SAC) not only provides a more flexible striking force than missiles but plays a vital role in conventional war as well. American military commanders in Vietnam have been enthusiastic in their praise of the effectiveness of SAC's B-52 bombers. Despite the undoubted high quality of SAC's forces, however, the need for modernization is ever present--a need that may be partially fulfilled with the introduction in the near future of advanced manned strategic aircraft and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles.

192
Holyoake, Keith. A DEFENCE AND FOREIGN POLICY FOR NEW ZEALAND. In New Zealand. Dept. of External Affairs. External affairs review, v. 19, Mar. 1969: 3-14. JX1591.A35, v. 19
Text of a speech to the Institute of International Affairs, Mar. 5, 1969.

Traces postwar developments in Asia, summarizes New Zealand's foreign and defense policies, and outlines its role in promoting future security and stability in East Asia. Holyoake sees no reason to believe that New Zealand will be threatened by external aggression, but the continued instability in Southeast Asia could pose a long-term threat to Australia's as well as New Zealand's security. For this reason, New Zealand's defense interest should focus primarily on Southeast Asia. He advocates a policy of collective defense and support of those regional organizations in Asia that deal with the area's defense and security requirements, especially in Southeast Asia. Holyoake concludes by reaffirming New Zealand's determination to take up the challenge of Asian security and defense in cooperation with other area countries, noting that it will not relinquish this task because of Great Britain's withdrawal East of Suez.

XUM

193
Hosmer, Craig. REASON, COMMON SENSE AND MODERN AIRCRAFT CARRIERS. Navy, Oct. 1969: 12-17. illus. VA49.N28, 1969

Argues against proposals before the U.S. Congress to cut back carrier forces. Hosmer outlines a new U.S. military strategy that assigns naval aviation a central role. He recommends that the United States take steps to establish a naval presence in every strategic area of the globe and that it compensate for the deactivation of overseas military bases with offsetting buildups of naval strength.

194
HOW JAPAN IS REVIVING ITS MILITARY MACHINE. U.S. news & world report, v. 67, Oct. 27, 1969: 91-92. illus. JK1.U65, v. 67

Cites evidence to show that, almost unnoticed, Japan has adopted a low-keyed but significant policy of gradually building up its military forces. Many influential Japanese are now convinced that Japan needs a stronger defense force "to gain prestige and influence as well as to deter aggressors." Some increases have already been made, and the Japanese defense industry is prospering. However, financial limitations and the fear of an untoward political impact at home and abroad all but eliminate the possibility of dramatic changes in defense policy for the foreseeable future.

195
Hubbell, John G. A BOLD NEW PLAN FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. Reader's digest, v. 95, Oct. 1969: 82-87. illus. AP2.R255, v. 95

The U.S. Navy's Office of Strategic Offensive and Defensive Systems has recommended that the United States be defended by naval nuclear power instead of the ICBM system. If the U.S. defensive nuclear power was widely dispersed in moving submarine and surface vessels, a first strike by an aggressor would be suicidal because it could not be widespread enough to cripple the U.S. power to retaliate. The probability of the ballistic missile ship's surviving attack is second only to that of the submarine, and a strategic nuclear missile sea force would not be militarily provocative. The ICBM system could be phased out or dispersed more widely and some Minuteman missiles adapted for ship installation. Though military technology and strategy are constantly evolving, a defense system based on missile ships should provide the United States with effective defenses for many years.

196
Hudson, Geoffrey. PAPER TIGERS AND NUCLEAR TEETH. China quarterly, no. 39, July/Sept. 1969: 64-75. DS701.C472, 1969

China launched its own nuclear-weapons program only after Khrushchev in June 1959 reneged on a promise of Soviet assistance in the development of a Chinese nuclear capability. Nevertheless the Chinese made rapid progress and will have the means to deliver nuclear warheads several hundred miles by 1970 and an intercontinental capability by 1975. As long as Mao was sure of Soviet support, he could safely regard the American nuclear force as a paper tiger, and even now he has little reason to fear an American preemptive nuclear strike. However, since China is in open conflict with not only the United States but the Soviet Union as well, Mao must decide the crucial question whether revisionists as well as imperialists are paper tigers. The Soviet threat to China is greater than the American threat for at least three reasons: the long land frontier between China and the Soviet Union, Chinese claims to Soviet territories, and the ability of the tightly controlled Soviet Government to prepare a preemptive nuclear strike in secrecy. Soviet military doctrine provides a clear outline of the requirements for such an attack. Mao and Lin Piao appear to have deceived themselves by their own utopianism and anti-Soviet polemics, however, and to have underestimated the seriousness of the Soviet threat.

197
THE IMPORTANCE OF CIVIL DEFENCE. In Canada. Emergency Measures Organization. EMO national digest, v. 9, Aug./Sept. 1969: 10-12. UA926.C295, v. 9
Reprinted from NATO Letter, v. 17, February 1969. D845.2.A44

Describes NATO's role in coordinating and developing civil defense programs in member countries, lists the main elements of a civil defense organization, and discusses the alliance's technical boards and committees to deal with potential problems in the recovery period.

198
Isnard, Jacques. RE-VAMPING FRENCH MILITARY STRATEGY. Atlantic community quarterly, v. 7, summer 1969: 241-244. D839.A85, v. 7
See also item 170 in this bibliography.

The appointment of General Michel Fourquet to succeed General Charles Ailleret as Chief of Staff of the French Armed Forces coincides with major changes in French military policy. The evidence for this is to be found in an article by General Fourquet in the May 1969 issue of the Revue de Defense Nationale, in which he rejects the "all or nothing" nuclear strategy of the Gaullist era in favor of a more flexible response, recognizes the value of tactical nuclear weapons, accepts the principle that all nuclear armaments must remain under firm political control, and abandons the all-azimuth strategy for one that presupposes that attack will come from the East and be met with French forces fighting in conjunction with other Western armies. In these respects, French strategy has moved closer to that of NATO. Only one major source of disagreement remains--the question of the timing of the West's response to

aggression. The French believe that in case of attack the United States will play for time, and this the Europeans may not be able to afford. France, therefore, must retain the power of deciding when to commit its forces. The French nuclear force will remain outside NATO's deterrence structure, and it may be necessary to use French troops as a NATO general reserve. General Fourquet's proposals on the organization of paramilitary defense units also go beyond anything contemplated by his predecessor, and his plans may run into resistance from other professional soldiers, who would rather see the money spent on equipment for France's greatly reduced conventional forces.

199
Jewett, Pauline. A DEPARTMENT OF PEACE? Maclean's, v. 82, Apr. 1969: 8.
AP5.M2, v. 82

The many attacks on Canadian Postmaster General Eric Kierans' public questioning of the need for NATO and the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) show the difficulty of challenging the status quo, especially in such sensitive matters as foreign policy and defense. It cannot be known if his arguments will be heeded--if the Canadian Government will use its influence to terminate NATO and NORAD or at least drop its commitments and "establish some more contemporary and meaningful cornerstone for Canadian foreign policy." However, at the next review of foreign policy and defense Canada "may even be ready to make defense the servant, not the master, of foreign policy, occupying a small slot in an External Affairs department . . . rechristened the 'Department of Peace.'"

200
Kapur, Ashok. INDIAN MILITARY POLICY AND STRATEGY. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 49, July 1969: 67-74. Z6723.U35, v. 49

Evaluates India's defense policy with respect to the Chinese and Pakistani threats and advocates "an indigenous nuclear capability of a countercity type" to deter a future Chinese nuclear threat. India's current defense capabilities would allow it to conduct a conventional holding operation against China and Pakistan only in a limited war because the Indian theater lacks depth. Kapur constructs four strategic models involving the United States, China, India, and Pakistan, which reflect the uncertainty of the strategic balance in Asia, and concludes that China's growing nuclear capability and massive military posture in Asia make it imperative that India acquire a nuclear as well as a conventional deterrent system.

201
Kielmansegg, Johann A., Graf. THE FEASIBILITY OF WEST EUROPEAN DEFENSE. Orbis, v. 13, spring 1969: 133-143. D839.068, v. 13
Special issue on NATO and European security.

The basis of NATO's strategy and the key to the West's security and freedom for the past 20 years has been deterrence. Although deterrence as a basic principle has not changed, its structure has. The strength of flexible response depends upon the defender's capability to resist a conventional attack and to confront the aggressor with a credible risk that his attack will fail. Unfortunately, NATO forces are not capable of achieving a conventional stalemate. The Warsaw Pact conventional forces outnumber those of NATO and are reputed to be, in the words of the Strategic Army Command Europe, "the most effective in the world, and incomparably so in conventional forces." The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia demonstrated the military capabilities of the East, and the Soviets have carried out a number of military measures apart from the invasion that have greatly improved their capabilities. Although the Soviet Union does not plan to attack Western Europe, its improved military capabilities make it easier for Moscow to be tempted into launching a swift limited action. The longer the Warsaw Pact forces remain superior in strength and number to NATO's, the greater danger there is of an aggression against Western Europe. Since the flexible response strategy was adopted in 1962 there has been a gradual weakening in NATO's defenses. The French withdrawal in 1966, the recall of British and American troops, the thinning out of Belgian troops, the halt on a further increase in German forces, and the Canadian announcement of a phasing-out intention are indicative of this weakening trend.

202
Lindsey, George R. NORTH AMERICAN AIR DEFENCE. In Canada. Emergency Measures Organization. EMO national digest, v. 9, Aug./Sept. 1969: 1-7, 23. illus. UA926.C295, v. 9
Testimony before the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence excerpted from Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 43.

The North American antibomber defense system, which has become markedly vulnerable in the past few years, must be revitalized to work against low-altitude penetration and the air-to-surface missile by such innovations as the over-the-horizon radar system, the airborne warning and control system, improved interceptors, dispersed fighter aircraft, airborne radar, and a small fleet of maintenance aircraft. The continuance of an improved air defense system conforms with U.S. objectives of ensuring against a surprise Soviet nuclear bomber attack, preventing damage from an air attack by other countries, and precluding a manned bomber attack on U.S. strategic retaliatory forces.

203
London. Institute for Strategic Studies. THE MILITARY BALANCE, 1969-1970. London [1969] 63 p. UA15.L65, 1969-70

Contents.--pt. 1. The United States and the Soviet Union: The United States. The Soviet Union.--pt. 2. The European balance: The Warsaw

Pact. The North Atlantic Treaty. Other European countries.--pt. 3. The Middle East and the Mediterranean.--pt. 4. Asia and Australasia: China. Other Asian countries. Australasia.--pt. 5. Southern Africa.--Tables: Estimates of comparative strategic strengths. Major nuclear delivery systems. Defence expenditure and national economies. Military manpower. Major identified arms agreements July 1968-June 1969.--Appendix. The military balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

Eleventh annual review of the world's major military forces. Soviet and U.S. forces are compared in a separate section, with the remaining countries grouped by continent. "Cuba and Morocco have been omitted from this edition, while Rhodesia appears for the first time."

204
Lowe, George E. A NEW STRATEGY IS PROPOSED TO SOLVE U.S. MILITARY PROBLEMS. Navy, v. 12, July/Aug. 1969: 11-15. illus. VA49.N28, v. 12

Appraises Soviet Sea Power, a panel study sponsored by the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies. The major question put to the panel was, "Has the Soviet Union shifted from its historic, defensive-minded, army-dominated, coastal-oriented naval posture to a balanced, comprehensive, global maritime policy aimed at gaining supremacy as a seapower?" The panelists agreed unanimously that the growth of Soviet seapower in the last decade has been impressive, but they could not reach accord on the long-term significance of this growth or on a strategy to combat it. Lowe concurs in the recommendation of Rear Adm. George Miller that the United States meet the Soviet challenge by putting more of its strategic striking power at sea.

205
McGovern, George S. ARE OUR MILITARY ALLIANCES MEANINGFUL? In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. America's changing role as a world leader. Philadelphia, 1969. (Its Annals, v. 384, July 1969) p. 14-20. H1.A4, v. 384

Between 1945 and 1949, motivated by fear of world communism, the United States negotiated pacts which tied its defense posture to the military security of forty-two other nations. World conditions have changed radically since that time. The Sino-Soviet dispute and East European developments have shown that a monolithic Communist bloc does not exist. West Europe and Japan have recovered economically and are now capable of sharing the burden of their own defense and of assistance to others. A technological revolution has occurred in weaponry, resulting in emphasis on ICBM's and mobile striking forces, rather than local security forces. Our NATO commitment should be reduced from six to one or two divisions, symbolizing our continued interest in defending West Europe. This would ease tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, especially in the confrontation over Germany. SEATO has always been an unrealistic treaty. Its signatory nations have never exhibited unified motives or policies. SEATO left the United States with an open-ended commitment to maintain Asian stability; our efforts to do so have endangered our relations with strategic allies and have lessened the likelihood of our ever reaching an understanding with Mainland China. American dissent and protest to the Vietnam war have demonstrated that a democracy can conduct a war only with the wholehearted support of more than a bare majority and with belief of those fighting the war in the justice of its purpose and the wisdom of its policy-makers. Any commitment of troops to combat should be considered war, and should require prior congressional legislation. We should emphasize arms and alliances less, and an international system for maintaining peace more, in our efforts to ensure American security and world peace. (Abstract supplied)

206
Mackintosh, Malcolm. THE EVOLUTION OF THE WARSAW PACT. London, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1969. 25 p. map. (Adelphi papers, no. 58) U162.A3, no. 58

Officially the Warsaw Pact was created as a counterweight to NATO. The real reason for its creation was, however, that central and Eastern Europe had become politically, economically, and militarily wasting assets for the Soviet Union and that Stalin's successors needed a multinational quasi-democratic funnel through which they could dictate and coordinate East European policies, rally the East European expression of support for Soviet foreign and intrabloc policy for the benefit of the outside world, and subordinate East European resources to Soviet defense. A new Soviet military doctrine, which took into account postwar improvements in weapons and mobility for ground forces, required the East European armies to play a part in the Soviet Union's defense. Although the East European countries were bound to the Soviet Union by bilateral defense treaties--as they still are, except for Albania--the training of their forces was uncoordinated with that of the Soviet Army. The Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) integrated, reequipped, and streamlined them and cut down their manpower to realistic strength. Unlike NATO the military as well as the political organization of the WTO "has never been made public in any detail." Under Marshal A. A. Grechko, who became Commander-in-Chief of the WTO forces in 1960, the WTO High Command--comprising the Commander-in-Chief and the national defense ministers of the WTO's non-Soviet member states--finally took shape as the administrative and coordinating agency of the Soviet Defense Ministry for the East European armies but without command responsibilities or the establishment of logistic services. The armies have remained under their own national command except during major operations when they fall under the Supreme High Command of the Soviet Armed Forces or its organs. The WTO's Political Consultative Committee, Commander-in-Chief, and High Command faded completely out of the picture during the 1968 inva-

XUM

sion of Czechoslovakia despite the official claim that this was the WTO's military operation. The invasion occurred without the WTO's authorization. The Warsaw Pact presents the Soviet Union with fundamental contradictions, which the new Brezhnev doctrine is unable to resolve. As an instrument to subordinate East European national interests, it has become useless.

207
Matveev, V. NATO: IN FEVER AND WHY. Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 21, July 9, 1969: 16-17.
D839.C87, v. 21
Translated and condensed from Izvestiia, June 14, 1969. Slav Rm

The Soviet proposal for an all-European conference was met by the Atlantic bloc with its usual hostility. It was neither repudiated nor accepted; the response was a highly elastic formulation about negotiation with the Soviet Union with no reference to the Budapest message. Moreover, Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, the retiring NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, while touring the European capitals, tried to influence the NATO members to increase their commitments of troops and arms. Although this propaganda cannot be taken lightly, it evidently must fail because the European public does not believe that the Soviet Union wants aggression or is a threat to peace. Nevertheless, the Western Powers, which do not want any relaxation of tensions in Europe, adopted a series of measures, including an increase in military expenditures and a continuation of the arms race, the ensurance of the use of tactical weapons in an early stage of a possible conflict, and the creation of a NATO naval force, especially in the Mediterranean, which might include the Turkish Navy. Despite all their efforts, the Western Powers cannot bury the idea of a European security system, which is dear to the population and to those who understand that the division of Europe into military blocs must be abolished.

208
Meyer-Detring, Wilhelm. [FRANCE'S CHANGED STRATEGY?] Veränderte Strategie Frankreich's? Wehrkunde, v. 18, July 1969: 337-338.
U3.W396, v. 18

Considers indications by French military leaders that France's defense plans emphasize strategic nuclear weapons and provide for continued NATO membership, but outside the alliance's integrated military structure. The leaders stress that the strategy must not be based on a "single-conflict hypothesis" and should protect French interests abroad.

209
Mochalov, V. WHAT LIES BEHIND THE THEORY OF "LIMITED" WARS? Soviet military review, Aug. 1969: 54-56.
U1.S7, 1969

After the loss of its nuclear monopoly and the development of national liberation movements, the United States replaced its strategic doctrine of "massive retaliation" with a peculiar "hybrid"--"flexible response"--which became the official doctrine of the North Atlantic bloc and includes the theory of limited wars. Such wars were regarded as better adapted to suppress national liberation movements than massive retaliation. Western strategists divide them into three categories: local wars to be fought in the Third World; wars with conventional weapons only, which are possible in Europe; and limited nuclear wars between the United States and the U.S.S.R., in which the aim would be not mutual destruction but negotiations after two or three nuclear blows. Soviet military science regards this classification as totally erroneous because the first two types are identical, and the third would soon escalate into a global nuclear war. In addition, no sober-minded theoretician can assume the violation of the integrity of the Socialist community or the suppression of a national liberation movement without immediate reaction from the Socialist countries. The whole American doctrine is fallacious in its political basis and has not brought victory to the Western Powers, who, in trying to settle international conflicts by force, must resort to brutality--a sign of weakness not of strength.

210
Moore, William C. HISTORY, VIETNAM, AND THE CONCEPT OF DETERRENCE. Air University review, v. 20, Sept./Oct. 1969: 58-63. illus.
TL501.A5574, v. 20

While future historians may debate whether the military or civilians are primarily responsible for the tragedy of Vietnam, President Kennedy's policy of flexible response clearly has failed. A review of the Soviet-U.S. confrontation since World War II reveals the disastrous consequences of the formal abandonment of the massive retaliation policy. The U.S. decision to respond to aggression with limited means was an open invitation to Communist subversion. The Eisenhower administration avoided this error by officially adhering to a policy of nuclear deterrence while practicing flexible response. The Vietnam War will not have been fought in vain, however, if the United States asserts a determination to escalate its response to Communist aggression to any level necessary to keep it from its goal.

211
Moorer, Thomas H. THE SOVIET NAVY; OUR ABILITY TO MEET THE CHALLENGE. Vital speeches of the day, v. 35, Oct. 1, 1969: 742-746.
PN6121.V52, v. 35
Speech delivered to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Philadelphia, Aug. 19, 1969.

The Soviet maritime capability, which was formidable even before World War II, has since grown enormously in the quantity and quality of warships and merchant vessels. American warships now in service are older than Soviet warships, and the

XUM

U.S. merchant marine has actually declined in its sealift capability. The Soviet claim to be the world's greatest maritime power is thus not without substance. The U.S. Navy nevertheless remains adequate to fulfill its global mission, which differs from that of the Soviet Union, and no attempt to match the Soviet Navy in numbers is necessary or intended. The "heavyweight" of the U.S. Navy--the aircraft carrier--continues to provide the margin of superiority over the Soviet Navy. It is important to emphasize the valuable contribution to national security made by aircraft carriers since the war and their indispensable role in meeting present and foreseeable naval requirements.

212
Morse, Wayne L. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS. Humanist, v. 29, July/Aug. 1969: 3-5. BL2700.H78, v. 29

Unconsciously the United States has spawned an extensive military-industrial complex and a military-foreign policy bureaucracy whose policies and practices remain relatively stable "through one titular change at the top after another." It has expanded its global commitments and its nuclear missile force to such an extent that it has stepped beyond the bounds of defense into the realm of "eternal readiness to wage war, not only in the arena of instantaneous nuclear exchange but conventional and nuclear war on every continent and in virtually every country of the globe." The United States is engaged in an extensive arms race, which invites more Vietnams and threatens the Nation's security. The American people must be reeducated "back to the needs of defense, as against the needs of war," to reverse the present trend toward a readiness to fight anywhere, at any time.

213
1969 GREENBOOK: A STATUS REPORT ON THE U.S. ARMY. Army, v. 19, Oct. 1969: 15-180. illus. U1.A893, v. 19

Status reports by U.S. Army Commands and a special section on the Vietnam War. Photographs of commanding officers and a guide to Army equipment and weapons are included.

214
[19TH AIR FORCE ALMANAC] Air Force and space digest, v. 52, Sept. 1969: 8-243. illus. UG633.A65, v. 52

Partial contents.--The new politicians and the defense budget, by John F. Loosbrock.--The ABM showdown; rationality wins by a single vote, by Claude Witze.--Lessons of the C-5 program, by Edgar E. Ulsamer.--Balance; the key to national security, by Robert C. Seamans, Jr.--The Air Force's Mission, by John D. Ryan.--Reports from USAF's major commands and separate operating agencies.--A gallery of USAF weapons.

Reports on the role and programs of the Air Force. According to Loosbrock, attacks by the "new politicians" on U.S. military policy either ignore or downgrade the Communist threat. Ulsamer thinks that "wild attacks" on the C-5 program have seriously damaged the Department of Defense image but have led to recommendations that should improve the development and procurement of Air Force weapons systems. Seamans describes the proper balance as "a sufficient ABM system to protect . . . deterrent weapons, but not enough to protect cities against the opponent's full retaliatory force" and believes that ABM defenses can be fixed at deterrent levels if both sides favor arms control. Ryan "establishes the broad 'scope and the critical nature of air operations.'"

215
Palmer, J. M. THE BALANCE OF SEA POWER IN THE SEVENTIES. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 14, Aug./Sept. 1969: 28-32. illus. UA646.F5, v. 14

Though the aim of Soviet military strategy is now, as it has always been, to defend the Soviet homeland, one must not confuse a defensive posture with a passive one. The Soviet Union is committed to a doctrine of active defense and nowhere more than in its maritime policy. In the Mediterranean, it is using its growing naval influence to make important political gains. It has also penetrated into the seas East of Suez, and, though its strength in those areas is less than elsewhere, so is that of the West, which has no forces in the Indian Ocean at all. Nor can the West afford to ignore the startling growth of the Soviet merchant fleet, which in the long run may be the most serious threat of all. To counter these Soviet initiatives, NATO must adopt a high seas policy of containment, which means matching seapower with seapower at every contested point. The struggle here is not for territory but for policital influence and trade. It can be won only if NATO, like the Athenians of old, puts its trust in seapower.

216
Palsokar, R. D. MINIMUM DETERRENT AND ESCALATION. United Asia, v. 21, Jan./Feb. 1969: 13-20. DS1.U55, v. 21

Considers the nature of escalation in a future limited war between Communist China and India and examines whether India's possession of nuclear weapons will act as a minimum deterrent in maintaining the Asian balance of power. Palsokar compares the development of nuclear weapons in France and China, noting that their introduction into those countries did not escalate the cold war, and reviews Sino-Indian relations. He contends that India's possession of a minimum deterrent capability would have a deescalating effect vis-a-vis China because it would deter Peking from exploiting a revolutionary situation on India's borders. The author concludes that for this reason India ought to acquire a tactical nuclear capability.

371-992 O - 70 - 4

217
PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY. Asian almanac, v. 7, Aug. 23, 1969: 3497-3501.
DS1.A4752, v. 7

Assesses the role of the People's Liberation Army of Communist China and its administration, political control by the Military Control Committee, support of the Communist Party, relation to civil administration, internal conflicts, and strength.

218
Perret-Gentil, Jacques. [THE SOVIET THRUST INTO THE MEDITERRANEAN] Der sowjetische Vorstoss in den Mittelmeerraum [by] J. Pergent [pseud.] Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift, v. 135, Sept. 1969: 516-520. U3.A43, v. 135

Traces the history of Soviet influence in the Mediterranean and shows how the Soviet Union has outflanked NATO's carefully built Greek-Turkish defense line. Perret-Gentil considers the composition and strength of the Soviet naval forces in the region and concludes that they are still far weaker than the NATO naval forces there. However, NATO's defense posture in the Mediterranean is inadequate to meet the combined challenge of the Soviet naval presence and the possible expansion of Soviet influence in North Africa.

219
Ploger, Robert R. POST-ATTACK VIABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES. Military engineer, v. 61, Sept./Oct. 1969: 317-319. map.
TA1.P85, v. 61

Reviews the findings of studies on the possible effects of thermonuclear war and recovery measures. Ploger cites a recommendation that satellite cities be developed to reduce losses from attacks on overcrowded metropolitan centers.

220
POSITION OF CIVIL DEFENCE IN FINLAND. International civil defence, v. 16, May 1969: 5-8.
UA926.I488, v. 16
Translated from Zivilschutz-Protection Civile, no. 1, 1969.

Describes Finland's peacetime civil defense program, which includes voluntary organizations, evacuation plans, training programs, industrial protection, and a warning and alarm system. About 400,000 people belong to the civil defense organization, and, in an emergency, each Finnish citizen between the ages of 16 and 65 is required to participate.

221
"RED OR DEAD WITHOUT NATO," SAY BRITISH CONSERVATIVES. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 14, Apr./May 1969: 10-13. UA646.F5, v. 14

Applauds a resurgence of support for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Great Britain, outlines the contrasting views of the Labour government and its Conservative opposition on questions of alliance strategy and troop and materiel requirements, and deplores alleged weaknesses in the British defense establishment.

222
Roschmann, Hans. [THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION AROUND THE INDIAN OCEAN] Lageentwicklung um den Indischen Ozean. Wehrkunde, v. 18, Sept. 1969: 446-452. map. U3.W396, v. 18

Discusses the politicomilitary situations of Pakistan, India, Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Iran, Yemen, and Nepal. Roschmann points out the Sino-Soviet competition for domination of Asia because of the decreasing American commitment in the area. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and the Central Treaty Organization have lost their significance as military alliances, the military cooperation of Indian Ocean nations is unlikely, and the Soviet Union has strengthened its influence by supplying arms to Pakistan and India. The British withdrawal from East of Suez in 1971 may mark an end of the region's relative calm.

223
Rubtsov, O. THE BUNDESWEHR UNMASKED. Soviet military review, Sept. 1969: 58-59.
U1.S7, 1969

In reply to The Bundeswehr--An Army Against War, published in West Germany, East German writers have prepared The Bundeswehr--An Army For War, in which they emphasize the aggressiveness of West Germany's militarism by describing its large weapons buildup. The Bundeswehr, according to the East Germans, already has the means of delivering nuclear weapons and is involved in aggression throughout the world. Thanks to the East German book, the peace-loving peoples of the world have been reminded of the need to watch closely the intrigues of West German imperialism.

224
Sawhny, Rathy. THE THREAT TO INDIA'S NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE SEVENTIES. In United Service Institution of India. Journal, v. 98, Oct./Dec. 1968: 341-356. U1.U5, v. 98
Lecture given at the U.S.I. on Dec. 6, 1968.

Surveys the military and economic potential of Pakistan and China and their probable intentions during the next decade on the assumption that these nations constitute the principal threat to India's security. Sawhny argues that Pakistan represents a threat primarily in the short term since India's higher rate of economic growth will progressively reduce the chances for a successful Pakistani military venture. On the other hand, China, with its growing nuclear potential, may someday be in a position to intimidate India unless India takes the steps necessary for the rapid development of nuclear weapons if they should be needed.

XUM

225
Schmidt, Helmut. [THE STRATEGY OF COUNTERBALANCE; GERMAN PEACE POLICY AND THE WORLD POWERS] Strategie des Gleichgewichts. Deutsche Friedenspolitik und die Weltmächte. Stuttgart [-Degerloch] Seewald [1969] 325 p.
DD257.4.S335

Contents.--Preamble.--Preface: the Germans and strategy.--World history in the epoch of bipolarity. --Consequences of modern weapons.--The Soviet concept of a limited risk.--Europe in the eyes of our neighbors.--The role of hostile brothers.--The West's position.--Principles of our foreign policy.--Our external security at the beginning of a new decade. --Domestic stability: progress instead of stagnation.

Expounds fundamental principles of West Germany's postulated defense policy: West European security and the success of West German efforts toward East-West détente must depend on the preservation of the military balance of power in Europe; West Germany's military posture should be defensive; in the absence of adequate international arms control or a European security system the nation's security depends largely on political cooperation within the Atlantic alliance and on NATO's military posture; West Germany must avoid total dependence on NATO's ability to function; and the strategic task of the West German Armed Forces should be within their means.

226
Schnez, Albert. [THE GERMAN ARMY'S CONCEPTION OF ARMAMENTS] Die Rüstungskonzeption des deutschen Heeres. Wehrkunde, v. 18, June 1969: 277-282.
U3.W396, v. 18

Considers the principles on which the German Federal Republic's armaments are based and the limitations of those arms. Schnez focuses on West Germany's "differentiated armaments," the cooperation of the military with the defense industry, and West German participation in international arms development and production projects.

227
Schrader, Rudolf. [TECHNOLOGICAL FORECASTING FOR DEFENSE] Technologische Vorhersage für die Verteidigung. Assenpolitik, v. 20, July 1969: 402-411.
D839.A885, v. 20

Outlines research being done in the United States and NATO in forecasting technological development so that the data obtained by such research can help the medium- and long-range planning of defense policy. Methods used are mostly intuitive, but new processes recently were developed that allow greater accuracy in forecasting. (Translation of supplied abstract, modified)

228
Selle, Otto. [WESTERN DEFENSE--WITHOUT FRANCE?] Die westliche Verteidigung--ohne Frankreich? Wehrkunde, v. 18, Sept. 1969: 452-454.
U3.W396, v. 18

Stresses the importance of France's geographical position for NATO's defense. Selle argues for Franco-American cooperation outside NATO's integrated military structure similar to French-West German military cooperation, which Bonn hopes will grow closer.

229
SINO-SOVIET WAR? AND MAO ON WORLD WAR. China news analysis, no. 767, Aug. 1, 1969: 1-7.
DS777.55.C4469, 1969

Discusses the international implications of a possible Sino-Soviet war, Mao's past and present statements on nuclear war, and the extent of Chinese preparations for war. The republication of some of Mao's earlier statements disparaging the harmful consequences of a new world war is interpreted as more in the nature of hyperbole than a serious expression of intent. Although there are signs of a general preparation for war, there is no conclusive evidence that specific measures have been taken thus far.

230
Soward, F. H. [CANADA'S NEW NATO POLICY; TRUDEAU'S REFORM OF FOREIGN POLICY: THE FIRST PHASE] Kanadas neue NATO-Politik; Trudeaus Reform der Aussenpolitik: die erste Phase. Europa-Archiv, v. 24, July 25, 1969: 493-502.
D839.E86, v. 24

Discusses the background of Canada's decision to reduce its NATO forces in Europe. Soward points to the supremacy of foreign policy over defense considerations in Canada's NATO policy and concludes that the decision does not indicate the nation's retreat to neutralism.

231
Staar, Richard F. STRATEGIC POWER OF THE U.S.S.R. An article from the Marine Corps Gazette of June 1969. Extension of remarks of the Hon. David E. Satterfield, of Virginia, in the House of Representatives, June 12, 1969. Congressional record [daily ed.] 91st Congress, 1st session, v. 115: E4854-E4857.
J11.R52, v. 115

The growing number of ICBM's, the development of a fractional orbital bombardment system, and the large increases over the past 5 years in the Soviet defense budget indicate that Moscow's nuclear strategy is based on the offensive. These trends reflect the basic doctrine of Soviet military strategy, which advocates the simultaneous destruction of the enemy's politicomilitary centers and armed forces by the launching of a second strike or a preemptive attack. Indeed, many Soviet strategists believe that it is vitally important for the Soviet Union to have a first-strike capability because America's policies may precipitate a critical confrontation between the NATO and Warsaw Pact nations or an escalation of a local war owing to a conflict between vital interests. Such an offensive strategy could change the Communist principle of peaceful coexistence into the

XUM

advocacy of violence if the Kremlin leaders decide that the Soviet Union has achieved an overwhelming military superiority.

232
Stassen, John H. SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE UNCOMMON DEFENSE: THE CASE AGAINST IMPOUNDING OF WEAPONS SYSTEM APPROPRIATIONS. Georgetown law journal, v. 57, June 1969: 1159-1210.
LL

Investigates the practice of Presidential impounding of funds appropriated by Congress. Stassen first reviews the history of recent disputes between Congress and the Presidency, which involved the impounding of funds appropriated for manned bombers (RS-70's) and nuclear frigates (DLGN's), then proceeds to the general question of the constitutionality of impounding. He concludes that impounding is not only unconstitutional but detrimental to the national security as well. In order to restore the constitutional balance between Presidential and congressional authority, he recommends that the President be permitted to exercise an item veto over specific defense appropriations, subject to congressional power to override the veto by a two-thirds vote.

233
[STRATEGY] Strategie. Dokumente; Zeitschrift für Übernationale Zusammenarbeit, v. 25, Aug. 1969: 307-325. H5.D65, v. 25

Contents.--Not without America . . . , by Paul Stehlin.-- . . . still without European unity, by Johann A. Graf Kielmansegg.--Strategy and tactics . . . , by André Dulac.-- . . . with a German-French foundation, by Heinrich Buksch.--European defense union, by Michel Garder.--Peace preservation and war prevention, by Gerd Schmückle.

Considers the possible defense of Western Europe without immediate U.S. involvement and a Western strategy in a hypothetical era of East-West détente.

234
Subrahmanyam, K. FIVE YEARS OF INDIAN DEFENCE EFFORT IN PERSPECTIVE. International studies quarterly, v. 13, June 1969: 159-189.
D839.B2, v. 13

Chronicles India's defense expenditures during the past 5 years, assesses the present status of Indian security, and indicates the probable nature of future Indian defense policies and programs.

235
Subrahmanyam, K. INDIA'S SECURITY: POLICY OPTIONS. Quest, no. 61, Apr./June 1969: 9-16.
AP8.Q4, 1969

Analyzes the Chinese and Pakistani threat to India, assesses the possible impact of any normalization of relations between these countries on India's defense efforts, and outlines policy options open to India's national security planners. Subrahmanyam criticizes India's decisionmaking and defense management organizational structures for their failure to improve methods of formulating long-range intelligence estimations, especially in the case of the Chinese nuclear threat. He concludes that the greatest threat to India's security is this inadequate decisionmaking and intelligence estimation process since it has led policymakers to formulate superficial estimations in dealing with the question of whether India should acquire a nuclear capability.

236
Taubinger, L. M. [JAPANESE MILITARY DEFENSE] Die japanische Landesverteidigung. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift, v. 135, Sept. 1969: 537-539. U3.A43, v. 135

Considers the postwar development of the Japanese Armed Forces, outlines their organization, numerical strength, and weaponry and reports on naval and air force armaments projects.

237
Taylor, John W. R. DEFENCE IN THE 'SEVENTIES. Royal Air Forces quarterly, v. 9, summer 1969: 93-97. illus. UG635.G7A1252, v. 9

This year's Statement on the Defence Estimates is probably one of the best in 13 years from the viewpoint of the Royal Air Force (RAF), but there is still much that one can criticize concerning Britain's military aircraft program, such as the trimming of $72 million from funds allocated for research and development. However, the overall British aircraft program remains credible and is such that "even a major change in defence policy . . . would not find Britain lacking aircraft suitable for the task." However, the viability of the program depends on the successful production of a multirole combat aircraft (MRCA), which does not yet exist on paper. The MRCA would be designed to counter Soviet air defense developments such as the pulse-doppler radar, surface-to-air missiles, and high altitude bomber-destroyers and would play an important role in NATO's future capability to counter and limit a Soviet attack without permitting escalation. Once the aircraft becomes a reality, it will make the RAF one of the world's best-equipped air forces by the middle of the 1970's.

238
Thomas, Stephan G. GERMANY AND A NATO POLICY TOWARD THE EAST. Orbis, v. 13, spring 1969: 256-260.
D839.068, v. 13
Special issue devoted to NATO and European security.

Traces the formation of NATO and illustrates "the clear organic relationship between Germany and the aims of Soviet power politics." Thomas contends that Germany is the focal point of the East-West struggle and that the current peace in Germany and Europe is a result only of the NATO alliance. He

concludes that Germany should be committed to a détente policy through which it could pursue genuine peace with the East European nations to end the Soviet Union's traditional conflict strategy and to reunify Europe.

239
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee. INVESTIGATION OF THE PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM; REPORT UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF S. RES. 225, 90TH CONG., 2D SESS. ON STATUS OF U.S. STRATEGIC POWER. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1968. 23 p.
UA23.A4165 1968

Contents.--Witness list.--Introduction.--The evolution of national strategy.--The threat; present and projected.--U.S. forces; present and projected.--Discussion of comparative force capabilities.--Research and development.--Concluding statement.--Recommendations.

Examines the current status of U.S. strategic forces and compares them with their Soviet and Chinese counterparts. The subcommittee notes the declining margin of U.S. superiority in nuclear weapons and the corresponding shift of emphasis in U.S. nuclear policy from damage limitation to assured destruction. While the rapid growth in Soviet nuclear forces in recent years is expected to taper off, the Chinese may constitute a limited threat by the early 1970's. The report concludes that the United States must rely on qualitative improvements in its strategic forces to maintain an adequate deterrent.

240
U.S. VIEWS ON CIVIL DEFENCE; AMERICANS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL AND CIVIL DEFENCE ENVIRONMENTS, 1968. In Canada. Emergency Measures Organization. EMO national digest, v. 9, Aug./Sept. 1969: 24-25.
UA926.C295, v. 9

"Extract of conclusions and implications of a report prepared by the Department of Sociology, University of Pittsburgh" for the U.S. Office of Civil Defense.

Examines the opinions of the American people on international affairs and civil defense in the summer of 1968. The survey revealed that the public is ill informed on civil defense, views a nuclear nonproliferation treaty as desirable, and generally favors an ABM system, although it knows little about it.

241
Vasil'ev, P. SCANDINAVIA AND EUROPEAN SECURITY. International affairs (Moscow) no. 8, Aug. 1969: 44-48.
D839.I465, 1969

Following World War II, the Governments of Finland and Sweden wisely adopted a policy of neutrality, but Denmark and Norway, both victims of Nazi aggression, were cajoled into joining NATO on the basis of unfounded U.S. allegations of possible Soviet attack. After 20 years of NATO membership, these two nations have begun to have second thoughts about the desirability of participation in an alliance that includes imperialist and militarist powers like the United States and West Germany. They note with alarm the revival of German militarism and concurrent efforts to integrate their defense arrangements with those of West Germany. Their defense budgets are determined not by their own needs but by the overall requirements of NATO. Membership in NATO threatens not only their security, however, but their political and economic independence as well. It is not surprising that many Scandinavians have responded favorably to Soviet proposals for a European security conference and for improved relations with Eastern Europe.

242
Vernant, Jacques. [NUCLEAR ARMAMENT AND EUROPE'S DESTINY] Armement nucléaire et destin européen. Revue de défense nationale, v. 25, Oct. 1969: 1671-1675.
D410.R45, v. 25

Since a European conflict could not be limited or localized unless Europe became balkanized and stripped of its alliance systems, war would be total and therefore nuclear. Because a nuclear war would be catastrophic, its possibility is therefore eliminated for rational men. The French nuclear force is a deterrent to conventional and by extension nuclear war, because France retains an independent nuclear initiative, which would disappear were France to join an Anglo-U.S. or European nuclear defense system. France's deterrent force could be effective, however, in a European union with one nuclear force to defend one state; i.e., Europe. Unfortunately Europe is not prepared for such a union, and it would be unrealistic to assume future cooperation. In fact, the French nuclear force, which injects an element of uncertainty into the superpower nuclear balance, is vital to maintain the independence of France and aid European stability and security.

243
Weisbrod, Hanno. AUSTRALIA'S DECISION TO BUY THE F-111. Australian quarterly, v. 41, June 1969: 7-27.
DU80.A95, v. 41
Bibliographical footnotes.

Contends that the announcement by the Australian Government in October 1963 that it had arranged for the purchase of 24 F-111 fighters from the United States was politically motivated. Weisbrod details the steps leading up to the F-111 decision and examines the relevant technical and political considerations. He concludes that coincidence of political interests between the Menzies government and the Kennedy administration led to the American offer of an F-111/B-47 package deal, which was accepted over other offers although it did not significantly improve Australia's defense posture.

244
Weithas, Curt. [NEW FORMS OF SOVIET STRATEGY] Die neuen Formen der sowjetischen Strategie. Revue

militaire générale; general military review, Sept. 1969: 216-237.
U2.R48, 1969
Includes summaries in French and English.

The Soviet attack on Czechoslovakia took place in a manner contrary to all the Western assumptions --without any period of warning and without the slightest approach in the direction of the nuclear threshold. Peacetime manoeuvres became an instrument of strategy. Strong now at its centre, the Soviet Union can henceforward give more attention to its flanks--Finland and the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean has exercised its attraction since ancient times. It took the blockade of Berlin in 1945 and the first takeover of Prague in 1948 to make Europeans and Americans realize faintly the inevitability of successive Russian drives eastward, southward and westward. Soviet aims include the Persian Gulf with its oilfields, reopening of the Suez Canal, and its reopening the Near and the Far East. The Russians now have jet bombers in Egypt and can patrol the Atlantic from Blida in Algeria. Europe will soon be encircled. The Soviet Naval Forces have been reorganized. The Near East Fleet is based in Syria, the Eastern Mediterranean Fleet at Alexandria with the base at Solum being reorganized, the Western Mediterranean Fleet anchors off the Algerian coast, and other units control the passages of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. (Abstract supplied, modified)

245
Westmoreland, William C. [interview] ARMY CUTBACKS--THE RISKS. U.S. news & world report, v. 67, Sept. 29, 1969: 66-71. illus.
JK1.U65, v. 67

Replies to questions on various aspects of U.S. defense policy. Westmoreland speculates on the shape of the post-Vietnam American Army, expresses doubts about the wisdom of current military spending cutbacks, and gives his opinion on the extent of U.S. commitments abroad, the situation in Europe, domestic attacks on the military establishment by the New Left and other groups, the draft, the ROTC, the proposed all-volunteer army, the Vietnam experience, and the outlook for peace in that country.

246
Whetten, Lawrence L. OBSERVATIONS ON FLEXIBLE RESPONSE. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 49, Oct. 1969: 82-86. illus.
Z6723.U35, v. 49

Suggests a reassessment of the flexible response strategy, which would include an upward adjustment of the nuclear threshold and modify the current preference for massive retaliation in case of a Soviet attack against Western Europe. In addition, Whetten discusses conventional options open to the West within the context of the strategy and new approaches to passive defense--i.e., hardening, concealment, and dispersal of missiles. He notes that future strategic planning will have to remain flexible because of the changing nature of alliances and polycentrism within the power blocs and concludes that this planning should include assessments of national interests and strategic objectives to avoid committing the United States and its allies to fighting in areas that do not represent their vital interests.

247
Yahuda, Michael B. CHINA'S MILITARY CAPABILITIES. Current history, v. 57, Sept. 1969: 142-149, 182. map.
D410.C82, v. 57

Communist China's military policies are essentially defensive for a number of reasons. Not only does the People's Liberation Army (PLA) lack the sophisticated weaponry of the Soviet and American armies, but "China's low level of economic development, her comparatively small industrial base, her relatively poor transportation system and her policies of 'self-reliance'" prevent rapid national mobilization. The PLA, which maintains close contact with the general populace and performs vital economic and political functions, can fight effectively only in a "people's war." It could not respond adequately to a nuclear attack by either the Soviet Union or the United States that was not followed by an invasion, or to conflicts short of all-out invasion. China's Air Force consists mainly of obsolescent aircraft, and its Navy--which is the weakest of the services--could defend at most against a small-scale coastal attack. China lacks the transport facilities to sustain a large-scale invasion of any of its neighbors by either sea or land. China has made impressive progress in the acquisition of nuclear weapons but has proceeded more slowly than expected in the development of an effective and reliable delivery system. China will become most vulnerable to a nuclear attack at the point when it has the ability to strike regional targets in Asia or even limited targets in the United States and European Russia but does not have a second-strike capability. It is precisely under these circumstances that the Soviet Union and the United States will be most tempted to launch a preemptive strike. However, it is unlikely that China can develop a second-strike capability by any of the usual methods--submarines, missiles mounted on rails, or hardened launch sites--before 1980. The outlook for the next decade is therefore that China will of necessity continue to pursue a basically defensive military policy.

248
York, Herbert F. MILITARY TECHNOLOGY AND NATIONAL SECURITY. Scientific American, v. 221, Aug. 1969: 17-29. illus.
T1.S5, v. 221

Public debate on the ABM has dramatized a more basic issue: "the feasibility of a purely technological approach to national security." The ABM system proposed by President Nixon and defended in recent congressional hearings raises several basic questions. First, it is not clear that Safeguard is needed to protect Minuteman--assuming

XUM

that it could do so--since it is incredible that the Russians could destroy all U.S. deterrent systems simultaneously as they would have to do to prevent retaliation. Second, even if Safeguard "works" it may not be able to protect Minuteman. The DoD's own estimates indicate that at the current rate of deployment Soviet SS-9 missiles would be able to overwhelm the Safeguard system by exhausting it. Third, there are serious doubts whether Safeguard would work in an actual attack. Fourth, deployment of the Safeguard system will almost surely provoke another round in the strategic arms race. None of the alternatives to Safeguard appears to offer any longrange hope of protecting Minuteman. The only effective solution to protecting Minuteman is both morally and politically unacceptable: to launch on warning, either by developing a computerized detection system that would automatically make this decision or by relegating the final decision to a human agent who would have only minutes in which to deliberate. All of these considerations point to the necessity for finding a solution to the problem of national security that does not rely solely on military technology. The most promising approach would be to enter into serious strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union while there is still parity in strategic weapons. The public debate on the ABM has supported such an initiative by revealing "that Safeguard will safeguard nothing."

249
Yudkin, Richard A. AMERICAN ARMED STRENGTH AND ITS INFLUENCE. In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. America's changing role as a world leader. Philadelphia, 1969. (Its Annals, v. 384, July 1969) p. 1-13.
H1.A4, v. 384

Two questions arise in dealing with this issue: (1) To what extent is our existing military power relevant? (2) What forms of power are needed to enable the United States to achieve its objectives? The process for developing a relevant military posture can best be described as a rational, iterative method involving the interaction of four elements: (1) policy objectives which are derivatives of more transcendent national goals, (2) environment, (3) strategy, and (4) military capabilities. To the degree that we can control and utilize the interaction of these elements, we can begin to formulate positive responses to the two questions posed. Our social and political heritage weighs heavily against military power ever becoming an end in itself. A goal-oriented military force structured according to this process, while still responding to the realities of the environment, acts against such an eventuality. Military power remains relevant to the attainment of both domestic and international goals, since security from external threat is a precondition for internal development and progress. Until substantive changes in the international environment occur, our military power should take those forms which enable it to (1) deter nuclear attack on the United States; (2) contain the level of potential conflict with another nuclear power; (3) insure our national survival should nuclear war occur; (4) protect United States interests; and (5) promote the cause of peace abroad. (Abstract supplied)

250
Zhukov, Iurii. NATO: WHAT NOW? International affairs (Moscow) no. 7, July 1969: 84-89.
D839.I465, 1969

Soviet history of NATO, which concludes that more clear-headed Europeans are now convinced that they will be unable to withstand U.S. economic pressure and political hegemony without the Socialist countries; therefore the idea of European cooperation is gaining ground.

251
Zhukov, Iurii. "THE NEW AMERICAN MILITARISM." Daily review, translations from the Soviet press, v. 15, July 16, 1969: pt. 1, [item] 4, 1-6.
Slav Rm
Translated from Pravda, July 13, 1969.
Slav Rm

Presents a compilation of quotations that criticize U.S. militarism. Zhukov quotes Senators J. William Fulbright and George S. McGovern, Gen. David M. Shoup, and Herbert F. York, in support of the thesis that the military-industrial complex of the United States is striving to turn national human and industrial resources into "a weapon for gaining world domination." Zhukov ascribes this self-criticism to an effort to deflect attention from the basic defects of the U.S. social system by directing public criticism to certain specific features of the system.

CONSEQUENCES OF NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICIES AND WAR

Biological

252
BENEFITS OF CBR RESEARCH. Army digest, v. 24, Aug. 1969: 6-13. illus.
U1.A827, v. 24

Reviews some of the health, economic, and social benefits from U.S. Army research in chemical and biological warfare. In addition to providing "defensive chemical-biological capability" for the U.S. Armed Forces, this research has led to such discoveries as antidotes for heavy metal poisoning, the use of mustard gas to treat cancer and of certain types of nerve gas to relieve glaucoma, chemicals to extinguish fires, and improved methods for detecting minute quantities of cyanide in industry.

253
Bennett, Burton G., and Harold L. Beck. EXTERNAL RADIATION ON BIKINI ATOLL. Nature (London) v. 223, Aug. 30, 1969: 925-928. illus.
Q1.N2, v. 223

Reports on a survey of residual environmental radiation on the islands of Bikini Atoll. Bikini, which was the scene of more than 20 well-documented nuclear tests between 1946 and 1958, presented the investigators with "a unique opportunity for investigating an aged, relatively intense fallout field" where they could "relate exposure rates on the atoll to test locations and environmental conditions at and subsequent to the times of the tests."

254
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE: OFF LIMITS TO DOCTORS. Medical world news, v. 10, July 25, 1969: 23-26B. illus.
R11.M864, v. 10

Examines the U.S. biological warfare program and the controversy that surrounds it from the point of view of the medical profession. Two issues are of greatest concern to physicians. The first is the question whether participation in or support for such a program is compatible with medical ethics. The second relates to the Government's policy of secrecy, which has prevented physicians from getting the information they would need to take countermeasures in the event of a biological attack.

255
Dubrovin, B. COMPLETELY AND FOREVER. Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 21, Aug. 20, 1969: 18.
D839.C87, v. 21
Translated and condensed from Pravda, July 25, 1969. Slav Rm

In recent U.N. discussion the Soviet Union has continued to stand for a complete and permanent ban on chemical and biological weapons. It regards the 1925 Geneva Protocol on these weapons as a significant document, which stood the test of the Second World War and should be signed by all nations. The British proposal of July 10, 1969, to ban only biological weapons would undermine the Geneva Protocol and is thoroughly nonsensical because the two types of weapons have always been considered in combination, and "a ban on the use of these types of weapons represents a single, universally recognized international legal standard." Great Britain obviously does not want to offend the United States, which uses chemical weapons in the Vietnam War, and it does not favor the ban because, along with West Germany, it is a producer of chemical weapons.

256
GERMS, ANYONE? [editorial] Commonweal, v. 90, Aug. 8, 1968: 475-476. AP2.C6897, v. 90

Upholds the recommendation of U.N. Secretary General U Thant that chemical and biological weapons be eliminated. The British proposal to prohibit the "development, production or use of such weapons 'in any circumstances'" and to require the destruction of all bacteriological and chemical stockpiles or their conversion to peaceful uses, if possible, is supported as the only possible solution to this problem.

257
Harkness, D. D., and A. Walton. CARBON-14 IN THE BIOSPHERE AND HUMANS. Nature (London) v. 223, Sept. 20, 1969: 1216-1218.
Q1.N2, v. 223

Points out shortcomings in some of the mathematical models being used to compute how much carbon-14 generated by nuclear explosions is reaching the human body from the environment. Many uncertainties enter into calculations of this kind, and these can lead to errors large enough to be of significance in estimates of the somatic effects of artifically generated carbon-14 on human populations.

258
Hersh, Seymour M. DARE WE DEVELOP BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS? New York times magazine, Sept. 28, 1969: 28-29, 78, 80, 83, 85, 86, 88.
AP2.N6575, 1969

The burden of future control of biological weapons is upon the United States, which is the world leader in the development of these weapons. Indicative of this development is Fort Detrick, whose "most important mission is to develop a variety of diseases capable of killing or maiming man." Another is the Pine Bluff Arsenal, which is geared to the massive production of biological warfare agents in the event of an enemy attack; i.e., by the Soviet Union. The most significant dangers from the current U.S. biological warfare programs "stem from the possibility of the inadvertent spread of disease that could trigger a worldwide epidemic of doomsday proportions" and from the accidents and deaths that have occurred in biological warfare laboratories. The Pentagon continues to defend its biological warfare programs on the grounds that the United States needs this type of deterrent, and Pentagon officials, including the Secretary of Defense, insist that America will never be the first to use biological weapons. However, there is a movement in Congress and elsewhere to urge the President to resubmit for ratification the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which bans the first use of chemical and biological weapons. The tide is rising in favor of such a proposal, but the military will never agree to an international ban on chemical and biological weapons unless foolproof means to monitor it are devised. These technical difficulties should be solved quickly in order to halt the development and production of weapons that have the capability to destroy all mankind.

259
Langer, Elinor. U.N.: EXPERTS' REPORT ON CBW SUPPORTS DISARMAMENT EFFORT. Science, v. 165, July 11, 1969: 163-164. Q1.S35, v. 165

Evaluation of the "Report of the Secretary General on Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use," issued as U.N. document A/7575. Langer declares the most significant recommendation of the report to be the "parenthetical inclusion of 'tear gas and other harassing agents'" with the substances banned by the Geneva Protocol.

XUM

260
McCarthy, Richard D. BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AS NATIONAL POLICY: AN OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY. Vital speeches of the day, v. 35, Sept. 1, 1969: 681-683.
PN6121.V52, v. 35

Speech delivered before the American Bar Association, Dallas, Tex., Aug. 10, 1969.

U.S. policy on chemical and biological weapons is to maintain a defensive capability to conduct military operations in a toxic environment and a limited offensive capability to deter the use of these weapons by other nations. The emphasis, however, is on deterrence rather than defense. Moreover, the United States reportedly contemplated the offensive first use of biological weapons during the Cuban missile crisis and maintains huge stockpiles of such weapons for possible use. The United States should unequivocally renounce the use of biological weapons even if they are used first by an enemy since the effects of these weapons are less predictable than those of either conventional or nuclear weapons. The Government should also formally ratify the Geneva Protocol of 1925 or, even better, support the resolution currently pending before the 25-Nation Disarmament Conference to ban biological weapons entirely.

261
Novick, Sheldon. THE CARELESS ATOM. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1969. 225 p.
TK9152.N6

Contents.--Accidents happen.--Turning swords into plowshares.--Earthquakes and accidents.--The problem of insurance.--Radiation damage.--A new pollution problem.--The coming thing.--Why reactors?--Information and action.--Notes.--Index.

Describes the adverse effect that the atomic energy program is having on America's environment and argues that decisionmaking in the program has largely been removed from the normal course of open debate. Between 1949 and 1964, according to T. J. Thompson of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, there were nine serious reactivity accidents in nonmilitary installations in the United States. Sheldon believes the major argument that proponents of the program use to acquire more reactors is that there is a decreasing fuel supply in America and concludes that altering the present course of atomic energy development in the United States will not be an easy task.

262
Petrov, M. THE URGENT NEED TO PROHIBIT CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE. International affairs (Moscow) no. 8, Aug. 1969: 40-43.
D839.I465, 1969

Urges a complete ban on the stockpiling and use of chemical and biological weapons. Petrov contends that the United States, Great Britain, and West Germany have stockpiled huge quantities of these weapons since World War II and have intensified their efforts in recent years. He reviews the history of attempts to ban chemical and biological weapons and affirms the support of the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries for "the principle of unconditional and immediate banning [of] all weapons of mass destruction."

263
RECLAIMING THE WORLD'S MOST H-BOMBED AREA. U.S. news & world report, v. 67, Oct. 13, 1969: 98-101. illus.
JK1.U65, v. 67

Depicts the reclamation of Bikini Atoll, site of 23 large-scale nuclear and thermonuclear explosions. Eleven years after the last test series, the physical destruction caused by the blasts is still very much in evidence, but radioactivity has fallen to a level where the islands are once again safe for human habitation. To prepare the atoll for the return of the native population, the debris left by the tests has been removed and trees planted.

264
THE SILENT ARSENAL: A UNITED NATIONS REPORT ON THE PRODUCTION, USE, AND EFFECTS OF CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. Saturday review, v. 52, Sept. 27, 1969: 14-17, 43.
Z1219.S25, v. 52

"Excerpted and adapted from a study prepared by an international group of experts for U.N. Secretary General U Thant in accordance with a resolution of the U.N. General Assembly."

Surveys the principal categories of chemical and biological agents and pleads for an immediate and unconditional ban on their production and use. The chemical agents described are mustard, phosgene and related compounds such as hydrogen cyanide and botulinum toxin, and psychochemicals; biological agents described include anthrax, coccidioidomycosis, and plague. The report concludes that the unpredictability of these agents makes them of dubious value to any nation's security.

265
Sternglass, Ernest J. THE DEATH OF ALL CHILDREN; A FOOTNOTE TO THE A.B.M. CONTROVERSY. Esquire, v. 72, Sept. 1969: 1a-1d.
AP2.E845, v. 72

"A full-scale A.B.M. system, protecting the United States against a Soviet first strike, could, if successful, cause the extinction of the human race" because of the genetic effect of long-lived strontium-90. U.S. infant mortality rates declined from 1935 to 1950 except along the path of nuclear fallout. Factors like medical care, population movement, new drugs, pesticides, smoking, or epidemics do not explain infant mortality trends. Genetic effects were absent in Hiroshima and Nagasaki because the bombs were detonated at such an altitude that there was essentially no fallout. For the United States as a whole there is a correlation between excess infant mortality over the 1935-1950 base line, the total strontium-90 produced by testing, and the 4-year average concentra-

tion in U.S. milk from 1955, after the first large H-bomb tests, and 1965, when strontium-90 concentrations leveled off and declined. Some argue that the ABM system is needed to prevent destruction of U.S. deterrent forces by a massive first strike from Russian SS-9 missiles. Such an attack appears inconceivable because the amounts of long-lived strontium-90 that it would release into the world's atmosphere would cause the death of all Russian infants born in the next generation, ending the existence of the Russian people and all mankind. The height of bomb detonation makes no difference because the half-life of strontium-90 is 28 years, sufficient time for its return to earth by the next generation. Even if a "clean" weapon without fissionable material were possible, the carbon-14 produced would affect the genetic material controlling the life processes of all living cells, and it would be 5,770 years before half of the radioactivity were exhausted.

266
TWO CHEMICAL PRODUCTS PLAY STRATEGIC ROLE IN VIETNAM COMBAT. Army research and development, v. 10, Jan. 1969: 10-11. U393.A8, v. 10

Describes the role of two chemical agents in the Vietnam War, gives examples of weapons that have been designed for firing these agents, and concludes that they are valuable in terms of their tactical use and the lives they save.

267
U.S. Library of Congress. Legislative Reference Service. Science Policy Research Division. A TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT OF THE VIETNAM DEFOLIANT MATTER; A CASE HISTORY. Report to the Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development of the Committee on Science and Astronautics, U.S. House of Representatives, Ninety-first Congress, first session. Aug. 8, 1969. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1969. 73 p. (Serial F)
P&GP RR
At head of title: Committee print.

Partial contents.--Evolution of the military herbicide program.--Criticism of herbicide warfare. --Role of the AAAS [American Association for the Advancement of Science] in assessing war use of herbicides.--Conclusions and observations.

Information on the development and use of herbicides and the controversy resulting from their military use in Vietnam.

268
Vasil'ev, Gennadii. POISONERS FROM THE PENTAGON. Daily review, translations from the Soviet press, v. 15, June 30, 1969: pt. 1 [item] 5, 1-2.
Slav Rm
Translated from Pravda, June 30, 1969.
Slav Rm

Criticizes the "sinister Pentagon plan" to dispose of obsolete poison chemicals by dumping them into the Atlantic Ocean and U.S. failure to ratify the Geneva Protocol, which bans chemical and bacteriological warfare. Vasil'ev asserts that the development of such weapons is "one of the manifestations of the aggressive aspirations of American imperialism."

Economic

269
Alexander, Archibald S. THE COST OF WORLD ARMAMENTS. Scientific American, v. 221, Oct. 1969: 21-27.
T1.S5, v. 221
Text of survey is annotated as item 1694 in v. 5, no. 4, of this bibliography.

Analysis and discussion, illustrated by graphs, of World Military Expenditures and Related Data: Calendar Year 1966 and Summary Trends, 1962-1967, the third and latest survey by the Economics Bureau, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. One of the findings: "In the first half of the 20th century the world spent $4 trillion and millions of lives in wars and preparations for wars . . . [and] may now be on the verge of launching military programs costing $4 trillion in just one decade."

270
[ANATOMY OF WAR; NEW DOCUMENTS ON THE ROLE OF GERMAN MONOPOLY CAPITAL IN THE PREPARATION AND CONDUCT OF WORLD WAR II] Anatomie des Krieges. Neue Dokumente über die Rolle des deutschen Monopolkapitals bei der Vorbereitung und Durchführung des zweiten Weltkrieges. Berlin, Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1969. 523 p. illus.
D735.A6
Authors: Horst Bednareck, Wolfgang Bleyer, Klaus Drobisch, Dietrich Eichholtz, Gerhart Hass, Wolfgang Schumann, and Raimund Wagner.
Editors: Dietrich Eichholtz and Wolfgang Schumann.
List of documents: p. 41-77.
Bibliography: p. 35-40.

Contents.--Introduction.--List of documents.--Index.

Presents the texts of documents on Nazi Germany's defense industry and war economy and asserts that the monopolistic phase of German capitalism was responsible for World War II.

271
Bamberg, Hans-Dieter. [ECONOMY AND REMILITARIZATION; INFLUENCE OF ECONOMIC INTERESTS ON THE DECISION TO REARM THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC AS REFLECTED IN THE LITERATURE OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC] Ökonomie und Remilitarisierung; die Einwirkung ökonomischer Interessen bei der Entscheidung für die Wiederaufrüstung der Bundesrepublik im Spiegel der DDR-Literatur. Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, v. 14, Aug. 1969: 829-849.
D839.B57, v. 14

Discusses the East German opinion that West Germany's rearmament policy has been dictated by

the mechanisms of the capitalist economic system. Bamberg considers such aspects of that opinion as the interrelationship of business interests and armaments and the control of the state by "monopoly capital" and describes the East German view of West Germany's rearmament process.

272
Cobb, Stephen A. DEFENSE SPENDING AND FOREIGN POLICY IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 13, Sept. 1969: 358-369.
JX1901.J6, v. 13

In an attempt to test part of a theory that a "military-industrial complex" unduly influences foreign policy formulation in this country, we have examined the influence of defense spending concentrations on the voting of Congressmen in the area of foreign policy. A Guttman Scale of foreign policy items was developed as a dependent variable. We also developed two separate indices of defense spending concentrations from Department of Defense data. After entering region represented and party in the regression equation, we found that defense spending concentrations had absolutely no effect on voting. We then subdivided the sample on appropriate lines and checked for statistically significant correlations between defense spending and foreign policy voting. Almost none were found. We concluded that the ideological predispositions represented by region and party were the controlling factors and that defense spending was not an important influence. We then made conjectures about future research in the area, including the theoretically more promising possible relationship between defense appropriations bill voting and defense spending concentrations. (Abstract supplied, modified)

273
Connolly, Violet. THE SOVIET PACIFIC BASTION; NORTH OF USSURI. Survey, no. 70/71, winter/spring 1969: 176-192. DK1.S549, 1969

Depicts how the Sino-Soviet conflict has stimulated development of the vast natural resources of the Far Eastern region of the U.S.S.R., a center of domestic and international problems and significant Soviet economic and political ambitions.

274
Duscha, Julius. THE PENTAGON UNDER FIRE. Progressive, v. 33, Sept. 1969: 32-34, 36-37.
AP2.P8655, v. 33

Congressional efforts to control military spending are receiving more support both in and out of Congress than at any time since the 1930's. Many influential Congressmen continue to defend the military, however, and lucrative defense contracts are an important factor in many areas. There will probably be no major reductions in defense costs "unless the nation has a President, a Secretary of Defense, and a Director of the Budget who believe that military costs are too high." Neither President Nixon nor Secretary of Defense Laird, both of whom are great admirers of the military, have shown any inclination to reexamine the longstanding foreign and defense policies that have led to the present $80 billion defense budget. Director of the Budget Robert Mayo has established a procedure for reviewing defense spending but may not be willing to challenge Laird or, if he does, may not receive the President's support. Several Senators and Congressmen have led at least partially successful attempts to reduce spending or establish closer controls over the military, but their efforts are not likely to bear much fruit--despite the military's present unpopularity--as long as the administration refuses to press for significant defense cuts.

275
Freel, William F. JOINT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE DISCLOSES NEW EFFORTS TO CUT U.S. SUBMARINE POWER. Navy, v. 12, July/Aug. 1969: 32-33. illus.
VA49.N28, v. 12

Reports congressional criticism of proposals to cancel work on the U.S. Navy's quiet submarine, scuttle ten Polaris submarines, and "stretch out" procurement of nuclear-powered surface ships. These and other cost-saving proposals, which owe their origin to Pentagon systems analysts, will put U.S. security in jeopardy and should be rejected.

276
Fried, Edward R. THE COST OF ALLIANCE. Interplay, v. 3, June/July 1969: 42-44. illus.
P&GP RR

The United States is assuming a greater share of the costs of supplying equipment and troops to NATO than are the European members. America will spend approximately $15 billion a year for general-purpose forces in NATO, which is "almost three-fourths of the combined total defense budgets of all European NATO countries." Some U.S. policy-makers believe their country's investment in NATO is misplaced and that the United States should make a unilateral withdrawal of its troops to force the European members to do something. However, such unilateral action may beget a response in the same direction, and, if NATO is to remain an effective instrument of collective security, it will be necessary to face these problems together. The other critical financial issue confronting the organization is the balance-of-payments problem, which can be resolved by the implementation of offset agreements between Germany and the United States. The present situation, in which the United States sustains foreign exchange costs and Germany receives foreign exchange windfalls, "is a financial travesty."

277
Gierschke, H. [THE DEPENDENCE OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC ON RAW MATERIAL IMPORTS] Die Abhängigkeit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland von Rohstoffimporten. Wehrkunde, v. 18, Sept. 1969: 469-477. map.
U3.W396, v. 18

Discusses the causes of West German dependence on foreign raw materials and the degree to which the German Federal Republic could rely on its own resources in a crisis. Gierschke points out that the national security requires increasing the domestic production and stockpiling of raw materials, securing raw materials from the Third World, and avoiding dependence on imports from the Warsaw Treaty Organization countries.

278
Herold, Detlef. [REGIONAL DIFFERENTIATION OF THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEFENSE POTENTIAL IN THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC] Über die regionale Differenzierung des sozioökonomischen Wehrpotentials in der BRD. Wehrkunde, v. 18, June 1969: 313-316. illus.
U3.W396, v. 18

Inquiry into the geographical and structural susceptibility of West Germany's socioeconomic defense potential to crises. Herold discusses such regional indicators as the density of population, industrial capacity, and gross product of an area, describes the measurement methods employed, and presents the statistical results of his inquiry. He concludes that the "domestic and international divisions of labor and trade enable the growth of a highly developed economy and in effect the basis of a defense potential, but they create an extreme susceptibility to crises."

279
Kaufman, Richard F. AS EISENHOWER WAS SAYING . . . 'WE MUST GUARD AGAINST UNWARRENTED INFLUENCE BY THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX.' New York times magazine, June 22, 1969: 10-11, 68-72.
AP2.N6575, 1969

Marshals evidence for the thesis that there is an ever-widening community of interests between the U.S. Defense Department and its large contractors and that this militates against the public interest. Kaufman examines defense procurement and personnel policies, the institutional links between the Pentagon and industry, and the influence of defense spending on the domestic economy, foreign policy, research and development, and education. He concedes that a military establishment is a necessary evil but expresses alarm at the great size and rate of growth of the military-industrial partnership. The only viable defense against its spreading influence is to sharply reduce the defense budget.

280
MacAvoy, Paul W. ECONOMIC STRATEGY FOR DEVELOPING NUCLEAR BREEDER REACTORS. Cambridge, Mass., M.I.T. Press [1969] 204 p. illus.
TK9203.B7M29

Partial contents.--The questions in future reactor research and economic approaches to answers.--The costs of fast breeder research and development programs.--Initial forecasts of the benefits from breeder reactors.--The economic fast breeder development program.

Economic evaluation of the breeder reactor development program in the United States. MacAvoy emphasizes national economic benefits rather than technical advances in the reactor industry alone. His objective is to find alternative breeder programs that would offer the greatest economic benefits over and above research costs.

281
THE NEW PRESSURES TO TRIM U.S. DEFENSES. U.S. news & world report, v. 67, July 21, 1969: 38-40. illus.
JK1.U65, v. 67

Notes the growing pressure in the U.S. Congress to trim defense spending and reduce overseas commitments. Distrust of the military-industrial complex, a disinclination to play the role of world policeman, and concern over growing domestic problems underlie Congress's mood of retrenchment. The outcome will be a slight decrease in defense spending this year, a sharp manpower cutback after the Vietnam War, and a general reduction in the size and number of overseas commitments.

282
Prina, L. Edgar. BUDGET CUT BRINGS BIGGEST NAVY GAMBLE OF CENTURY. Navy, Oct. 1969: 18-22. illus.
VA49.N28, 1969

Speculates on the consequences of the U.S. Navy's decision to meet a Congressionally imposed $1 billion spending cutback by reducing operating forces and personnel while sparing new construction and research and development. The decision is a gamble because there is no certainty that the Navy can continue to control the seas with its reduced forces, but it could pay off in the long run since it permits the fleet modernization program to go forward uninterrupted.

283
Sisson, Elbert R. THE OVERPAID OVERKILLERS; BRAINS, BRAWN, GOLD, AND GUNS. Peace, v. 4, spring/summer 1969: 20-25. P&GP RR
Chapter from a forthcoming book, America Against Man.

Denounces capital and labor for having been seduced by money into the production and sale of weapons and condemns the U.S. educational community for research "into the science of weaponry . . . and techniques of mass human extermination." Sisson describes the United States as "a world educator in . . . organized violence and a wholesaler of the most up-to-date and efficient machinery for its conduct." American society, according to Sisson, is so conditioned to accept militarism, the draft, and the involvement of a large part of the population in military-industrial employment as to lead to totalitarian military power.

284
Spencer, Daniel L., and Alexander Woroniak. VALUING TRANSFER OF MILITARY-ACQUIRED SKILLS TO CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT. Kyklos, v. 22, fasc. 3, 1969: 467-492.
H1.A15, v. 22

XUM

Summaries in English, French, and German.
Study conducted under the sponsorship of the U.S. Air Force Office of Scientific Research.

Without entering the controversy on the importance of human capital in relation to technological progress, an economist faces a challenging technical problem: how to measure or quantify in monetary terms the significant value of specific skills, both for the individual and for the social entity. This paper attempts to contribute to this objective on two levels: one is to develop an acceptable methodology for evaluation of the incremental contribution of skills; second, the paper summarizes preliminary results of a case study on the transfer of skills acquired during military training to the civilian sector in Japan during the post-World War II period. Implications of the study suggest a critical review of by-product contributions of military expenditures. In spite of pejorative evaluations of the military establishment on moral grounds by a segment of public opinion, military training remains a pervasive mechanism for mass development of skills in all nations, particularly in less-developed and socialist countries. The potentiality of tapping the experience and the know-how of military establishments for development of skills transferable for application in a progressively technical society opens opportunity for further scientific exploration and operational exploitation. (Abstract supplied)

285
Stennis, John C. DANGER IN ARMS CUTS: A SENATOR'S WARNING. U.S. news & world report, v. 67, Sept. 15, 1969: 38-39. JK1.U65, v. 67
Excerpts from an address to the U.S. Senate, Sept. 3, 1969.

Decries attempts in Congress to reduce the FY 1971 military budget. Stennis argues that budget cuts should be delayed until after the Vietnam War is settled and then accomplished through a reduction in numbers of military personnel on active duty rather than the elimination of funds for new weapons systems. Proposals before the Congress to cancel procurement of new ships, tanks, and fighter and transport aircraft would, if adopted, "cut the bone and muscle out of our 1975 military capability."

286
Walsh, John. NAVAL R & D: CONVERSION SOUGHT FOR RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE LAB. Science, v. 164, June 6, 1969: 1148-1149. Q1.S35, v. 164

Details the efforts of several West Coast scientists and a bipartisan group of San Francisco Bay area Congressmen to delay dispersal of the staff and instruments of the Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory, scheduled to close in December, until new Federal support can be obtained to continue nonmilitary research there.

287
WAR WORK PAYROLLS START HEADING DOWN. Business week, June 14, 1969: 134-135. illus.
HF5001.B89, 1969

Fiscal year 1968 saw a slight decline in defense industry employment, and the figures for fiscal year 1969 are expected to show a continuation of this trend, along with a leveling off of prime contract awards. With an end to the fighting in Vietnam, these falloffs can be expected to accelerate, but, since defense spending of $30 billion is a rather small increment in a gross national product approaching $1 trillion, it is anticipated that the problems of adjusting to a peace economy will be mild. However, the distribution of the impact will be uneven. Some areas are more heavily dependent than others on the defense spending that has been generated by the Vietnam War. The Pentagon keeps tabs on the "defense dependency ratio" of each State in order to gain some insight into how each will be affected by pending cutbacks. These figures show that the South and the Midwest have been the major beneficiaries of increased Pentagon spending. The statistics understate the whole problem, however, since they do not include indirect employment, multiplier effects, and personnel on military bases. These figures must be supplied, and a number of other questions must be answered before any accurate predictions can be made about the impact of defense spending cutbacks.

Ethical and social

288
Douglass, James W. THE NON-VIOLENT CROSS; A THEOLOGY OF REVOLUTION AND PEACE. New York, Macmillan [1968] xv, 301 p.
BT736.4.D6 1968

Partial contents.--The non-violent power of Pacem in Terris.--Toward a new perspective on war: the vision of Vatican II.--Anatomy of the just war.

Counters the charge that Pacem in Terris is unrealistic and naive with the affirmation that the peace of nations rests on mutual trust. Douglass terms more realistic the dependence on nonviolence rather than on military strength and finds the just war concept unacceptable to a Christian conscience. He concludes that "in the context of a global status quo which is murderous in its distribution of wealth at the same time as it is supported by genocidal armaments, a nonviolent politics of protest, and eventual revolution, is essential to human hope."

289
Eckhardt, William, and Alan G. Newcombe. MILITARISM, PERSONALITY, AND OTHER SOCIAL ATTITUDES. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 13, June 1969: 210-219.
JX1901.J6, v. 13

Militarism has been shown by previous studies to be associated or correlated with authoritarianism, dogmatism, neuroticism, rigidity, conservatism, and religion. However, most of these studies have correlated militarism with only one other variable at a time. The purpose of the present study was to correlate all of these measures with each other

XUM

simultaneously, in order to establish their coherence as a complex of personal and ideological variables in the human mind. A scale of militarism was administered to 46 subjects along with scales of authoritarianism, conservatism, dogmatism, intolerance of ambiguity, rigidity, and tendermindedness. Tendermindedness was loaded on a factor with religious membership in more orthodox churches, and more church attendance. This religious factor proved to be relatively but not entirely independent of a second factor, which determined a complex of variables including the other six just listed. Approximately 50 percent (squared factor loading) of the variance in militarism was determined by this latter factor. It is suggested as a generalized hypothesis that militarism is at least partly a function of a hypocritically restrictive culture. (Abstract supplied)

290
Sadler, Jack R. WEST AFRICA SEARCHES FOR STABILITY. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 49, Nov. 1969: 28-38. illus. Z6723.U35, v. 49

Discusses the role of the military in west African politics. Sadler argues that the cause of military intervention in the domestic politics of the states of this region is that "the only institution with discipline, organization, and the ability to enforce law and order has proved to be the army."

291
Stiller, Ernst A. [THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC IN ARMS; MILITARISM BECOMES A PRINCIPLE HERE] DDR in Waffen; Militarismus wird hier zum Prinzip. Europäische Begegnung, v. 9, June 1969: 238-241. illus. AP30.E78, v. 9

Describes military mass education and military propaganda in East Germany and includes discussion of, among other things, childhood education and the paramilitary organizations.

292
Van Buskirk, Lawrence E. MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL IN NATIONBUILDING. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 49, Nov. 1969: 10-17. illus. Z6723.U35, v. 49

Proposes the use of U.S. Army maintenance personnel to assist underdeveloped countries in the mechanization of their agriculture. Van Buskirk recommends that the Army form equipment maintenance training teams and dispatch them to underdeveloped countries to set up training programs staffed by local instructors.

293
Visscher, Maurice B. SCIENCE AND THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX: AN ETHICAL PROBLEM. Humanist, v. 29, July/Aug. 1969: 15-16. BL2700.H78, v. 29

The scientific community has a large self-interest in promoting the military establishment since money for basic research is more readily available through military than nonmilitary channels. Its members do not necessarily approve of the projects in which they are engaged and are disturbed by the increasing military control over basic science-support policy, mainly because of the complex ethical issues involved. Nevertheless, the willingness "of scientists to accept financial support from the military unquestionably increases the power and prestige of that establishment" and poses the question of whether such actions best serve humanity. Perhaps scientists should adopt a Hippocratic code for their profession; human survival may depend upon the immediate "clarification of background issues, including ethical ones," surrounding scientific participation in war-related research.

294
WAR, PEACE, AND CONSCIENCE. Presbyterian life, v. 22, July 15, 1969: 16-17, 31-33. BX8901.B57, v. 22

A statement by the 181st general assembly of the United Presbyterian Church.

Explicates the theory of the "just war," emphasizes that responsibility for deciding whether or not to support a particular war lies with the individual, and urges legal recognition of the right to selective conscientious objection.

Other

295
AMERICAN MILITARISM. Look, v. 33, Aug. 12, 1969: 13-28, 30-34, 36-39, 41-43; Aug. 26: 17-24, 26-29, 31-35, 37. illus. AP2.L79, v. 33

Contents.--pt. 1. Introduction. What is it doing to us? by Eric Sevareid. The Marine machine, by Thomas Barry. Incident at Van Duong, by Jack Shepherd. The draft: hazardous to your health? by John Poppy. Our restless reserves.--pt. 2. The defense establishment, by Charles W. Bailey and Frank Wright. The power people. Defense contract: the money web, by Gerald Astor. Generals for hire, by Berkeley Rice. The waste: how to cut the budget, by David R. Maxey. The university arsenal. Our security lies beyond weapons, by W. Averell Harriman.

A critique of the American military and its social, political, and economic influence. Pt. 1 deals mainly with the role of the military in promoting social attitudes favorable to militarism. Pt. 2 focuses on the intimate relationship between defense expenditures and the American economy.

296
Beaumont, Roger A. PROSPECTS FOR NUCLEAR NULLIFICATION. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 49, Oct. 1969: 29-35. illus. Z6723.U35, v. 49

XUM

Future technological innovations, such as warning satellites, orbiting missiles, ABM systems, lasers, and counterlasers, could nullify the thermonuclear threat. However, a bombless world "may be less a panacea and more of a Pandora's box" because nuclear nullification would give disproportionate power to the Soviet Union in Europe and to Communist China in Asia and would increase the need to plan for chemical and biological warfare. It would make those areas of the world susceptible to antimilitarism--i.e., the United States and Western Europe--more vulnerable to conventional attack by the massive ground forces of the Soviet Union. Further, it would increase the likelihood of war in Europe over Germany because there would be no threat of nuclear retaliation, which has been the main reason for the present stability in that area. Although a bombless world would mean removing the mortgage from millions of people's lives, the world would be returned to those with large conventional armies "and the masters of the darker side of technology."

297
Bowles, Chester. AMERICA'S NEXT RENDEZVOUS WITH DESTINY. Saturday review, v. 52, Sept. 6, 1969: 17-19, 48. Z1219.S25, v. 52

The present period of turbulence is not the first time that Americans have experienced a crisis of confidence in their basic institutions and values. The elections of Jefferson in 1800, Lincoln in 1860, and Roosevelt in 1932 also constituted major watersheds in American history that led to new consenses on fundamental political, social, and economic values. The Nation now appears to be moving toward a fourth watershed, which will be instituted by and reflect the aspirations of the emerging new generation. These new leaders must address themselves to several critical problems: the need for congressional reform to eliminate control by small but powerful minorities, the serious imbalance in national priorities, the excessive expenditures on national security, major deficiencies in public medical care and housing programs, the disproportionate power of the Federal vis-a-vis state and local governments, an antiquated tax structure, and the problems of the developing nations of Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

298
CANADA'S ATOMIC ENERGY. In Canada. Dept. of External Affairs. Canadian weekly bulletin, v. 24, Aug. 13, 1969: 1-2.
F1034.A3, v. 24

Excerpts from the 1968-1969 annual report of the Atomic Energy of Canada Limited.

Discusses the chief objectives of the Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) and the Canadian nuclear power system, whose outstanding feature is the economical use of neutrons in its nuclear reactors. The report includes several highlights of 1968 involving AECL's accomplishments and responsibilities with respect to developing nuclear power systems to meet long-term Canadian needs for low-cost energy.

299
Du Bois, Victor D. THE STRUGGLE FOR STABILITY IN THE UPPER VOLTA: PART IV, FOREIGN REACTION TO THE OVERTHROW OF PRESIDENT MAURICE YAMÉOGO. [Hanover, N.H.] American Universities Field Staff [1969] 15 p. (Fieldstaff reports. West Africa series, v. 12, no. 4, Upper Volta)
DT491.A7, v. 12

Reports that replacement of the Upper Volta Government of President Maurice Yaméogo by a military regime headed by Lt. Col. Sangoulé Lamizana, former Army Chief of Staff, caused surprise and some dismay in Africa and Europe. The strongest reaction was in the Ivory Coast because of the long friendship and cooperation of the two countries. While the new chief of state quickly reaffirmed Upper Volta's political alliances and alinement with the West, friendly relations with the Ivory Coast have been difficult to reestablish.

300
Gerasimov, G. MISSILES, MYTHS AND MONEY. New times, no. 33, Aug. 20, 1969: 5-6.
D839.N483, 1969

The U.S. administration's decision to establish an ABM system around some of its ICBM bases caused doubts among the public about the system's efficiency and cost and aroused a bitter battle in the U.S. Senate. Although President Nixon himself conceded that at the present time no antiballistic missiles can safeguard all the people against an attack by a sophisticated major nuclear power, the project was not abandoned, only modified and renamed. It is regarded as nonprovocative because its aim is allegedly only to protect America's retaliatory capability. The whole discussion is pointless because everybody can see that the Soviet Union does not want to attack the United States. Nevertheless, Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird does not hesitate to scare the people by pretending that the Soviet Union is preparing for a first strike, to ready the situation for a demand for greater defense appropriations. He, of course, is being pressed by the military-industrial complex, which welcomes the project as a continuation of profits from Defense Department contracts. The failure of the Vietnam War, however, has forced many Americans to take a new look at the military, and the ABM debate may not be ended by the passage of the bill by the Senate on August 6, 1969.

301
Hurewitz, Jacob C. MIDDLE EAST POLITICS: THE MILITARY DIMENSION. New York, Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Praeger [1969] xviii, 553 p. (Praeger university series, U-660)
DS62.8.H8
"Bibliographic note": p. 511-531.

Partial contents.--Legacies: The Islamic tradition. The beginnings of military modernization. European imperial styles.--Postwar politics: Military politics and the lingering cold war. Armies in postwar politics.--Military republics. --Military-civilian coalitions.--Traditional

XUM

monarchies.--Modernizing monarchies.--Non-military republics.--Regional consequences: Armies as agencies of social change. Arms races in the region. Races in the Arab-Israel zone. Changing military politics and United States options.

Inquires into the causes and consequences of military interventions in the political life of the states of the Middle East. Hurewitz examines the postwar record of civil-military relations in some 18 states of the region and relates this record to the domestic peculiarities of each state, its regional associations, and its place in the cold war. He concludes by identifying U.S. political and military policy options in the area.

302
Morison, Robert S. SCIENCE AND SOCIAL ATTITUDES. Science, v. 165, July 11, 1969: 150-156.
Q1.S35, v. 165

Adapted from an address at a conference on "Science and the Future," Boulder, Colo., Apr. 13-19, 1969, sponsored by the British Association for the Advancement of Science and the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

Assesses public opinion of the role of science in military affairs. Morison ascribes society's unfavorable attitudes to the fact that beneficial scientific discoveries from military research seem to be "crumbs that fall from the rich Pentagon's table." He proposes instead that the military use of science be spinoff from nonmilitary research.

303
PLAYING WITH DICE ON AMCHITKA. Nature (London) v. 224, Oct. 11, 1969: 98-99.
Q1.N2, v. 224

The nuclear tests conducted by Communist China and the United States last week raise some interesting points for discussion. The Chinese conducted two tests, one in the atmosphere and one underground. Outsiders can only speculate about the reasons for the underground test. It is doubtful that China is conducting Plowshare-type experiments or preparing to sign the partial test ban treaty. More likely, the object was to conceal the test from observation by the United States and the Soviet Union, both of which could be using aerial surveillance of the Chinese and French tests to study such things as radar blackout. The U.S. test program on Amchitka has provoked a flood of protest. Many fear that the explosion of a nuclear device on the island will trigger an earthquake or tidal wave. Though the United States has an admirable nuclear safety record, and the first Amchitka test went off without a hitch, predicting seismic effects, as every seismologist will admit, is no simple matter, and the Atomic Energy Commission is ill advised to continue the present test series at Amchitka.

304
Ryall, Alan, and William U. Savage. A COMPARISON OF SEISMOLOGICAL EFFECTS FOR THE NEVADA UNDERGROUND TEST BOXCAR WITH NATURAL EARTHQUAKES IN THE NEVADA REGION. Journal of geophysical research, v. 74, Aug. 15, 1969: 4281-4289. illus.
QC811.J6, v. 74

Presents the results of a field seismic study of local earthquake activity at the Nevada Test Site, following the Boxcar underground nuclear test (m_b=6.42) on April 26, 1968. Thousands of small aftershocks were recorded in the six-week period following the explosion, and events selected for focal determination were found to lie in a zone 12 km. long, 3-4 km. wide, and 6 km. deep. There is evidence of migration of this activity with time with earlier earthquakes concentrated in the vicinity of the blast and northeast part of the zone and later activity in an extension of the zone to the southwest. Most of the Boxcar aftershocks had a focal depth of less than about 5 1/2 km., which is shallower than the predominant depths found for natural earthquakes in the Nevada region. Recurrence curves for the Nevada Test Site sequence had a b-value of 0.62, different from values of 0.79-0.84 for natural earthquakes in the region. The sequence decayed according to the relationship $N(t)=372t^{-0.79}$, with N(t) and t in number of recorded events per hour and hours, respectively. A unique type of seismic event, seemingly related to the blast cavity, was observed following the Boxcar explosion; it is typified by emergent P arrivals, poorly defined S waves, low signal frequency, and long-duration surface waves. Differences between the Boxcar aftershock sequence and natural earthquakes in the Nevada region are significant and suggest that stresses due to the explosion may have been more significant than regional tectonic stresses in the generation of this aftershock sequence. (Abstract supplied)

305
UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTING. Environment, v. 11, July/Aug. 1969: 2-13, 41-44, 46-53. illus.
UF767.S33, v. 11

Report from the Scientific Division of the Committee for Environmental Information.

Discusses Project Plowshare, its radiation and seismic hazards, and the safety precautions undertaken by the Atomic Energy Commission. The report concludes that public criticism of the program is mounting because of the adverse environmental effects of underground testing.

III. INSTITUTIONS AND MEANS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE

INTERNATIONAL LAW

306
Beilenson, Laurence W. THE TREATY TRAP; A HISTORY OF THE PERFORMANCE OF POLITICAL TREATIES BY THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN NATIONS. Assisted by Bernard M. Dain. Washington, Public Affairs Press [1969] 344 p. (A Foreign Policy Research Institute book) JX4165.B4

Contents.--Foreword, by William R. Kintner.--Acknowledgments.--Introduction.--The everlasting Greeks.--The United States: the Founding Fathers.--The United States: the twentieth century.--The dazzling age of Louis XIV.--The Humpty Dumpty period.--The Revolutionary and Napoleonic era.--The peaceful century in Europe: from Vienna to Berlin.--The peaceful century in Europe: from Berlin through Versailles.--The collective security of Woodrow Wilson.--The Soviet Union.--Patterns of violations.--Guides.--Notes and references.--Appendix: Treaty France-Hanover.--Bibliography.--Chronological index of treaties cited.--Index.

"Relates the history of the performance of political treaties by the United States and European nations from 1661 through 1965 and discusses the motives for their breaches." Beilenson finds that these treaties have nearly always been broken when one or more parties to a treaty believed it was in its own interests to do so. He contends that treaties are as unreliable today--despite nuclear weapons and the shortening of time-distance factors--as they ever were. He therefore cautions against excessive reliance on treaties as a means of advancing national interests and suggests stringent guidelines to be followed whenever a nation contemplates entering into a treaty.

307
Falk, Richard A. LAW, LAWYERS, AND THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS. Yale law journal, v. 78, May 1969: 919-934.
LL

The debate between legalists and antilegalists tends to obscure the basic problem of determining the proper role of law in international relations. The antilegalist position has been stated in various ways. Dean Acheson has asserted that national sovereignty takes precedence over international law whenever questions of ultimate power are involved; Leonard C. Meeker has ridiculed the notion of treating law as an abstract imperative to be enforced in all cases; and Henry Kissinger has argued in favor of a realistic foreign policy based on national interests. On the other hand, the "pseudo-legalist ideology" of Dean Rusk and Walt Rostow and the moralism of Woodrow Wilson and John Foster Dulles represent a strong tradition of legalism in American diplomacy. The need for legal restraints on the conduct of foreign relations is acute. The United States, which has a special responsibility to enhance the role of international law because of its power, has a structural bias against international law that could be partially remedied by establishing a new Cabinet-level position--the Attorney General for International Affairs--to make available an impartial legal voice at the highest levels of policy-making. Neither legal nor nonlegal approaches to world order are adequate as presently conceived. What is needed rather is that "a new kind of transnational functionalist world order" be outlined; that "international lawyers . . . begin to define ecological, demographic, and technological developments as within the province of their professional concern"; and that "the idea of a world order emphasizing the problems of war and peace . . . be rejected in favor of a broader conception that is equally concerned with the protection and promotion of dignity, safety, and security for individuals and groups."

308
Falk, Richard A. THE SIX LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF THE VIETNAM WAR. [Princeton, N.J., Center of International Studies, Princeton University] 1968. 53 p. (Princeton University. Center of International Studies. Research monograph no. 34)
JX1573.P29
Bibliographical footnotes.

Examines "the legal status of the United States involvement in the Vietnam war." Falk argues that the war in Vietnam has demonstrated the necessity to find more reliable ways of making international law a more important consideration in foreign policy decisions. To strengthen the legal restraints on policymakers, he recommends the creation of a new Cabinet-level post--the Attorney General for International Affairs--and a redefinition of Congress' role in decisions involving the use of military force. Under the heading "The Six Categories of Legal Issues Relevant to an Appraisal of the United States Involvement in the Vietnam War" he discusses the Geneva agreements, the U.N. Charter, the Peace of Westphalia, the Soviet justification for intervening in Hungary, the Hague and Geneva conventions, the Tonkin Gulf resolution, and the Nuremburg trials. He contends that American foreign policy must adapt to a world in which revolutionary social change

371-992 O - 70 - 5

is a basic fact of life and urges that individual claims of conscience involving the principles of international law be adjudicated by domestic courts on their merits.

309
Grieves, Forest L. SUPRANATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION. Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1969. xv, 266 p. illus.
JX1971.G75

Contents.--List of tables.--List of illustrations.--Sovereignty and supranationalism.--Central American Court of Justice.--Permanent Court of International Justice.--International Court of Justice.--Court of the European Communities.--European Court of Human Rights.--Summary and conclusions.--Appendices.--References.--Index.

Analyzes the concept of "supranationalism" and examines five international courts to determine to what extent they may be described as "supranational."

310
Kolodkin, A. TERRITORIAL WATERS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW. International affairs (Moscow) no. 8, Aug. 1969: 78-81. D839.I465, 1969

The definition of territorial waters remains ambiguous despite repeated attempts to reach international agreement on this vital question. Imperialist powers like the United States oppose the extension of territorial waters beyond the 3-mile limit because this would restrict the effectiveness of their naval and air forces. Nevertheless there is a definite trend in favor of a 12-mile limit, and several states have even attempted to extend their control far beyond 12 miles. The Soviet Union recognizes the 12-mile limit as consistent with the principles of international law although it does not insist that all states with smaller limits extend their territorial waters to this maximum.

311
Kröger, Herbert. [TWENTY YEARS OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC'S FOREIGN POLICY--TWO DECADES OF THE POLICY REFLECTING THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUR ERA] Zwanzig Jahre Assenpolitik der DDR--zwei Jahrzehnte Politik im Sinne des Völkerrechts unserer Zeit. Staat und Recht, v. 18, Sept. 1969: 1464-1476. LL

The strategic aim of the German Democratic Republic [GDR] is to guarantee security and peace to master successfully the tasks of Socialist construction. Security and peace agree with the aims of the Socialist system of states, which does not include powers interested in rearmament, aggression, expansion, or oppression of other peoples. The 20-year history of the foreign activity of the Socialist state of the German nation testifies to this. The principles of the GDR's foreign policy indicate a new type of international relations, which objectively determines on the basis of universal laws of Socialist revolution and Socialist construction the mutual relations between the countries of the world Socialist system. The foreign policy of the GDR is at the same time concerned with the world-wide struggle between socialism and imperialism. On the basis of the new type of international relations within the socialist community of states a new socialist international law emerges. Its main task is to consolidate the Socialist community of states as the main force of progress and peace in the world, under strict observation of the principles of proletarian internationalism, mutual aid and support, equality, sovereignty, and noninterference in domestic affairs of brother states. This process takes place along with the struggle against imperialism and deepens the democratic character of universal obligatory international law norms valid in our time. A main direction of its development is to prevent the imperialist forces from using aggression and force in international relations. In its struggle for peaceful coexistence between the two German states the GDR has contributed to the development of a European security system based on generally obligatory international law norms. (Abstract supplied, modified)

312
Neuhold, Hanspeter. [INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF THE CIVIL WAR IN NIGERIA] Völkerrechtliche Aspekte des Bürgerkrieges in Nigeria. Österreichische Zeitschrift für Aussenpolitik, v. 9, no. 2, 1969: 63-87. DB47.043, v. 9

Unlike other new African states Nigeria had been handicapped since its independence by a multiparty political system, which brought out ethnic, religious, cultural, and economic differences between various parts of the country and various groups of the population. The consequent paralysis of the Government, the successive coups d'etat, the resistance of some regions toward government policies to centralize or decentralize the country, and the massacre of Ibos in the Northern Region have led to the present situation in which Biafra claims to be an independent sovereign state, and Nigeria's Central Government is determined to reestablish its authority over the area now under Biafran control with what it terms a "police action." International law norms on civil war, most of which are based on customary law, are few and vague. In such essential questions as support of insurgents or the government against which they rise by foreign countries, the law is uncertain. According to the prevailing view, the recognition of belligerency on the part of insurgents by the parent government makes them a partial subject of international law. Such recognition does not change, however, the domestic affair character of a civil war unless the U.N. Security Council decides that the conflict endangers the international peace. So far the Council has failed to do this. The Geneva Red Cross Conventions of August 12, 1949, put certain limitations on the use of violence in civil wars. Nigeria acceded to those conventions in 1961 as a successor state to former British

XUM

territories and is thus bound by the demand for the humane treatment of "persons taking no active part in the hostilities." The Genocide Convention of 1948 considers the destruction of ethnic groups a crime under international law, which should be prevented and punished by the contracting parties. Biafra has accused Lagos of efforts to exterminate Biafrans, but it needs to prove such an intention on the part of the Nigerian Central Government. The recognition of Biafra's right to national self-determination is questionable, given the inprecise definition of that principle in international law, the difficulty of its application, and the contemporary praxis of African states.

313
Regala, Roberto. WORLD ORDER AND DIPLOMACY. Foreword by Carlos P. Romulo. Quezon City, Central Lawbook Pub. Co. [1969] 205 p. illus.
JX1664.R43
Bibliography: p. [197]-201.

Partial contents.--Definitions and nature of international law.--Sources of international law.--Contributions of some international organizations.--The United Nations and international law.--Nature of diplomatic immunities.--Some leading cases involving diplomatic immunity.--Nature and concept of diplomacy.--The new nation's impact upon diplomacy.--Nature of the functions of the foreign service.--Training under U.S. State Department before independence.--Early period of organization of the department and the foreign service.--Observations and suggestions for improvement of the foreign service.

Studies the basic principles of diplomacy by examining international law, concepts of diplomacy, and the Philippine Foreign Service and evaluates the role of diplomacy in the promotion of understanding among peoples and international peace and stability. Regala includes a number of appendices to supplement the text and to acquaint the reader with laws and regulations pertaining to diplomacy. He asserts that a bipartisan reappraisal of Philippine policies on and attitudes toward diplomacy is urgently needed.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

314
Barr, Stringfellow, and others. TABLE TALK/WHATEVER HAPPENED TO THE U.N.? Center magazine, v. 2, July 1969: 79-85. P&GP RR

Views on whether there has been a decline in respect for the United Nations among U.S. policy-makers and the public and, if so, its causes and consequences.

315
Khvoinik, P. THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE THIRD WORLD. International affairs (Moscow) May 1969: 29-34.
D839.I465, 1969

Examines the progress of the United Nations in assisting the economic development of the Third World by tracing the establishment of those U.N. organizations that are designed to alleviate the economic plight of underdeveloped countries. Khvoinik criticizes the West for using the U.N. and its organizations to promote its own interests and for impeding the Organization's attempts to further real equality for the developing countries in international economic relations. He concludes with a study of the reasons for the failure of the U.N.'s First Development Decade and a discussion of the plans for a Second Development Decade.

316
Kozhevnikov, F. I., and V. A. Mazov. UNO AND THE PROBLEMS OF MAINTAINING PEACE. Daily review, translations from the Soviet press, v. 15, Sept. 19, 1969: suppl., [item] 1, 1-19.
Slav Rm
Translated from Voprosy istorii, no. 7, 1969.
Slav Rm

States that the imperialist Western Powers, particularly the United States, have obstructed the main mission of the United Nations, world peace. Failures, shortcomings, and Soviet-recommended remedies through rigid implementation of the U.N. Charter are discussed. The authors emphasize the importance to mankind of U.N. legal activity but declare that the prevailing balance of power, not imperialism, is the determining factor in international relations.

317
Spinelli, Altiero. WHAT IS AT STAKE IN EUROPE TODAY. World today, v. 25, Aug. 1969: 363-368.
D410.W63, v. 25

Discusses the prospects for further progress in the unification of Western Europe, enumerating recent events that have reawakened interest in the issue, and suggesting a strategy to exploit the situation. Spinelli calls for the merger and enlargement of the existing European economic communities, an end to the transition period in the Common Market, and the direct election of the European Parliament.

318
Symington, William Stuart. THE UNITED NATIONS; REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1969. 37 p.
JX1977.A48U6 1969
At head of title: 91st Congress, 1st session. Committee print.

Contents.--Introduction; general observations.--Increased membership and role of small and less developed countries.--Jurisdictional problems in United Nations; second development decade.--Major actions of the General Assembly.--The situation in the Middle East.--The role of the military in the United Nations.--Financial position of the United Nations.--Concluding comments.--Appendices.

Reports the activities of the 23rd session of the U.N. General Assembly.

319
Yost, Charles W. MICRO-STATES AND UNITED NATIONS; ASSOCIATE MEMBERSHIPS. Vital speeches of the day, v. 35, Oct. 1, 1969: 746-748.
PN6121.V52, v. 35

Speech delivered to the U.N. Security Council, Aug. 27, 1969.

"Should even the smallest independent state be eligible for full membership in the United Nations, no matter how few its people or how limited its resources," or should some alternative form of membership be devised for such states? This question has become urgent in recent years, with the possibility that some 40 or 50 very small states may soon gain independence. Membership in the United Nations requires that a prospective member be not only willing but able to meet its obligations. Many "micro-states" lack both the human and material resources to fulfill their duties as members or could do so only by making unreasonable sacrifices. It is therefore in their best interests as well as those of the United Nations to establish an associate-membership status that would provide for participation in U.N. activities to the extent of a micro-state's capabilities, including General Assembly debates, but that would restrict or deny the voting privilege. The United States recommends that this question be brought up for discussion by the General Assembly and that a commission be appointed to examine the problem in greater detail.

INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY FORCES

320
Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. VIETNAM AFTER THE WAR; PEACEKEEPING AND REHABILITATION [by] H. Field Haviland, Jr. [and others] Washington, 1968. 116 p.
DS557.A692B7

Contents.--Foreword.--The problem: Functions of the proposed multilateral system. International vs. other approaches. Consensus and conflict.--Peacekeeping guidelines: The Geneva accords. Other possible consortia. Summary of case for consortium. The United Nations. Conclusions.--Peacekeeping operations: Operational assumptions. Functions and operations.--Relief and rehabilitation programs: Requirements for a relief and rehabilitation program. Organizational issues. Potential roles for existing agencies. Immediate steps to prepare for peace. Conclusions.--Appendix A. Synopsis of major peacekeeping operations.--Appendix B. United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.--Appendix C. United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency.--Appendix D. United Nations Civil Operations in the Congo.--Appendix E. Possible organization of an international relief and rehabilitation program for Vietnam.--Appendix F. Suggested functions and staffing patterns for an international relief and rehabilitation program.

Explores various approaches to the problems of peacekeeping and relief and rehabilitation in postwar Vietnam. The study is based on the assumptions that neither side in the present conflict can achieve total victory and that both sides will be receptive to some form of international assistance following a negotiated settlement. Three peacekeeping approaches are examined: "the arrangements established under the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962 with some modification of the existing machinery, . . . a new international consortium, or . . . an authority established under the United Nations." In their analysis of possible relief and rehabilitation programs the authors express a preference for a broad multilateral approach under the auspices of the United Nations.

321
Harbottle, Michael N. PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEMAKING. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 49, Sept. 1969: 43-59. illus. Z6723.U35, v. 49

Offers advice on the command of United Nations peacekeeping operations. Drawing on personal experience as Chief of Staff, United Nations Forces in Cyprus, Harbottle defines the political role of such forces and discusses solutions to some of the major problems of strategy, tactics, organization, logistics, and communications that are likely to be encountered.

OTHER PROCESSES, PLANS, AND PROPOSALS

322
Barth, Herbert. [EUROPEAN SECURITY--AN URGENT NEED OF THE MOMENT] Europäische Sicherheit--dringendes Gebot der Stunde. Einheit, v. 24, no. 6, 1969: 688-695. HX6.E4, v. 24

Expounds a "new peace initiative" by the Warsaw Treaty Organization, which is embodied in the March 17, 1969, resolution of the Budapest meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee. The resolution called for renewed efforts to convene an all-European security conference. Barth criticizes West German leaders for their rejection of the Budapest appeal and points out the favorable reception of the resolution by social-democratic and bourgeois parties in Finland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and some other nations in Western Europe. According to the author, there are at present two factions in NATO: one, which is led by West German militarists, aims at further consolidation of its ties with aggressive American circles and at strengthening the West German Armed Forces; the other, which includes France, Italy, and Belgium, opposes the arms race.

323
Beaufre, André. SECURITY AND DEFENSE IN WESTERN EUROPE. Orbis, v. 13, spring 1969: 76-86.
D839.068, v. 13

XUM

Despite the Soviet-American rapprochement, disturbing problems remain in Europe, such as the division of Germany and the liberalization movement in Eastern Europe, that require effective crisis management techniques in a political framework. European security should be considered within the context of these problems and strengthened by an organization that provides political as well as military security. At present, NATO is a defensive military alliance and not a political security system that can function effectively in peacetime. The Western Powers must develop a security system that would limit an adversary's action through measures that proved the powers' "willingness to accept the worst contingencies rather than to give up." These measures, which might include an offensive operation at the cold war level, should be carefully calculated to make the enemy lose its freedom of action but never to put the adversary in a situation where it has only one choice. The Western Powers should deal with crises by referring to a list of common policy alternatives, which would emphasize the consequences such policies would have on world opinion and the enemy. These policy alternatives could be undertaken jointly by these powers as part of their national planning and allied operations. The Western Allies could then construct a political warning network involving instant satellite communication systems. This network could even be extended to include the enemy to "play an essential role in avoiding serious misunderstandings, as well as in ensuring that political measures . . . are clearly understood." Where crises cannot be avoided, a defensive strategy based on nuclear deterrence and incorporating strategic, tactical, and conventional weapons should be emphasized.

324
Cardinale, Hyginus E. [THE VATICAN'S CONTRIBUTION TO WORLD PEACE] Der Beitrag des Vatikans zum Weltfrieden. Europa-Archiv, v. 24, May 25, 1969: 365-374. D839.E86, v. 24

Considers the Vatican's diplomacy, ecumenical policy, and social teachings on aid to underdeveloped nations--the Church's three major contributions to world peace. In the Church's view, peace is not a self-fulfilling good but "a prerequisite for the order, justice, and harmony of things."

325
Deutscher Evangelischer Kirchentag, 13th, Hanover, 1967. [THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC AND PEACE; PAPERS DELIVERED AT THE COMMITTEE ON POLITICS AT THE 13TH CONVENTION OF THE GERMAN EVANGELICAL CHURCH, HANNOVER, 1967] Die Bundesrepublik und der Friede. Vorträge in der Arbeitsgruppe Politik des 13. Deutschen Evangelischen Kirchentags, Hannover 1967. Stuttgart, Kreuz-Verlag [1967] 76 p.
DD259.2.D42 1967c

Contents.--For what are the Germans here? by Herbert Wehner and Karl Dietrich Erdmann.--Service to peace with and without weapons, by Klaus von Bismarck, Rolf Juergens, Martin Schröter, Albrecht von Mutius, and Joachim Beckmann.--Investments for peace, by Wolf Häfele, Gerhard Stoltenberg, Heinz Markmann, and Kurt Pentzlin.

Readings that deal with actual or desired West German contributions to European and world peace. Some underline the problem of German and European unification as associated with the problem of peace.

326
Deutscher Evangelischer Kirchentag, 13th, Hanover, 1967. [JEWS AND CHRISTIANS IN SERVICE FOR PEACE. LECTURES AT THE COMMITTEE ON JEWS AND CHRISTIANS OF THE 13TH CONVENTION OF THE GERMAN EVANGELICAL CHURCH, HANNOVER, 1967] Juden und Christen im Dienst für den Frieden. Vorträge in der Arbeitgruppe Juden und Christen des 13, Deutschen Evangelischen Kirchentags, Hannover 1967. Stuttgart, Kreuz-Verlag [1967] 76 p.
BT736.4.D4 1967aab

Contents.--Jews and Christians, their Biblical mission, by Robert Raphael Geis and Hans-Joachim Kraus.--Jews and Germans; their road to peace; on the history of the Jews in Germany, by Robert Raphael Geis, Eva G. Reichmann, and Walter Dirks.--The demolition of prejudices; service to peace, by Dietrich Goldschmidt and Erhard Eppler.

Considers the moral and religious aspects of an approach to peace. The papers discuss Christian and Jewish discord and harmony in the pursuit of peace, especially in Germany.

327
THE EUROPEAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY CONFERENCE: FOR WHOSE BENEFIT? East West digest, v. 5, July 1969: 209-215. P&GP RR

Reviews the positions of NATO member-states toward the call for a conference of all European countries issued at the Budapest meeting of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. While the desire for European settlement, to which the Communists try to appeal, exists in Western Europe, NATO members regard the proposal as a propaganda instrument. Many believe that the Soviet Union's real aim is to achieve recognition of East Germany's borders and to neutralize West Germany's military potential; they are aware of the danger inherent in the doctrine of limited sovereignty, which was enunciated by the Soviet Union after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and are certain that the Soviet Union wants to preserve the status quo in Europe. Nevertheless, it is concluded that the Western response shows a willingness to maintain contacts with the Soviet Union and the East European countries and to wait to see if the contacts indicate whether there is real hope for concrete progress. Thus "the burden of the proof lies with the East."

328
Hacker, Jens. [SLOGAN: EUROPEAN SECURITY] Schlagwort: Europäische Sicherheit. Politische Meinung, v. 14, no. 2, 1969: 83-92.
H5.P75, v. 14

XUM

Considers the March 17, 1969, proposal by the Budapest conference of the Warsaw Treaty Organization "seven powers" to call a European peace conference. Hacker outlines Moscow's European and German policy since 1954 and concludes that the main reason for that proposal is the consolidation of the status quo that is marked by the partition of Europe and Germany.

329
Hoffman, Hallock. THE VIEW FROM HELL. Center magazine, v. 2, July 1969: 21-25.
P&GP RR

Disputes Jacques Ellul's contentions in Violence: Reflections from a Christian Perspective that violence is inevitable on earth and that the only answer to this problem is Christianity. Hoffman argues that, since man is a learner and has succeeded in transforming biological evolution into cultural adaptation, he has the capacity to "construct the foundation of a truly human life on earth."

330
HOMO SANGUINIS VERSUS HOMO SAPIENS [editorial] National Medical Association. Journal, v. 61, Sept. 1969: 437-439.
DNLM

Man has made astounding advances in science and technology but has yet to learn to control his own destructive impulses. The violent conflicts flaring up in every part of the globe and the daily intensification of the superpower arms race place the survival of man in doubt. Unilateral disarmament is no answer; all nations must participate in the process of arms reductions. But how can this be brought about? In the evolution of the human species, homo sanguinis, the predator, preceded homo sapiens, the rational and ethical man, and to this day the later development constitutes little more than a thin and vulnerable veneer over the earlier. Material wealth has not brought spiritual maturity, and consequently today's pecuniary culture has failed to address itself to the problem of meeting real human needs. New solutions are not required; the way out was discovered long ago by Socrates and Christ. Men must learn that "the life is more than meat and the body than raiment," or very soon it will be too late for homo sapiens.

331
Ishida, Takeshi. BEYOND THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPTS OF PEACE IN DIFFERENT CULTURES. Journal of peace research, no. 2, 1969: 133-145.
AS9.J6, 1969

The concept of peace varies from one culture and language to another. "Shalom" (Hebrew) expresses a relationship, not a state of mind or being, and stresses the need for justice; "eirene" (Greek) and "pax" (Latin) both signify a condition of harmony and unity in the social order; "santi" (Hindu), "p'ing ho" (Chinese), and "heiwa" (Japanese) refer primarily to a state of mind, although the last two terms also are used to describe a political or social order. Each of these concepts emphasizes a different aspect of peace; excessive emphasis on any one distorts the meaning. Japan, whose Constitution expressly renounces war and the threat or use of force in resolving international disputes, provides a test case for the feasibility of nonviolent direct action to achieve social goals. Numerous polls reflect the antipathy toward war widespread among the Japanese, but the Japanese Government has nevertheless resisted demands to adopt a policy of unarmed neutrality. The Government has been able to resist these demands partly because of the traditional Japanese concept of peace, which identifies peace with harmony and consequently attaches a stigma to anyone who disrupts the social order regardless of purpose or methods.

332
Kettle, John. ALCOCK & THE PEACE LAB. Canada month, v. 9, June 1969: 10-14. illus.
F1001.C1623, v. 9

Interview with Dr. Norman Zinkan Alcock, president of the Canadian Peace Research Institute, which outlines the history, objectives, financing, and publications of the institute, with comments by the interviewer.

333
Kuby, Heinz. [DÉTENTE AS A PURPOSE AND AN EXPOSTULATION] Entspannung als Wille und Vorstellung. Merkur, deutsche Zeitschrift für europäisches Denken, v. 23, Aug. 1969: 693-711.
AP30.M43, v. 23

Considers possibilities in the Soviet bloc and in the West of conducting anti-status-quo policies. Kuby discusses various models of Europe, such as the concepts of Metternich and De Gaulle, and stresses that partisans of West European integration "have for too long underestimated the tenacious reality of nation-states." The status quo, in his view, comprises the territorial position, the condition that results from foreign and security policies, and the sociopolitical situation. The only way to an all-European peace and security system is through changing the existing "power structures," which cannot be done by the East or West alone or by the "sheer addition of economic and power potentials."

334
Kuznetsov, Nikolai. BEHIND THE "EUROPEAN" SCREEN. Daily review, translations from the Soviet press, v. 15, July 16, 1969: pt. 1, [item] 3, 1.
Slav Rm
Translated from Pravda, July 16, 1969.
Slav Rm

The 2-day conference of the Committee for the United States of Europe shows that certain British and West German circles are trying to revive the 1955 plan for unification to strengthen the power

of financial capital under the patronage of the "biggest monopolies of a number of West European states." This plan had failed because of an "inter-imperialist rivalry" for leadership. Now Bonn is promoting European unification, and the West German minister has suggested the formation of "a nuclear 'pool' under 'European control' as the basis for the unification of Western Europe." The danger of such a plan is increasingly obvious.

335
Lucey, Dan, and Rose Lucey. A NATION DIRECTED TO PEACE? America, v. 121, Aug. 30, 1969: 120-121.
BX801.A5, v. 121

Though the United States professes "to be a nation directed toward peace and desirous of peace," peace is no one's responsibility. No opposition has been expressed to the creation of a department of peace, but, since one has not been established despite many proposals throughout U.S. history, it can be assumed that Congress has concluded that the Nation is not interested. The United States has spent millions on academies to study the science of war but has no academy for scientific research and study of the means for peace. In this turbulent period the young people of the United States have been trying to direct attention to matters that distress and disillusion them; perhaps they can bring the concepts of a department of peace and a national peace academy, which is of equal importance, to public attention.

336
Montagu, Ivor. PEACE POLICY FOR ISRAEL. Labour monthly, v. 51, Sept. 1969: 410-414.
HD4505.L25, v. 51

Comments on the importance of Israel Without Zionists by Uri Avnery (annotated as item 1758 in v. 5, no. 4, of this bibliography) as a dissent from the "Zionist myth." Montagu asserts that Zionism is racist; Jewish racism is irrational because Jews are of many races; Israel could not last "economically or militarily, if it did not serve the ends of US imperialism and its satellites by continually menacing all that is progressive and unifying among the indigenous peoples of the region"; and that Zionist policies and ambitions endanger adjoining states and are unjust to the original inhabitants. He advocates "a secular Palestine in which all--Arab, Jew, Christian, Moslem--all, including all Jews now in Israel and all former Palestinians and immediate descendants who wish to return--shall dwell with equal rights in a fully democratic state."

337
[PEACE RESEARCH: NON-GUARANTEED DISCIPLINE] Friedensforschung; ungesicherte Disziplin. Spiegel, v. 23, Aug. 18, 1969: 32.
AP30.S66, v. 23

Reports on a peace research institute, the Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung der Lebensbedingungen der wissenschaftlich-technischen Welt, which is to be established in May 1970 in Munich by the West German Government to evaluate centrally the results of important research in that area done elsewhere and to conduct its own research. The institute, which will employ 16 scientists and will have an annual budget of 1 million DM, will be unable, according to the author, to do any peace research of consequence, for this would require the resources of a full-fledged university or a big science institute.

338
Starke, Joseph G. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE OF PEACE (IRENOLOGY) Leyden, A. W. Sijthoff, 1968. 216 p. (International series of studies on sociological problems) JX1952.S77

Contents.--Preface.--Nature and scope of the science of peace (irenology).--The conditions and factors favourable to peace.--The conditions and factors unfavourable to peace.--The sociological framework of peace.--The maintenance of peace.--The restoration of peace.--Peace in relation to disarmament and arms control.--The legal framework of peace.--Some special topics of peace.--Appendix I. Table of notable historical peace plans.--Appendix 2. Bibliography.--Index.

Explores the possibility of establishing a science of peace and examines the types of data and problems that are relevant to such a science.

339
Vernant, Jacques. [EUROPE IN A STATE OF TRANSITION. FRENCH IDEAS ABOUT THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF STATES] Europa im Stadium des Übergangs. Französische Vorstellungen über eine europäische Staatenordnung. Europa-Archiv, v. 24, May 25, 1969: 339-344.
D839.E86, v. 24

Describes differences between West European governments on the problem of the political and economic integration of Europe. Vernant considers the impact of the growing Sino-Soviet feud on East-West relations in Europe, discusses the role of the West European Union and the Council of Europe, and outlines prospects for a new political order in Europe characterized by the growing cooperation of West European countries and the possible unification of Western and Eastern Europe. He expects Franco-German political and economic ties to grow further and points out that Great Britain's and France's common status as Western Europe's nuclear powers will make Franco-British solidarity stronger than rivalry for neither France nor Great Britain wants to yield its nuclear power to a "collective authority."

340
THE VIENNA INTER-PARLIAMENTARY MEETINGS, APRIL 7-13, 1969. In Inter-Parliamentary Union, Geneva. Bulletin, v. 49, no. 2, 1969: 52-69.
JK1930.I682, v. 49

Report on the 57th Inter-Parliamentary Conference and related meetings of the Executive Com-

mittee and Council of the Inter-Parliamentary Union and texts of resolutions on "The Role and Responsibilities of Medium and Small Powers in the Maintenance of International Peace," "Measures for the Prohibition of the Production and Use of Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons," and "Measures for the Prohibition of the Production and Use of Nuclear and Thermonuclear Weapons," adopted at the session.

341
Weizsäcker, Carl F., Freiherr von. ON THE ART OF PROGNOSIS. Scientific world, v. 13, no. 3, 1969: 7-10. Q1.S8415, v. 13

From a lecture at the annual meeting of the German Science Foundation, Wiesbaden, 1968.

Asserts that the superpower balance of power has been more stable in the 1960's than ever before. However, Weizsäcker maintains that the problem of preventing aggression at levels where nuclear weapons are not involved has become more acute. Developments like the ABM may make war appear less of a threat, but antiballistic missiles do not necessarily remove the first-strike temptation. He describes the view that the development of armaments furthers economic and scientific growth as "neither entirely correct nor entirely false." A shift from weapons production would bring disruptions and economic risks, but a carefully planned reorganization from military expenditures to useful investments encouraging economic growth, rather than to development aid, should benefit the economy. Weiszäcker maintains that world peace can be secured not by technical developments but by creating conditions such that no power can start a war on its own initiative. He concludes that the great future task is "building up consciousness and . . . practical action."

IV. GENERAL ANALYSES AND COMPREHENSIVE APPROACHES

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

342
Andrade, Ernest. THE UNITED STATES NAVY AND THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE. Historian, Phi Alpha Theta, v. 31, May 1969: 345-363.
D1.H22, v. 31

Relates the struggle between U.S. Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes and his naval advisers during the negotiation of the Washington naval treaty of 1922. Though naval officers were cooperative in their advisory role, they were suspicious of many of Hughes' proposals, disagreed on the terms of the treaty, and opposed it in its final form. History, however, has largely vindicated the Secretary, for, while the treaty put the United States at some disadvantage in the Far East, it was generally favorable to U.S. interests, particularly in mitigating great-power rivalries after the war.

343
Barrea, Jean. [CONCERNING EUROPEAN UNIFICATION] A propos de l'unification européene. Politique étrangère, v. 34, no. 3, 1969: 317-347.
JX3.P6, v. 34

Franco-British rivalry concerning European unification recalls the hostility between Prussia and Austria and that between the former colonies of Nova Scotia and Canada in the framework of the political unification of Germany and English North America. These renewals of history invite a search of the explanation for the Paris-London feud not in its specific historical characteristics but in the very nature of the political phenomenon, which is at the same time "duty" (security, prosperity, and promotion of characteristic values) and "power" (or domination, expropriation, hegemony, etc.). An attempt to explain the Paris-London rivalry with respect to the "duties" of security, etc., in terms of which the processes of political unification are regulated fails; whereas an analysis of these processes in terms of domination or hegemony explains the Franco-British rivalry concerning the creation of a European union. Briefly, since it is a concern of international competition, political integration is not the safest alternative to "power politics." (Translation of supplied abstract)

344
Calvert, Peter. LATIN AMERICA: INTERNAL CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE. London, Macmillan; New York, St. Martin's Press, 1969. xvi, 231 p. illus. (The making of the twentieth century)
F1414.C16
Bibliography: p. [202]-220.

Partial contents.--The new century.--Order and progress.--Land and liberty.--Soldiers and states. --Peace and social justice.--South America today.

A political and diplomatic history of Latin America in the 20th century that emphasizes the efforts to change the pattern of violent internal conflict. Calvert observes that in the future Latin America "will in its idiosyncratic way play a vital role" in international affairs.

345
[DISARMAMENT] Peace and the sciences, Apr./June 1969: 1-36. JX1901.P25, 1969

Contents.--Introduction.--Evolution of machinery and approaches.--List of General Assembly resolutions on disarmament and related matters, 1945-1966.--Soviet Government's memorandum on certain urgent measures on an end to the arms race and on disarmament.--Rusk remarks in General Assembly (excerpt).--Speech by A. A. Gromyko, USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the plenary meeting of the General Assembly, October 3, 1968 (excerpt).-- Introduction to the annual report of the Secretary-General on the work of the organisation (excerpt).

Reviews the history of institutions and measures to promote disarmament. The excerpts set forth the respective positions of the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Nations.

346
Graf, Rudolf, Hans Gerhard Müller, and Siegfried Stübner, eds. GERMAN REALITY; DOCUMENTATION ON THE DIVISION OF GERMANY AND THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO GERMAN STATES. [Dresden, Verlag Zeit im Bild, 1968] 86 p. DD257.25.G6513
Translation of Deutsche Wirklichkeit.
DD257.25.G65

Contents.--Preparation and implementation of the division of Germany.--Democratic reunification or remilitarization.--Peaceful co-existence or nuclear World War.--Recognition of the GDR; pivotal question of European security.--Reality and alternative.-- References.

Traces the division of Germany to an "antinational plot" of West German capitalism and the Western occupation powers. The authors stress East Germany's efforts toward European peace and arms control and disarmament and the German Federal Republic's rearmament and aggressive intentions toward Eastern Europe.

GENERAL ANALYSES

347
Afanas'ev, Viktor G. MARXISM-LENINISM--AN INTERNATIONAL DOCTRINE. In U.S. Joint Publications Research Service: Feb. 20, 1969. Washington. (Its JPRS 47,494) p. 1-9.
P&GP RR
Translated from Sovetskaia Litva, Vilna, Jan. 12, 1969. Slav Rm

Although Marxism originated in a Western capitalist country and Leninism in an Eastern agrarian one, Marxism-Leninism is an integral international doctrine. Marx and Engels conceived the principle of proletarian internationalism out of concern for the international working class. Lenin's nationality program was an implementation of this principle, through which Russia became a great commonwealth of highly developed nations and Lenin not only a leader of the Soviet Union but a leader of the international working class and the world Communist movement. Bourgeois ideologists and the opportunists on the right and left of the Communist movement deny the international nature of Marxism-Leninism and try to prove that it is a local and regional doctrine applicable only to agrarian or industrially and culturally backward countries. The Soviet Communist Party has never forced any country to copy mechanically the specific and individual experience of the Soviet Union. But, while it holds that the transition to socialism and communism might produce various political forms in the Socialist countries, it strongly emphasizes that the essence, the dictatorship of the proletariat under the leadership of the working class and its Communist Party, must remain the same. The Soviet Communist Party, which considers itself a detachment of the international army of world Communists, promotes by all means in its power the revolutionary movement in capitalist countries and the national liberation struggle and is a consistent defender of Socialist achievement in other Socialist countries. This it proved in Czechoslovakia. Marxism-Leninism as the ideology of the working class is international and cannot be split into regional and national quarters. The working class and its unity must be strengthened in order to defend this ideology, conquer capitalism, and establish socialism throughout the world.

348
Bollinger, Klaus, and Hans Maretzki. [U.S. GLOBAL STRATEGY IN EUROPE] USA-Globalstrategie in Europa. Berlin, Staatsverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1967. 72 p. (Blickpunkt Weltpolitik)
D843.Z4

Contents.--U.S. global strategy against peace and security.--Aspiration of U.S. imperialism for world domination.--Anti-communism; a connecting link of imperialist foreign policy.--The development of the special aggressive alliance between Bonn and Washington.--The road to collective security in Europe.

Criticizes the convergence theory and its exponents, Z. Brzezinski, R. Aron, Walt W. Rostow, G. F. Kennan, and Walter Lippmann. Collective security in Europe can be built by the renunciation of force by all European states, normalization of their relationships, development of democracy in the German Federal Republic, and gradual cessation of the arms race.

349
Gallois, Pierre M. [TECHNOLOGY AND STRATEGY] Technique et stratégie. Revue militaire générale; general military review, Sept. 1969: 143-164.
U2.R48, 1969
Summaries in English and German.

The art of war, which had remained essentially the same for five centuries, was revolutionized by the development of the atom bomb and its delivery vehicle. The possession of this nuclear weapon system created an equilibrium of prudence, which in turn led to the so-called "peaceful coexistence" policies of the two great blocs. The range, power, and accuracy of this system have made it indefensible and have increased, over the years, its ability to annihilate almost completely the material capabilities of a country. For this reason a nuclear conflict between the superpowers seems out of the question. Unfortunately nuclear power in the hands of the superpowers has not brought peace to the world. In fact, these two powers unleash crises and foment trouble all over the world and are the primary cause of the increasing instability in the rest of the international community.

350
Goldman, Ralph M. A TRANSACTIONAL THEORY OF POLITICAL INTEGRATION AND ARMS CONTROL. American political science review, v. 63, Sept. 1969: 719-733. illus.
JA1.A6, v. 63

Arms control is a concomitant of political integration, and the latter results from the long-term experience of political actors with trust-inducing political transactions. A political transaction consists of an exchange of political "things" between political actors. The things exchanged can be thought of as currencies and classified according to whether they are of positional, decisional, or material value. Positional currencies are incumbencies of positions within the political group, decisional currencies are shares in the process of collective decisionmaking, and material currencies are commodities. For the problem analyzed in this study, armament and nonarmament commodities are treated as separate transactional categories. Application of this typology of political currencies to case studies of the political consolidation of two nations--England and Mexico--leads to the conclusion that political integration is achieved in three distinct stages. The initial unintegrated stage is characterized by a high frequency of transactions in armaments commodities and a low frequency of transactions in incumbencies. In the final, integrated stage, the opposite pattern prevails--a high frequency of incumbencies transactions and, eventually, no armaments transactions. Between these two stages lies the critical transition stage, which is characterized by a sharp rise in shares transactions and a sharp decline in armaments transactions. This increase

in shares transactions appears to be the principal generator of the transactor trust that is essential to the emergence of an integrated political entity. An experimental confirmation of the theory sketch presented here would have important practical implications. First it would lend support to the idea of directing arms control efforts toward promoting trust-inducing shares transactions among the political actors. Second, by calling into question much of the conventional wisdom on war and deterrence, it would confirm the need for greater reliance on validated theory in defense policy.

351
Goodman, Elliot R. DÉTENTE: THE SOVIET VIEW. Survey, no. 70/71, winter/spring 1969: 121-148.
DK1.S549, no. 70/71

The Soviet concept of détente in relation to a European settlement, which revolves around the simultaneous dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact and the establishment of "a European security system" with two separate Germanys locked in the center, threatens to increase rather than reduce tensions on the European Continent. Soviet global détente policy has been misunderstood. The belief in the transformation of the Soviet regime and the consequent possibility of an "accommodation on the gamut of issues that divide East and West" is an illusion. Experience indicates that, while both superpowers have an interest in "seeking agreement upon measures of crisis management and arms control," they have simultaneously been engaged in an intense global power conflict. Thus détente operates only within narrow limits and can easily be shattered. The common interest in arms control can easily be dampened "by the dynamics of technological breakthroughs in nuclear weapons development." The Soviet view that détente is compatible with "military adventures on a wide-ranging scale, so long as they remain below the nuclear threshold," makes it impossible at present to reach a complete understanding with the Soviet Union.

352
Kintner, William R. WESTERN SECURITY AND THE SUPERPOWER STRATEGIC BALANCE. Revue militaire générale; general military review, June 1969: 31-47.
U2.R48, 1969
Includes summaries in French and German.

Many Western observers believe the Soviet Union wants to halt the arms race because of internal economic difficulties and its dispute with China. However, the record of Soviet industry in the first 6 months of 1968 indicates that Moscow can buy not only guns but some butter as well, and the Soviet advantage in strategic weaponry over the Chinese is such that the Peking government, confronted with internal disruption, does not constitute a great threat to Soviet security. In fact, the Soviet leaders want to begin missile talks because they recognize that protracted arms control discussions can inhibit the U.S. desire to maintain its strategic advantage. This explanation is in accord with the basic motive of Soviet policy, which is "to develop its military power while simultaneously advocating comprehensive disarmament schemes." Indeed Soviet activity in the Middle East and North Vietnam and the enormous outlays for Soviet defensive and offensive weapons systems--the Soviet Union has spent twice as much as the United States in the past 5 years--indicate that Moscow's interest in disarmament is at best highly ambiguous. Because of the unstable ingredients in maintaining mutual deterrence and aggressive Soviet policies, the United States should continue to pursue a realistic and relevant policy of strategic superiority without fear of causing a spiraling arms race--such fear will lead only to the self-emasculation of American power. A comprehensive arms control agreement with the Soviet Union is unlikely in the foreseeable future, but the United States must continue to seek meaningful arms control agreements with the Soviet Union while avoiding the parity trap.

353
Luhmann, Niklas. [THE CLASSICAL THEORY OF POWER; A CRITIQUE OF ITS PREMISES] Klassische Theorie der Macht; Kritik ihrer Prämissen. Zeitschrift für Politik, v. 16, June 1969: 149-170.
JA14.Z4, v. 16

Points to a lack of "a useful sociological theory of power" and constructs a "classical theory of power" on the basis of typical premises of existing theories, which he shows neither articulate their premises sufficiently nor define peace adequately. Luhmann analyzes also the terms "power systems," "balance of power," "change of power," and "conflict," which are contained in some of these theories.

354
Rakhmaninov, I. EUROPEAN SECURITY: TASKS AND PROSPECTS. International affairs (Moscow) June 1969: 10-14. D839.I465, 1969

Although many West and most East European leaders are seeking the solution to the problems of European security, NATO leaders continue to intensify the struggle against the Socialist countries. While the Socialist states are attempting to initiate an all-European conference to deal with these problems, NATO's leaders are calling for a further buildup of armed forces and armaments and are demanding the establishment of a mechanism for periodic consultations in the Organization's dealings with the East to secure rigid control over all contacts between East and West. Despite these cold war tactics, wide sections of Western Europe are beginning to realize that "Europe needs a system providing reliable security, and the development of peaceful and fruitful cooperation between all European countries." Before such a system can be realized, however, West Germany will have to recognize the existing frontiers in Europe and renounce its claims to the territory of others. The European nations will then be able to build a security system, which is the only alternative to a dangerous military confrontation on the Continent.

XUM

GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

355
Oboler, Eli M. WORLD DISARMAMENT: A SELECTED READING LIST. Choice, v. 6, July/Aug. 1969: 630-632. Z1035.C5, v. 6

Basic list of selected bibliographies, collected works, periodicals, and monographs with commentary.

V. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AND LIMITED MEASURES

NEGOTIATION

356
Avnery, Uri. UNOFFICIAL AND UNREPRESENTATIVE BUT . . . . New Middle East, no. 12, Sept. 1969: 23-28. illus. DS63.1.N48, 1969

The Arab-Israeli dispute, which has its origins in the clash of two authentic nationalist movements, "is basically a war between Israel and the Arab people of Palestine"--not between Israel and the Arab States that surround it. A successful peace settlement must therefore be based on a political agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Arabs. Most Israelis would welcome the repatriation of Arab refugees if they received reliable guarantees of Israeli security in return, although many would regret the effects that repatriation would have on the homogeneity of the present Jewish state. The Palestinian Arabs are divided among those who prefer their status as Jordanian citizens; those, such as the members of the Palestine Liberation Organization, who believe they must rely on no outside support; and those who think Palestine should negotiate directly with Israel, but only with the approval of other Arab States. Direct negotiations between Israel and this last group offer the best hope of a lasting peace in the Middle East. It serves no useful purpose for Arabs to attack Israel as the agent of Western imperialism since Israel is allied with Western imperialism for the same reason that the Arab States are allied with Soviet imperialism--the need for foreign aid from any available source.

357
Chen, Shao-hsien. THE BILATERAL TALKS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION. West & East, v. 14, June 1969: [1], 1-4.
P&GP RR

Problems for Soviet-U.S. negotiation include the NATO-Warsaw Treaty Organization confrontation, relations between Eastern and Western Europe, and Soviet activities in the Mediterranean area. Both the United States and the Soviet Union seek to avert the danger of a nuclear war and see the need for negotiations. However, the U.S.S.R. is not motivated to aid in ending Vietnam hostilities because its intervention would alienate the North Vietnamese, and U.S. opposition to the war is advantageous to the Soviets in negotiations, as is the Arab-Israeli rivalry. The United States wants Europe to unite for the preservation of world peace, while the Soviet Union seeks to disintegrate the NATO alliance and force the United States out of Europe. Both powers wish to prevent any NATO-Warsaw Pact actions that would threaten peace and are unwilling to let West Germany have nuclear weapons. The issues to be negotiated are complicated by the recent growth of nationalism in new nations and changes in alliances. Confrontation and compromise may relax tensions and eliminate the danger of war, or the irresponsible military actions of ambitious small powers may provoke war. "That is the situation that Mao Communists want to use and manipulate, so as to hasten an American-Russian nuclear war."

358
Cousins, Norman. VIETNAM: THE SPURNED PEACE. Saturday review, v. 52, July 26, 1969: 12-16, 58-61. Z1219.S25, v. 52

Describes three instances in which the United States spurned the opportunity to negotiate with Hanoi and attempts to explain U.S. behavior. Cousins points to "the extent to which the Presidency of the United States has become the focal point of overwhelming and often unmanageable pressures, especially in military matters," and notes the various forces that influenced Presidential decisions on Vietnam; i.e., divisions within the Government, the American military in Vietnam, and political factions in South Vietnam. He concludes that the new administration should strengthen American foreign policy by restoring "the Constitutional primacy of civilian authority over the military" and emphasizing the genuineness of U.S. purposes.

359
Dubrovin, B. CONCRETE RESULTS ARE ESSENTIAL. Daily review, translations from the Soviet press, v. 15, July 16, 1969: pt. 1, [item] 2, 1-2.
Slav Rm
Translated from Pravda, July 16, 1969.
Slav Rm

Commentary on the resumption of meetings of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament, which has two new members--the Mongolian People's Republic and Japan. Dubrovin hopes for the drafting of a treaty at this session to ban the military use of the seabed and ocean floor, which would be in line with a draft treaty submitted to the previous session by the U.S.S.R. He criticizes a draft treaty that had been submitted by the United States as offering only a limited and partial solution.

360
HEMISPHERE: OAS HALTS WAR BETWEEN EL SALVADOR AND HONDURAS. Américas, v. 21, Sept. 1969: 42-45. illus. F1401.A57, v. 21
"Compiled with the assistance of George Meek."

For several decades Salvadorans have left their overcrowded country for new economic opportunities

in Honduras, but few establish legal residence. In June violence broke out when more than 15,000 Salvadorans fled or were driven from Honduras. Both countries requested the presence of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and the OAS was formally called into the crisis. When El Salvador broke diplomatic relations with Honduras and full-scale hostilities began, the OAS Council ordered a cease-fire. Mediation by the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs eventually ended the military confrontation.

361
Kabermann, Heinz. [WHAT IS TO BE EXPECTED FROM STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS? THE COSTS OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE] Was ist von SALT zur erwarten? Die Kosten der friedlichen Koexistenz. Politische Welt, no. 132, Aug. 1969: 17-20.
D839.P65, 1969

Argues that strategic arms limitation talks between the United States and the Soviet Union would give the latter the time necessary to improve its military posture vis-a-vis the West by a continuous buildup of strategic armaments while the United States would be acting in good faith. Kabermann considers it disadvantageous under present circumstances for the West to engage in such negotiations.

362
Mustafa, Zubeida. THE PARIS PEACE TALKS. Pakistan horizon, v. 22, no. 1, 1969: 29-38.
DS376.P32, v. 22

An interim political settlement is needed in Vietnam because of the nature of the hostilities. The basic American strategy of attrition has been modified by deescalation and withdrawal of troops as a result of U.S. political pressure and the Paris peace talks. Relations between the South Vietnam and U.S. delegations are strained by the apparent American desire to end the war, Saigon's refusal to negotiate with the Vietcong, and President Thieu's unwillingness to form a coalition government with the Communists. A bombing halt is opposed because of distrust of Communist promises to stop infiltration. The South Vietnamese stand reflects the volatile politics of a country with the plural ideologies of Catholics and Buddhists, northerners and southerners. President Thieu has had to adopt strong anti-Communist attitudes for support. The greatest threat to his power comes from the National Liberation Front (NLF), strongly entrenched in the south, which has formed a new organization since the Tet offensive, the Alliance of National Democratic and Peace Forces of Vietnam. In a political settlement it may have a better chance of Western acceptance than the NLF. No Vietnam settlement seems imminent because all parties adhere to their own demands, "but the forces which have brought the parties to the negotiating table might eventually induce them to compromise and accept a settlement."

363
PUTTING THE NUCLEAR GENIE BACK IN THE BOTTLE [editorial] Astronautics & aeronautics, v. 7, Aug. 1969: 10-12.
TL501.A688A25, v. 7

The outlook for strategic arms limitation talks is not bright because the time is passing, according to arms control specialists, when the United States and the U.S.S.R. can consider themselves nearly equal in nuclear arms. The President insists that the United States negotiate from a position of strength and that it can do better if impressive progress is evident in strategic weapons like the MIRV (multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicle) and the ICBM. Hearings and floor debate on MIRV's "have brought a new awareness to the Congress and the country about arms control issues. Whether this . . . can lead to progress at the negotiations table on actually controlling the arms race remains the big question."

364
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Government Operations. Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations. PEKING'S APPROACH TO NEGOTIATION; SELECTED WRITINGS. Compiled pursuant to S. Res. 24, 91st Cong. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1969. 94 p.
DS740.4.U55
Bibliographical footnotes.

Contents.--Foreword.--Western sources: "The misadventures of a barbarian eye, 1834-35" (from Foreign Mud, 1947), by Maurice Collis. "The loaded agenda" (from How Communists Negotiate, 1955), by Admiral C. Turner Joy. "What's it like to negotiate with the Chinese" (from The New York Times Magazine, October 30, 1966), by Arthur H. Dean. "China's perception of the Indochina crisis, 1953-1954" (from The First Vietnam Crisis, 1967), by Melvin Gurtov. "Repatriation of civilians: the single agreement" (from Faithful Echo, 1960), by Robert B. Ekvall. "The Taiwan Strait crisis and Peking's attitude toward nuclear weapons" (from Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era, 1962), by Alice Langley Hsieh. "Envoys to the great within" (from Reporter in Red China, 1966), by Charles Taylor. "The ambassadorial talks--in Warsaw" (from interview, U.S. News and World Report, July 4, 1966), by John Gronouski. "Adversary negotiation, Peking style" (from Negotiating With the Chinese Communists: the United States Experience, 1953-1967, 1968), by Kenneth T. Young.--Chinese Communist sources: "Fight, fight, talk, talk" (message to Taiwan by Peng Teh-huai, Minister of National Defense, PRC, October 6, 1958). "Secret instructions to the Chinese Army (from "Bulletin of activities," April 25, 1961, issued by the Chinese People's Liberation Army). "Tit-for-tatism" (from comment by the editorial departments, People's Daily and Red Flag, November 18, 1963). "Long live the victory of people's war" (from article by Marshal Lin Piao, People's Daily, September 3, 1965). "Peking's view of the ambassadorial talks, 1968-69" (NCNA transmission, May 28, 1968 and Peking Foreign Ministry statements, November 26, 1968 and February 18, 1969).

XUM

Selected papers on Chinese Communist foreign policy and negotiating methods, with emphasis on the difficulties that arise from China's attitude toward the West.

365
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Government Operations. Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations. THE SOVIET APPROACH TO NEGOTIATION; SELECTED WRITINGS. Compiled pursuant to S. Res. 24, 91st Congress. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1969. 92 p.
JX1807.U5

At head of title: 91st Congress, 1st session. Committee print.
Bibliographical footnotes.

Contents.--Foreword.--Western sources: "The technique for dealing with Russia" (from Memoirs 1925-1950), by George F. Kennan. "The operational code of the Politburo" (excerpts from RAND Corporation monograph R-206, August 1, 1950), by Nathan Leites. "Some Soviet techniques of negotiation" (from Raymond Dennett and Joseph E. Johnson, eds., Negotiating with the Russians, 1951), by Philip E. Mosely. "On dealing with Russia" (from Sketches from Life of Men I Have Known, 1959, and The New York Times Magazine, April 12, 1959), by Dean Acheson. "The gamesmanship of international negotiation" (from Soviet Policy towards International Control of Atomic Energy, 1961), by Joseph L. Nogee. "Techniques of negotiation" (from Ivo J. Lederer, ed., Russian Foreign Policy: Essays in Historical Perspective, 1962), by Gordon A. Craig. "How shrewd are Soviet negotiators?" (from How Nations Negotiate, 1964), by Fred Charles Iklé. "The Soviet voice in the East-West strategic discourse" (from Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads, 1964), by Thomas W. Wolfe. "Soviet diplomatic style and tactics" (from Test Ban and Disarmament: the Path of Negotiation, 1966), by Arthur H. Dean. "Czechoslovakia: the Soviet outlook" (from Studies in Comparative Communism, v. 1, no. 1 and 2, July/Oct. 1968), by Robert Conquest.--Soviet sources: "Diplomacy" (from Diplomaticheskii Slovar' [Diplomatic dictionary], v. 1, Moscow, 1960). "Lenin and Soviet diplomats" (from article by V. A. Zorin, V. L. Israelian and Sh. P. Sanakoev in O Sovremennoi Sovetskoi Diplomatii [On contemporary Soviet diplomacy], V. Z. Lebedev, ed., Moscow, 1963). "Role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR" (from book by Valerian A. Zorin, Osnovy Diplomaticheskoi Sluzhby [The bases of diplomatic service], Moscow, 1964). "Documents of Soviet diplomacy: two addresses" (from book by An. Kovalev, Azbuka' Diplomatii [The ABC's of diplomacy], 2d ed., Moscow, 1968).

"Analytic materials on the Soviet approach to international negotiation, drawing on both Western and Russian sources."

366
Vernant, Jacques. [THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE] La course aux armements stratégiques. Revue de défense nationale, v. 25, Aug./Sept. 1969: 1460-1464. D410.R45, v. 25

Urges the superpowers to negotiate an end to the arms race but asserts that a sweeping accord is out of the question at present. Vernant hopes that the United States and the Soviet Union will recognize that the best either power can achieve in the arms race is a strategic equilibrium and that negotiations must terminate the dangerous action-reaction cycle. He cites the ABM as a destabilizing factor and concludes that negotiations should deal with specific and essential problems. Broad questions concerning the Soviet threat to America's European allies and the strategic equilibrium in that region can come at a later date.

367
Vernant, Jacques. [THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION] Les États-Unis et l'Union Soviétique. Revue de défense nationale, v. 25, June 1969: 1059-1063. D410.R45, v. 25

Contends that, despite the Vietnam War and the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Soviet-American relations have become more stable during recent years. Vernant sees this manifested in the willingness of the superpowers to discuss strategic arms limitations and in the current four-power negotiations over the Middle East problem. Experts believe that the results of the impending round of arms limitation talks will differ vastly from previous negotiations whether there is an agreement or not. Vernant concludes that the Nixon administration is inclined to feel that the Soviet Union is willing now to engage in serious and useful negotiations.

368
Volskii, D. HOURGLASS POLICY. New times, no. 30, July 30, 1969: 13-15.
D839.N483, 1969

The aim of Gen. Earle G. Wheeler's trip to Vietnam on the eve of President Nixon's visit was not to inspect troops or assess the military situation, but to propagate the unbelievable idea that Washington, while waging war, seeks peace. The withdrawal of 25,000 or even 75,000 troops will not demonstrate this intent because the decrease in number is compensated for by the increase of materiel, and the plan to "Vietnamize" the war is thoroughly futile because the Saigon army, with its venal officers and deserting troops, is a bad bet. The whole approach to the Vietnam problem by the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee and its chairman, Senator John Stennis, is sterile and unrealistic and lacks constructive ideas. The influence of the Vietnam War is enormous in Asia, and it has impelled many Asian countries to seek an independent policy and better relations with other countries including the Soviet Union. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization is in a crisis. No flirtation with Communist China or attempts to divide Asia into a Chinese and an American sphere of influence will help the Americans out of the present impasse. If the United States wants to mend its badly damaged prestige in Asia, it should listen to Andrei Gromyko's advice--to abandon the

XUM

illusory hope for a military victory and reconsider the North Vietnam and Vietcong proposals, which contain a concrete basis for a settlement of the Vietnam War.

369
Woollacott, Martin. WHAT PROSPECTS FOR ARMS TALKS? Current, no. 109, Aug. 1969: 43-45.
AP2.C9259, 1969
"From 'The Balance of Terror,' Manchester Guardian Weekly, June 26, 1969."

Opponents of the ABM and the multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV) have exaggerated the destabilizing potential of these weapons but not their cost. Nevertheless, while spending on strategic forces is certain to increase if the new systems are deployed, it will not reach a level out of scale with past superpower expenditures. Nor are these new weapons incompatible with progress in the upcoming Soviet-American arms control talks. The Nixon administration has made no decisions yet as to what it wants from these discussions. It may hope to get an agreement limiting the numbers and type of deployment of ABM's. The MIRV raises more difficult problems since it cannot be detected by satellite reconnaissance. A tacit numerical limitation might be worked out, but, since the Soviet Union lags in this technological area, the United States might demand some quid pro quo, such as restrictions on the Soviet deployment of land mobile missiles or the fractional orbital bombardment system. Agreement might be reached to stabilize land missiles at 1,000 or so each, but sea-based missiles will not be touched because they are a strong stabilizing factor. No agreement on antisubmarine warfare is likely. The results of the talks are not going to be spectacular. The possibility of bringing the arms race to a halt does not exist, but "the possibility that the U.S. and the Soviet Union might agree to conduct the coming race with deliberate slowness, and within certain broad limits, does" and would be a substantial achievement.

REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF WAR

Escalation

370
Alcock, Norman Z., and Keith Lowe. THE VIETNAM WAR AS A RICHARDSON PROCESS. Journal of peace research, no. 2, 1969: 105-112.
AS9.J6, 1969

The general hypothesis of this empirical research is that an escalating limited war follows an action-and-reaction process which is less calculated and more irrational than an 'old-fashioned' declared war. The specific hypothesis is that the Vietnam war can be described by the Richardson arms race equations, with total casualties replacing total arms expenditures. Irregularities in the resulting curves were tested against qualitative events over the time period studied. The general hypothesis was not confirmed; the specific hypothesis was confirmed--the Vietnam escalation appears to be very similar to the arms race preceding World War II with a single sharp change in slope interrupting an otherwise consistent straight line plot. Two events may account for the apparent discontinuity: the Tonkin Bay incident of August 1964 and the Pleiku base incident of February 1965 followed immediately by the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam. It is noted that the events cited correspond to a change of office in the American presidency, and it is speculated therefore that another change of office in January 1969 may lead to a further discontinuity. On the basis of the calculations, it is suggested that peace negotiations and a de-escalation of the fighting are more likely to occur after there is a significant withdrawal of American combat troops from Vietnam. (Abstract supplied)

Conventional arms transfers

371
Brown, Neville. REVOLUTIONARY LIBYA'S ARMS POTENTIAL--WHO WILL BENEFIT? New Middle East, no. 13, Oct. 1969: 11-13. illus.
DS63.1.N48, 1969

Assesses the impact of Libya's recent military coup on its extensive defense ties to the West. Brown notes that the U.S. lease on Wheelus Air Force base near Tripoli will expire in 1971 and Libya's defense treaty with Britain has already been made less effective; both arrangements have long been a source of contention among Arab nationalists. However, Libya has contracted for substantial arms purchases from the West, particularly the United States and Britain, which the author predicts will benefit all parties.

372
Marsot, Alain Gérard. CHINA'S AID TO CAMBODIA. Pacific affairs, v. 43, summer 1969: 189-198.
DU1.P13, v. 43

Examines Chinese Communist aid to nonalined countries, especially Cambodia. Though China is itself an underdeveloped country, it began a program of economic aid in 1953 and since 1965 has given Cambodia weapons, military equipment, aircraft, an airport, coastal patrol boats, and military equipment for a field hospital. Marsot asserts that Cambodia's search for security determines its policy of nonalinement and acceptance of military aid. While maintaining ties with the West, Prince Sihanouk seeks friendly relations with the power he considers will dominate the area in the future.

373
Meyer, Charles A. U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 61, Aug. 4, 1969: 100-102.
JX232.A33, v. 61

XUM

The U.S. military presence in Latin America is being sharply reduced. By 1970, the number of personnel assigned to military groups will be reduced 35 percent below the 1967 level; money expenditures have already been cut by about 75 percent. Furthermore, the entire program of military assistance is undergoing an intensive review. Even in its reduced form, however, the program continues to be an important element in U.S. policy toward Latin America. A primary purpose of military aid is to assist Latin Americans to achieve social reform and economic progress without loss of political stability. For this reason, emphasis in the program is on counterinsurgency rather than external defense. While the danger of insurgency has receded somewhat in recent years, the persistence of social injustices and the readiness of some groups to exploit every manifestation of unrest make it necessary that this facet of the program be continued. In addition, many Latin American governments are anxious to modernize their conventional forces, and a noncooperative attitude on the part of the United States would only provoke political antagonisms while not preventing these governments from making their arms purchases in Europe. Besides, Latin American military establishments remain small, and, contrary to reports, U.S. military assistance does not encourage the establishment of military regimes, provoke local arms races, or stimulate the diversion of resources from social uses to military ones.

374
Moran, Theodore. A PRIMER ON U.S. ARMS SALES AROUND THE WORLD. Ripon forum, v. 5, July 1969: 15-18.
P&GP RR

During the 1960's U.S. arms sales abroad increased by 600 percent over the previous decade. The Department of Defense (DoD) deserves the major credit for this amazing sales record. Key elements in the DoD success story are DoD's International Logistics Negotiations Office, which has conducted a highly successful campaign to convince American arms manufacturers of the profitability of the overseas arms trade; DoD's revolving Military Credit Assistance Account; DoD's much used authority to guarantee loans extended to arms purchasers by commerical banks; and DoD's access to additional credit funds outside its own revolving account, as, for example, through the much criticized "country-x" loans of the Export-Import Bank. The program suffers from only one major drawback--the benefits are illusory. U.S. arms sales have escaped from political control. The deficiencies of DoD reporting procedures, the practice followed by some allied governments of purchasing arms from the United States for reshipment to underdeveloped countries, and the incompleteness of defense appropriation bills make such control discouragingly difficult. Three steps must be taken: First, DoD must be made to submit to Congress annual, standardized, composite reports on the Nation's arms business. Second, some agency outside DoD--preferably, the Office of Munitions Control or the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency--must be given the authority to control commercial arms sales. Third, the United States must restrict sharply the availability of easy credit for arms purchases. Politics, and not economics, must be the primary consideration. There is a crying need "to get military exports back in line with the best national security policy."

375
Pietrasik, Jerome. ["MIRAGE" AGAINST "MIG"] "Mirage" contre "Mig." Nouvel observateur, no. 244, July 20, 1969: 5-6. illus. AP20.02, 1969

Compares the Israeli and Arab Armed Forces, with emphasis on the relative merits of the aircraft of each side. Although the MiG-21, which is the mainstay of the Egyptian Air Force, can climb faster and travel farther than the Israeli Mirage IIICJ, the latter has superior electronic equipment and cannon fire and is capable of achieving higher altitudes. In addition, Israeli pilots are better trained and have benefited from many years of experience with the Mirage. Pietrasik discusses the rearmament of Egypt by the Soviet Union and the gradual lifting of the French weapons embargo against Israel, all of which can only add fuel to the Middle East fire.

Nuclear proliferation

376
Adelson, Alan M. PLEASE DON'T STEAL THE ATOMIC BOMB. Esquire, v. 71, May 1969: 130-133, 44.
AP2.E845, v. 71

There are few obstacles to stealing the ingredients for a nuclear bomb: Isotopes are carried regularly on commercial airline passenger flights, and unguarded shipments of enriched uranium and plutonium are made across the United States and the oceans. Experts say an accurate system of accounting for the traffic in nuclear materials must be instituted before the industry becomes unmanageable. In a few years nuclear reactors around the world will be producing some 20,000 kilograms of plutonium a year as byproducts; only 6 kilograms are needed for an A-bomb of the size dropped on Nagasaki. Nuclear-materials-processing losses of 2 percent are now considered normal, yet even 1 percent of what is now produced would be enough for universal destruction. The exact quantities of enriched uranium or plutonium on hand are hard to determine because processing involves many stages. A recent Atomic Energy Commission document has warned that a black market in nuclear explosives is likely. The strategic value of enriched uranium and plutonium almost assures criminal attempts at diversion to small governments, terrorists, or insurrectionists. The estimated cost on the black market of enough plutonium for one bomb is at least $270,000, so nearly $3,250,000 might be realized from one truckload. To sell nuclear materials with an intent to injure the United States or aid a foreign power is punishable by death, but the penalty for selling for gain without malice is only 5 years in jail and a fine of $10,000. New legislation with stiffer penalties is needed, and nuclear

371-992 O - 70 - 6

XUM

resources must be made secure "before the tremendous boom in nuclear power reaches a temporary peak in 1971-72."

377
Bebler, Aleš. ARMAMENT, DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY. Review of international affairs, v. 20, Feb. 5, 1969: 7-9. D839.R4, v. 20

Deplores the current arms race between the superpowers and the international arms trade and notes that little is being accomplished in this field to guarantee world security. Even the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, which has been hailed as a great achievement in disarmament, will not curb the arms race because it has not been signed by those countries on the threshold of becoming nuclear powers. Bebler states that a certain decisive trend against the armaments explosion, as reflected in the efforts of the conference of nonnuclear-weapon countries, must begin if international peace and security are to be achieved.

378
Biriukov, A. NUCLEAR AMBITIONS. Daily review, translations from the Soviet press, v. 15, Sept. 17, 1969: pt. 1, [item] 2, 1-2. Slav Rm
Translated from Pravda, Sept. 17, 1969. Slav Rm

Reports that the Japan Federation of Employers' Associations opposes that country's signing the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and is trying to influence the Government not to sign. Biryukov quotes the Federation as saying that the inspection contemplated by the treaty could be an obstacle to the development of atomic energy for peaceful uses. He characterizes this attitude and the opinion of Ken Okubo, president of the Association of Arms Manufacturers, that Japan needs nuclear weapons for defense as manifestations of Japanese militarism.

379
Conrad, Thomas M. DO-IT-YOURSELF A-BOMBS. Commonweal, v. 90, July 25, 1969: 455-457. AP2.C6897, v. 90

The belief that nuclear proliferation will inevitably involve nations rather than limited-resource organizations because of the high "entry prices" is being discredited by the technical information and data on nuclear weapons available in public literature. The Atomic Energy Commission publishes information by which the gross performances of U.S. nuclear weapons can be accurately estimated. In addition, there is a large body of information dealing with internal designs, materials, general systems, and nuclear explosives. A nuclear program that could exploit the results of 1,000 to 1,500 hours of reading and independent research by one man probably could attain a level of actual bomb production. A typical program might involve the production of 50 to 100 thermonuclear devices per year, with costs approaching $5 million per bomb or $1 billion for 200 thermonuclear bombs. There are many autonomous organizations like the Mafia that could afford this price and become potential nuclear powers. The introduction on the market of relatively cheap and quick nuclear bombs would enable these organizations to blackmail whole cities with nuclear destruction. The catastrophic implications of independent nuclear programs would not go unnoticed by the superpowers. In all likelihood they would bomb private plants before waiting for production to begin, but it is unclear whether such a reaction would deter either national or private nuclear programs. The continued disregard for the consequences of nuclear proliferation, coupled with the human capacity for folly and viciousness, will create a world in which nuclear stockpiles are available to every government, walled city-states are protected by nuclear missiles, and the population is down to 1 billion and falling at an average daily rate of 200,000 owing to nuclear explosions. Unless there is a serious attempt to deal with nuclear proliferation, those who can afford to should begin making plans to migrate to small, deserted islands far away from the civilized world.

380
Maddox, John. THE NUCLEAR CLUB. Listener, v. 81, June 5, 1969: 773-775. illus. AP4.L4165, v. 81

Ever since the first thermonuclear device was exploded in 1954, the world has lived with the fear that some new technological breakthrough will simplify the manufacture of thermonuclear weapons to the point where they will be within the reach of any nation that wants them. Although 15 years have passed without the anticipated breakthrough's taking place, apprehensions on this score remain as high as ever, having been stimulated anew in recent years by progress in laser and centrifuge technology. Investigation will show, however, that these new technologies are not nearly so dangerous as they appear to be. Proposals to use a laser beam to trigger the fusion process in thermonuclear weapons have run into formidable technical obstacles. A centrifugal enrichment facility could make small amounts of fissile material for explosive devices but would be more efficient as a producer of large quantities of less highly enriched uranium for nuclear reactors. If a nonnuclear power should choose to make nuclear weapons, it would begin by producing fission bombs from plutonium, which is a byproduct of certain types of power reactors. For this program, an enrichment facility would not be needed. Moreover, one must keep in mind that the forces that determine the extent of nuclear proliferation are not so much technical as political and military. A nation acquires nuclear weapons not merely because it has the technical means to do so but because it believes that nuclear weapons will be useful in a given international environment. However, since it is almost impossible to enter into a nuclear weapons program in a small way, a nation will think twice before acquiring these weapons, even when the political and military case for them seems

XUM

clear cut. Even a moderate-sized program can be costly, and it is evident that the small quantity of fissile material that could be produced by a bank of centrifuges could not begin to support an adequate program of nuclear armaments.

381
Malinin, Sergei A. LEGAL PROBLEMS OF THE TREATY ON THE NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. Pravovedenie, no. 1, Jan./Feb. 1969: 109-120.
LL

The ideal solution to the problems of nuclear weapons would be an agreement on their absolute prohibition. In the absence of such an agreement, the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons was signed on July 1, 1968. The treaty enumerates the obligations of three groups: the nuclear powers, the nonnuclear-weapon states, and international organizations. The accepted text on the obligation of nuclear powers demonstrates the failure of the American proposal "not to place any nuclear weapons under the 'national control' of any nonnuclear state." The treaty left unsolved the urgent problem of the deployment of nuclear weapons systems on the territory of the nonnuclear-weapon states. The safeguards for the security of the nonnuclear-weapon states included in a special resolution of the U.N. Security Council of July 17, 1968, seem sufficient. The most important of the nonnuclear-weapons states' obligations are those relating to international control that will be carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) by application of IAEA's "safeguards system." The opinions on this system are divided. The Soviet Union takes the middle road; it does not assume a completely negative attitude but is unwilling to give IAEA unlimited power. It recommends the use of the approach generally applied in international control, especially in the verification of partial disarmament measures. The obligations of the IAEA, which did not participate in the agreement, are nevertheless not in contradiction with international law because IAEA occupies a special position in relation to the Security Council, which controls it to a certain extent. The real value of the treaty lies in the fact that the principle of disarmament has been included in article 6, and this gives the principle the legal content and normative character of a provision of international law. The treaty is not an end in itself. The parties consider the partial disarmament agreements the best progress toward complete and general disarmament in the present era. Finally, the treaty has an original approach to the problem of "peaceful" nuclear explosions that might prevent the nuclear powers from arming their partners in aggressive military alliances with nuclear weapons under the pretext of benefits from "peaceful" nuclear explosions.

382
AN OBSTACLE ON THE PATH OF MILITARISM AND AGGRESSION. Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 21, Sept. 17, 1969: 10-12. D839.C87, v. 21
Translated from Izvestiia, Aug. 21, 1969.
Slav Rm

Report on the August 20, 1969, meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the two chambers of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., the topic of which was the proposal to ratify the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Extolling the advantages of the treaty for the Soviet Union and the world, Andrei A. Gromyko, in a report delivered to the meeting, recommended the ratification of the treaty, which, through reciprocal commitments by the nuclear and nonnuclear states, would effectively close the loopholes for the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. The chairman of the committee, Mikhail A. Suslov, stressed that the attitude of the Soviet Government stems from its peace-loving Leninist foreign policy and warned that West Germany's refusal to join the treaty constitutes a real danger of nuclear war because it is based on the country's determination to produce and eventually use nuclear weapons.

383
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. European Nuclear Energy Agency. URANIUM RESOURCES, REVISED ESTIMATES, DECEMBER 1967; A JOINT REPORT BY THE EUROPEAN NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY. [Paris] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [1968] 25 p. maps. TN490.U7072

Contents.--Foreword.--Definitions.--Comments on the reliability of the estimates.--Uranium from the sea.--Uranium resource estimates, country by country.--Thorium resource estimates.

Inventory of "reasonably assured resources" and "estimated additional resources" of uranium, compiled on the basis of data supplied by the member governments of the reporting agencies.

384
Quester, George H. ISRAEL AND THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 25, June 1969: 7-9, 44-45.
TK9145.A84, v. 25

Among Israelis, arguments for the nonproliferation treaty carry little weight. For one thing, the Arabs are incapable of making nuclear weapons now or in the foreseeable future, while nations that do have the capability--Brazil or India, for example--are of no concern to Israel. For another, whatever may be the case in other areas and between other belligerents, in the Middle East between Arab and Jew "the mutual renunciation of nuclear weapons will not induce waves of political good feeling that multiply out into real détente." Arguments against the treaty--e.g., that safeguards will encourage commercial espionage or be a serious hindrance in nuclear research and energy programs--are more convincing. In addition, many Israeli officials see an advantage in keeping the Arabs guessing about whether or not they intend to make nuclear weapons. Israel has the resources (except uranium) and expertise to make nuclear arms in a relatively short period of time. It is not likely to make any immediate decision on this matter, but as technology advances the nation is brought

closer and closer to nuclear weapons. Israel still may sign the treaty if its reputation and a significant amount of U.S. aid depend upon it. A signature cannot prevent Israel from openly renouncing or secretly evading the treaty should this appear necessary for national security. Furthermore, by ratifying the treaty, Israel qualifies for additional assistance in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and this could make a clandestine program of arms manufacture much simpler. These and other considerations must be accounted for in calculating the marginal advantages and disadvantages of nuclear weapons and treaty ratification, but it would seem that "the very circumstances that would make NPT more effective may serve as one more marginal disadvantage of the treaty in the pragmatic Israeli calculus."

385
Seaborg, Glenn T. GENERAL CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY HOLDS 13TH SESSION AT VIENNA. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 61, Oct. 20, 1969: 329-333.
JX232.A33, v. 61

Statement made before the 13th session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency on Sept. 24, 1969.

Outlines U.S. policy on international cooperation to extend the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Seaborg discusses U.S. participation in bilateral and multilateral programs, the expanded role of the International Atomic Energy Agency under the nonproliferation treaty, and the nature of the environmental problems raised by the increased use of nuclear power.

386
TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF URANIUM ENRICHMENT IN EUROPE. Nuclear engineering, v. 14, July 1969: 580-583.
TK9001.N75, v. 14

Reports on a one-day "international symposium sponsored by the Nederlands Atoomforum at Utrecht" on May 30, 1969. Participants discussed the political, economic, and technical aspects of proposals to build a uranium enrichment facility in Europe and lent encouragement to this project by releasing figures that suggest favorable economic prospects for the ultracentrifuge and nozzle enrichment processes as alternatives to the diffusion barrier method.

387
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS ON THE TREATY ON THE NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. [Washington, For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1969] xvi, 183 p. (Its Publication 48)
JX1974.A1U52, no. 48

Bibliographical footnotes.

Contents.--Foreword.--List of abbreviations.--Summary.--Background.--ENDC negotiations (1964)--Nonaligned developments.--First Chinese Communist test.--Disarmament Commission discussions (1965)--Eighth session of the ENDC (1965)--Twentieth General Assembly (1965)--NATO and Warsaw Treaty arrangements.--Pastore resolution.--Ninth session of the ENDC, January 27-May 10, 1966.--Tenth session of the ENDC, June 14-August 25, 1966.--Tenth general conference of the IAEA, September 21-28, 1966.--Twenty-first General Assembly (1966)--Concerns of non-nuclear-weapon nations.--Draft nonproliferation treaty, August 24, 1967.--Report by Secretary-General Thant, October 10, 1967.--Twenty-second General Assembly (part I)--Thirteenth session of the ENDC, January 18-March 14, 1968.--Twenty-second General Assembly (part II)--Security Council action on the tripartite assurances proposal.--Signing of the treaty.--Documentary annex.

"A historical review of the public international negotiations leading to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons." The documentary annex includes the various drafts that preceded the final version of the treaty opened for signature on July 1, 1968.

388
THE W.F.S.W. NINTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY. Scientific world, v. 13, no. 4, 1969: 29-35.
Q1.S8415, v. 13

Report of the 9th General Assembly of the World Federation of Scientific Workers, held in Paris, from April 1 to 4, 1969. In a resolution on disarmament, nuclear dangers, and Vietnam adopted at the session, the conference supported agreements on nuclear nonproliferation and the banning of nuclear weapons from space vehicles and maintained that the next steps toward disarmament "should include the conclusion of treaties prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons and banning all tests, including underground tests of these weapons."

389
Young, Elizabeth. THE CONTROL OF PROLIFERATION: THE 1968 TREATY IN HINDSIGHT AND FORECAST. London, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1969. 22 p. (Adelphi papers, no. 56)
U162.A3, no. 56

Examines the history of negotiations for the nonproliferation treaty and concludes that its deficiencies, which are most objectionable to the nonnuclear-weapon states, are a consequence of superpower dominance over the making of the treaty. The inadequacy of security arrangements for nonnuclear-weapon states and the failure to deal directly with the problem of vertical proliferation and other arms control issues are the treaty's major shortcomings and may undermine its effectiveness.

XUM

Other (accidental war, command and control of weapons, etc.)

390
[PANEL ON TACTICAL SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS] Signal, v. 24, Sept. 1969: 44-46, 48-56, 58-69. illus.
UG1.M65, v. 24

Contents.--Army tactical satellite communications, by George E. Pickett.--Navy tactical satellite communications, by Francis J. Fitzpatrick.--Air Force tactical satellite communications, by Lee M. Paschall.--SHF tactical satellite earth terminals, by E. F. Bailey.--Satellite airborne communications, by V. R. DeLong.--Tactical satellite communications requirements, by T. J. Mattis.

Discussion of tactical satellite communications. Pickett describes the Army's Tactical Satellite Communications program, which is designed to furnish the tactical commander with a reliable, flexible communications network for use at all echelons of the Army. Fitzpatrick deals with tactical communications developed for command and control of surface, submarine, and air naval forces and announces the development of an era of improved communications support through satellites.

REGIONAL

Tension areas

391
Alia, Josette. [NASSER'S NEW ARMY] La nouvelle armée de Nasser. Nouvel observateur, no. 248, Aug. 17, 1969: 10-11. illus.
AP20.02, 1969

President Nasser will accept Israel's peace terms on two conditions: The territorial boundaries must be restored to the "status quo ante bellum," and the peace treaty must be signed by all the Arab States. Nasser vows that he will go to war if Israel ignores these conditions, and Egypt appears to be preparing for such an eventuality. The general attitude among Egyptian Army officials is that Egypt has lost a battle but not a war and that the next war will be a long one, a war of attrition. In fact, almost 40,000 student volunteers have joined the Egyptian Army out of a desire to reconquer lost Arab territories. Such attitudes are indicative of a new army that is becoming a disciplined and polished war machine. However, it will be some time before the Egyptians will match the Israelis in the crucial aspect of air combat and antiaircraft defenses, and the Egyptian pilots recently trained in the Soviet Union must first experience combat before their value can be determined. Today, the main question is whether the Soviet Union, which has been holding the reins on Nasser, will have enough influence to maintain those reins if Egypt's leader decides to go to war.

392
Balta, Paul. [IS PEACE POSSIBLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST?] La paix est-elle possible au Moyen-Orient? Revue de défense nationale, v. 25, Oct. 1969: 1596-1606.
D410.R45, v. 25

Analyzes the obstacles to peace in the Middle East and the role of the great powers in a future settlement. Balta concludes that, because of the recalcitrant attitudes of the Arabs and Israelis, the Middle East is ready for a new war that could last 20 years.

393
Blumenfeld, Yorick. EASTERN EUROPE ON THE VERGE. Progressive, v. 33, Oct. 1969: 23-26.
AP2.P8655, v. 33

"Eastern Europe is in the doldrums." Economic stagnation is widespread, and political opposition to Soviet domination not only pervades the general populace but--except in Bulgaria--is found among many Communists as well. The Soviet Union maintains its hold on Eastern Europe only by force, economic blackmail, and the secret police. Demoralized by their failure to bring about "socialism with a human face," East Europeans are restive under what they regard as the mediocre and dogmatic--if not criminal--leadership of the Brezhnev regime.

394
Brecher, Michael. THE MIDDLE EAST SUBORDINATE SYSTEM AND ITS IMPACT ON ISRAEL'S FOREIGN POLICY. International studies quarterly, v. 13, June 1969: 117-139.
D839.B2, v. 13

Analyzes the Arab-Israeli dispute in terms of a subordinate system of Middle Eastern states. Brecher reviews the evolution of the present system and examines several of its basic characteristics: the existence of a common language--Arabic--and the important role of communications generally; conflicting patterns of values between secularists and traditionalists despite a common cultural heritage; contrasting political systems in which the contest between radical (military) and gradualist (civilian) modernizers predominates; and the changing configuration of power marked by the emergence of two "great powers" within the regional context--Israel and Egypt--and the relative growth in strength of the former vis-a-vis the latter.

395
Dudley, H. G. THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC OCEAN. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 14, Aug./Sept. 1969: 33-37.
UA646.F5, v. 14

Warns that NATO, being a maritime alliance and thus dependent for its security upon the preservation of the freedom of the seas in the North Atlantic and elsewhere, is highly vulnerable to the kind of seapower strategy now being pursued by

the Soviet Union. Dudley asserts that the Soviet leadership today is not more peace loving than 20 years ago but only more subtle. It continues to aim at world domination, but the military and political standoff in central Europe has forced it to turn to seapower to accomplish its purposes.

396
[THE EFFECTS OF THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT ON THE NEAR EAST CRISIS] Die Auswirkungen des sino-sowjetischen Konflikts auf die Nahost-Krise [by] U. G. F. Orientierung, no. 247, July 1969: 30-37.
DD1.07, 1969

Discusses Soviet and Communist Chinese efforts to increase their influences on the Arab-Israeli conflict. The article states that, while Communist China is interested in deepening the Soviet-American tension in the Mediterranean, the Soviet Union aims at sociorevolutionary change in the Arab States, not at liquidation of Israel. This divergence of goals puts the Arab States in a difficult situation, for they depend greatly on Soviet aid. The Sino-Soviet conflict contributes to the deprecation by the two Communist Powers of each other's Near East policies.

397
Feldman, Herbert. THE COMMUNAL PROBLEM IN THE INDO-PAKISTAN SUBCONTINENT: SOME CURRENT IMPLICATIONS. Pacific affairs, v. 43, summer 1969: 145-163.
DU1.P13, v. 43

Analyzes regional Indo-Pakistan conflicts. Feldman maintains that regional loyalties are stronger than national ones in both areas and are detrimental to national unity and strength. He concludes that area leaders will be irresponsible if they do not consider the grave consequences of a breakup in the subcontinents, after which West Pakistan, the most homogenous unit, will most likely emerge the strongest entity.

398
Garder, Michel. [POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS OF THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT] Les développements possibles du conflit sino-soviétique. Stratégie, no. 18, Apr./June 1969: 35-50.
U162.S78, 1969

Explores a certain number of hypotheses concerning the outcome of the Sino-Soviet conflict. Garder doubts that China will ever launch a direct attack against the Soviet Union or even India. However, some Soviet leaders, intoxicated by superpower status and fearful of China's growing nuclear capability, are advocating a preemptive strike against their Communist neighbor. Garder notes that the passage of the conflict from a "religious cold war" to a "hot war" is certainly possible but logically improbable. He concludes that the most desirable combination for peace in this situation, from the West's point of view, would be a peaceful change of the Soviet regime and the maintenance of the status quo in China. This would not only reduce the risk of armed conflict between the two powers but also facilitate the resolution of the problem of European unity in accordance with the views of the United States.

399
Giese, Fritz E. [THE BOSPORUS AND THE DARDANELLES--TREATIES AND STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE] Bosporus and Dardanellen--Vertrăge und strategische Bedeutung. Wehrkunde, v. 18, May 1969: 231-235.
U3.W396, v. 18

Traces the origins of the 1936 Montreux Convention, which restored Turkey's sovereignty over the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, and discusses its influence on the present strategic situation in the Mediterranean area. Giese considers Soviet naval and political expansion in the Mediterranean and underlines the strategic importance of Turkey for the security of the region and NATO.

400
Hacker, Jens. GERMANY'S 20-YEAR PARTITION. Central Europe journal, v. 17, Oct. 1969: 292-300.
DB200.7.S74, v. 17

The establishment of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) 20 years ago at Soviet behest was the final stage of a carefully planned scheme to divide Germany, whose unification had long been proclaimed by the Soviets as the basis for a German peace settlement. Thus the fateful division of Germany was engineered by the East. The Communists in the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany employed a "unity list" at "elections" but were forced to acknowledge that they had come off badly themselves. From this resulted demands in the zone for free elections, which to this day have not been fulfilled. Of particular interest is evidence brought that the "GDR" sees itself as the historical continuation of the old "German Reich" and has laid claim to all-German validity. Its Constitution does not provide the division of power intrinsic in a true democracy. Following disruption of the legal unity which continued to exist for some time between free Germany and the Soviet-occupied part of the country, the Communist regime made a complete break with historical continuity. Today the "State" apparatus is controlled by the Communist SED (Socialist Unity party), which is servile to Moscow. (Abstract supplied, modified)

401
Hinterhoff, Eugène. THE DILEMMAS OF THE GERMAN PROBLEM. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 14, Aug./Sept. 1969: 62-66. illus.
UA646.F5, v. 14

The division of Germany and the occupation of its eastern half by Soviet troops is the most dangerous and intractable problem facing the world today. Opportunities to reach a settlement acceptable to all parties have arisen from time to time but have always been overlooked or mishandled. Today, the resurgence of Soviet aggressiveness,

XUM

combined with the West's refusal to relinquish its hope for a solution that is compatible with German membership in NATO, sharply diminishes the likelihood of the problem's being solved. An imaginative new approach to the German question is needed. One alternative--reunification after the manner of Hitler's Anschluss with Austria--can be immediately dismissed as unrealistic. On the other hand, reunification on Soviet terms is a distinct possibility. An invasion would be out of the question in the face of American power, but a negotiated settlement between West Germany and the U.S.S.R.--a new Rapallo--might eventuate if NATO should weaken and the Germans prove unable to contain their frustrations. Since a new Rapallo would be a disaster for the West, some other alternative must be found. An approach along these lines might be fruitful: The two Germanys would withdraw from their respective alliances and associate in a loose confederation. Elections would be guaranteed in 2 to 5 years, and all foreign troops would be withdrawn from the soil of the two countries. Concurrently, the Oder-Neisse Line would be recognized as the permanent German-Polish boundary. A neutral zone, consisting of a united Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Rumania, and guaranteed by the United States and the Soviet Union, would have to be established. The states of this zone would be assured of the right to join a later all-European federation. It would seem that only a plan of this type could succeed in breaking the deadlock over Germany and opening the way to a negotiated East-West settlement of the issue.

402
Hudson, Michael. THE PALESTINIAN ARAB RESISTANCE MOVEMENT: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS. Middle East journal, v. 23, summer 1969: 291-307. DS1.M5, v. 23

The Palestinian Arab resistance movement, which did not emerge as a major factor in Middle Eastern politics until after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, comprises several groups representing various interests in the Arab community: Fatah, the largest; Saiqah, which is under Syrian control; and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a Marxist group divided into several factions. Despite divisive tendencies within the movement, "the trend has been toward consolidation of structures under the aegis of Fatah," whose goal is "the liberation of all of Palestine from Zionist political control" and the eradication of Zionism. Fatah leaders have managed to establish a modus vivendi with neighboring Arab governments but fear that American or Soviet pressure to enforce a settlement may undermine their position. They are confident that Israel cannot endure a campaign of protracted violence and insist that Israeli sources systematically understate the damage caused by guerrilla attacks. Resistance leaders are in general agreement that Jews now living in Palestine should not be expelled and should be granted equal rights with Arabs. The new state of Palestine would probably have a republican constitution, would definitely cease to be Zionist, and would pursue a Leftist domestic and neutralist foreign policy. While Israel has officially minimized the effectiveness of the resistance movement, it has shown an increasing concern to secure itself against guerrilla attacks. On the other hand the Palestinian Arabs, despite their determination to win recognition by the international community, do not appear to have the power to erase Zionism. At the very least, however, it is essential that they be a party to any solution of the present conflict, and "it is conceivable that the Palestinian resistance movement--its militant rhetoric notwithstanding--may hold the key to a just peace in the Middle East."

403
Kemp, Geoffrey. ARMS & SECURITY: THE EGYPT-ISRAEL CASE. London, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1968 [i.e. 1969] 27 p. (Adelphi papers, no. 52)
U162.A3, no. 52
Bibliographical footnotes.

Contents.--Introduction.--Air power and security: (A) Israel. (B) Egypt.--Land forces: (A) Israel. (B) Egypt.--Sea power: (A) Israel. (B) Egypt.--The other Arab countries.--The arms race.--Summary.--Postscript.

"Examine[s] some of the factors in the Arab-Israeli conflict that have direct bearing on the relationship between strategy, politics, and arms levels in the area." Kemp undertakes a detailed analysis of the major weapons systems in use or projected for use by the Israelis and Egyptians emphasizing quality as well as quantity. He reviews attempts to control the Middle East arms race and suggests that such efforts are almost certain to fail in an area of intense interstate conflict. The core of the Middle East problem remains political; arms control measures at best can reduce tensions and thus bring about a more favorable atmosphere for a political settlement.

404
Khadduri, Majdia D., comp. THE ARAB-ISRAELI IMPASSE; EXPRESSIONS OF MODERATE VIEWPOINTS ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT BY WELL-KNOWN WESTERN WRITERS. Washington, R. B. Luce [distributed by D. McKay Co., New York, 1969, c1968] 223 p. map.
DS119.7.K42
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Preface, by Alec Waugh.--Introduction, by Quincy Wright.--The background: The Middle East situation, by Sir John Bagot Glubb. The Middle East, past and present, by Arnold J. Toynbee. The tragedy of Palestine from the Balfour Declaration to today, by Anthony Nutting. --The Arab-Israeli War of 1967: How it began, by Charles W. Yost. The Soviets, the puppet, from "Le Nouvel Observateur." The Arabs 1967, by John S. Badeau.--United States policy in the Middle East: But what do we do about the Arabs? by Dan Cordtz. Problems of American policy makers in the Middle East, by Elmer Berger.--The Palestinian refugees: Palestine and Israel, by Albert Hourani. The problem of the Arab refugees, by Henry N. Howard.--Clerical opinion on the conflict: Christians on the Mideast crisis, by Willard G. Oxtoby. Resolutions of the National Council of

XUM

Churches.--Looking forward: Mideast prognosis, by Jean Lacouture. The Middle East; recurrent crisis, by Denis Baly. The U.N. resolution, November 22, 1967.

405
Kremnev, M. MOUNTING TENSION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. New times, no. 30, July 30, 1969: 15-16.
D839.N483, 1969

Warns that a new round in the Middle East war is imminent and can be prevented only by diplomatic negotiations and that Israel's refusal to withdraw its troops from Arab territories--the only just and sound basis for a peaceful settlement--frustrates the efforts of the four power negotiators. Kremnev refers to Andrei Gromyko's speech in Cairo, which assured the Arabs of Soviet support, and to the resolution of the Moscow Conference of Communist and Workers Parties, which condemned Israel's aggressive behavior. He concludes that nothing will help Israel, least of all the support of the leaders of world Zionism, and that Israel eventually will have to abide by the 1967 resolution of the U.N. Security Council.

406
Lubojanski, Jozef. POLISH WESTERN AND NORTHERN TERRITORIES. Contemporary Poland, v. 3, June/July 1969: 14-19. P&GP RR

Argues that the Oder-Neisse boundary is an indisputable and accomplished fact. Lubojanski concludes that this boundary is "an all-European question" and the cornerstone of the security of the Continent.

407
Maxwell, Neville. CHINA AND THE USSR ON THE BRINK. New republic, v. 161, Aug. 16, 1969: 17-19.
AP2.N624, v. 161

China and the Soviet Union are on the brink of nuclear war over disputed borders. Although such disputes have been negotiated peacefully between China and five neighboring states, India and the Soviet Union have agreed to negotiate only on terms unacceptable to China. The question is not whether Soviet military strength is sufficient to win a quick victory but whether it is sufficient for Russia to think that it can do so. Soviet actions in the dispute suggest ominously that Russia believes it can.

408
Niu, Sien-chong. SINKIANG, THE "NEW FRONTIER" OF CHINA. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 14, Apr./May 1969: 90-95. illus.
UA646.F5, v. 14

Discusses the political and military situation in Communist China's Sinkiang Province. Niu calls attention to the great strategic value and vast economic potential of the Province and describes the Government's use of military force and the cultural annihilation of minorities to consolidate its position there in the face of opposition from rebellious non-Hans, independent-minded "warlords," and the Soviet Union. As the rivalry between the Soviet Union and Communist China heats up, the situation in Sinkiang becomes more explosive.

409
Niu, Sien-chong. THE STRATEGIC CONFRONTATION IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 14, June/July 1969: 54-57, 59-60. illus.
UA646.F5, v. 14

Examines the major sources of tension and the balance of forces between North and South Korea. Niu describes the economic geography and demography of the Korean peninsula, discusses the social and political problems faced by the northern and southern governments, and compares the effectiveness of the opposing military forces. The recent spate of North Korean attacks on South Korean and U.S. military forces seem to have been provoked by fears of the consequences of South Korea's phenomenal economic growth.

410
Safran, Nadav. FROM WAR TO WAR: THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFRONTATION, 1948-1967; A STUDY OF THE CONFLICT FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF COERCION IN THE CONTEXT OF INTER-ARAB AND BIG POWER RELATIONS. New York, Pegasus [1969] 464 p. illus.
DS119.7.S32
Bibliographical footnotes.

Contents.--Introduction.--The evolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.--The pattern of inter-Arab relations and the Arab-Israeli conflict.--The big powers and the Middle East.--The dynamics of arms buildup: defense expenditures.--The arms buildup: evolution of armed forces.--To the brink and over: the May-June 1967 crisis.--The Six Day War (June 5-10, 1967).--The war and the future of the Arab-Israeli conflict.--Appendix A: Sources, methods, and comments.--Appendix B: The Armed Forces of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Israel on the eve of the war.--Appendix C: The opponents' military hardware.--Index.

Reviews the origins of the Arab-Israeli dispute, examines the dispute in the contexts of inter-Arab relations and great-power involvement, describes the arms buildups of Israel and the Arab States, recounts the 6-day war, and assesses its consequences for future Arab-Israeli relations.

411
Salisbury, Harrison E. WILL THERE BE WAR BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CHINA? New York times magazine, July 27, 1969: 10-11, 54-58. illus.
AP2.N6575, 1969

The threat of war between Russia and China may appear unreal to Westerners far removed from the sources of tension, but it is a matter of greatest urgency in the Asian heartland. Both Russia and China are making extensive preparations for war.

Mongolia has been transformed into an armed camp with the influx of Soviet troops and the emplacement of sophisticated weaponry and supporting equipment. The Chinese have made similar preparations on their side of the border; the main Chinese troop concentrations are in areas that would be threatened by a Soviet attack, and in recent months the Chinese have reinforced defenses around their nuclear production and testing facilities near the Mongolian border. Both sides have also intensified their campaigns of psychological and ideological warfare. The Chinese depict the Russians as the "new Czars" acting in concert with the United States to restore capitalism and recall the history of czarist territorial expansion at China's expense through the imposition of a series of "unequal" treaties. The Soviet Government has enlisted the support of well-known Soviet intellectuals--among them Konstantin Simonov, Evgenii Evtushenko, and Vladimir Vysotskii--in chauvinistic and even racist attacks on the Chinese. Some Soviet political leaders continue to voice the hope that relations with China will improve once Mao is gone, while others consider a peaceful solution no longer possible. The Soviet military is confident it can overthrow the Chinese Government with a preemptive strike against Chinese nuclear facilities and a lightning attack on the capital--"a tempting scenario for statesmen weary of polemics and worried about the population and growing nuclear swat of China." In the event of a Sino-Soviet war the United States might well be imperiled by nuclear fallout or even direct involvement should the conflict spread to other countries. Recognition of these possibilities has led to increasing demands for the United States to exert its influence to prevent a catastrophe.

412
Shepherd, Naomi. NASSER HOTS UP SUEZ. New statesman, v. 78, Aug. 1, 1969: 137-138.
AP4.N64, v. 78

The Middle East situation is likely to get hotter before it gets cooler because of the military escalation practiced by both Egypt and Israel. The escalation continues because of Egypt's policy of waging a war of attrition and Israel's determination to teach Egypt the futility of making war. It appears that Israel will enlarge the conflict because the continued French embargo on aircraft and the delayed shipment of the F-4 Phantom jets, together with Nasser's current policy, have increased the price Israel is willing to pay to remain on its present frontiers. There is little chance, however, that the United States and the Soviet Union will become involved in a direct military confrontation in this area. The next battle will involve Israel and Egypt alone; the other Arab States show no willingness "to be pulled along by an over-friendly handshake."

413
Shinn, Roger L. THE TRAGIC MIDDLE EAST. Christianity and crisis, v. 29, Sept. 15, 1969: 233-236.
BR1.C6417, v. 29

Finds on all sides in the Middle East a combination of moral fervor and insecurity that could lead to war and no confidence in a peaceful future. However, Shinn asserts that the people of the area should concentrate on future possibilities rather than on past grievances and that the great powers should cooperate to contribute to the area's economic health.

414
SOVIET THREAT IN THE MEDITERRANEAN; WEU REPORTS EXAMINE GROWING INTERVENTION. NATO letter, v. 17, June 1969: 2-7. illus.
D845.2.A44, v. 17

Excerpts from two reports by the Western European Union.

Examines the Soviet Union's moves to become a Mediterranean power, its military and economic aid to the Arab States, its new strategy that has built up a powerful navy capable of long-range intervention, and the tension caused by an alleged agreement to allow Communist China to station troops in Albania. It is concluded that, while there is little indication now that "outright aggression" is planned, the possible use of force by the U.S.S.R. must be considered.

415
SUMMING UP OF APRIL 28 "RETURN OKINAWA" STRUGGLE AND OUR FUTURE TASKS. Japan Socialist review, no. 181, June 15, 1969: 3-11.
HX9.J3, 1969

Summarizes Socialist Party activities to exert pressure for the "immediate, unconditional and complete return of Okinawa to Mainland Japan" and against the U.S.-Japanese security treaty. Future tasks announced include a third and fourth "nationwide united struggle" on June 23 and October 23, 1969, and 1-day struggles "at important moments" to be held in anticipation of the visit to the United States by Prime Minister Sato in November.

416
Tate, Gordon. CHINA'S ASIAN TARGETS. United Asia, v. 21, Mar./Apr. 1969: 60-62.
DS1.U55, v. 21

Examines Communist China's efforts to extend its influence in Asia and discusses the resentment of Asian nations against Chinese interference. Tate notes that very few Asian states have escaped Chinese meddling and that Peking's recent arrogance abroad stems from the cultural revolution and the emergence of the Red Guards. He concludes that Chinese interference throughout Asia is part of Mao Tse-tung's "Genesis" for Communist domination of all the developing countries of the world.

417
U.S. Dept. of State. THE MIDDLE EAST. [Washington, For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1968] 20 p. illus. (Its Issues in United States foreign policy no. 1)
DS62.85.1968.U5

Contents.--Introduction.--Regional profile.--Arab-Israeli dispute: a chronology.--Great power involvement.--U.S.S.R.--United States.--Conclusion.

Surveys the demographic, political, and economic characteristics of the Middle East; reviews the history of the Arab-Israeli dispute and the role of the great powers--notably Great Britain, Russia, and the United States--in Middle Eastern politics; and outlines official U.S. policy in the region.

418
Váli, Ferenc A. THE QUEST FOR A UNITED GERMANY. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press [1967] 318 p. map. (on lining papers) DD257.25.V3
Bibliography: p. 291-309.

Contents.--Preface.--Germany: one or many.--The reunification question in West German politics.--West Germans and the reunification question.--East Germany and reunification.--Berlin and the reunification problem.--The reunification problem and international politics.--The German problem of the mid-twentieth century.--Index.

Expounds German reunification as a political and historical necessity and points out the "four-power" responsibility to bring it about. Váli contends that compromise solutions to the German question, like détente through negotiated arms control or disengagement, would be doomed to failure; recognition of the territorial status quo by the Western Powers would conflict with the principles of the self-determination of nations and the democratic form of government. A possible means is a Bonn-Moscow dialog, which could eventually replace the official "four-power" responsibility once Moscow changed its negative policy toward reunification.

419
Vargas, Jesus. ASIA'S BALANCE OF POWER. SEATO record, v. 8, Apr. 1969: 9-13.
DS501.S7916, v. 8

Excerpts from a speech by the Secretary-General of SEATO before the American Chamber of Commerce in Bangkok.

Bringing together in Paris the opposing sides in Vietnam is an achievement. However, delaying tactics indicate that the Communists are in Paris only in the hope of preparing for the unification of Vietnam as a Communist state. Both China and the Soviet Union are working to exclude Western influence from Asia. Should Russia come within nuclear parity of the United States or China develop nuclear capability, the free nations of Asia would be at their mercy. The reduction of French, British, and particularly U.S. participation in Asian security is of very great concern to free Asian countries. It is hard to understand how the United States could unilaterally impose restraint on its participation in the existing interlocking system of bilateral and multilateral agreements and alliances. Such a U.S. policy would mean that free Asian countries would have to redirect their energies and resources to their own long-term security. The common danger from the threat of Communist China favors exploring the possibilities of an all-Asian defensive alliance, but many are not prepared to accept this. "The dominant threat to free Asians today is the real and present danger of Communist subversion," against which SEATO has provided aid to individual free Asian nations. Although it has been criticized by friends as well as detractors, "SEATO has helped maintain the balance of power in this strategic area."

420
Windsor, Philip. THE BOUNDARIES OF DÉTENTE. World today, v. 25, June 1969: 255-264.
D410.W63, v. 25

The status quo before the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was unable to accommodate "the strains of the contradictory policies pursued by the Powers concerned." That situation, the primary feature of which was a growing Soviet-American détente, was unsatisfactory to the Europeans, because it perpetuated the division of Germany and maintained tensions along an artificial frontier in Europe, and to the United States, which was torn between closer cooperation with its European allies and closer consultation with the Soviet Union. In addition, the Soviet-American détente frustrated Soviet attempts to deal with a growing mobility in West German policy and a deteriorating relationship with Communist China. Thus, the invasion attempted to unfreeze the status quo and reestablish an older, more rigid, one. Despite the invasion the Soviet-American détente has been maintained, and the United States has continued to pursue a greater understanding with the Soviet Union without sacrificing its objectives in Vietnam or the Middle East. However, Soviet-American cooperation has paid a high price: "There is now a sharper difference than ever before between the Soviet-American détente and East-West détente in Europe." Before August 1968 Europeans believed they could benefit from the Soviet-American dialog and would be free to cultivate their own relations. This, however, is no longer the case, and, although Soviet-American relations might continue to develop, the situation in Europe can become at best immobile, at worst hostile. If a Western détente policy is to become active again, the West must treat East Germany as an integral and important part of the Eastern diplomatic system. In the long run the inclusion of Pankow within the boundaries of détente might serve to promote the interests of the Western Powers. Until this decision is made, there can be little hope for the restoration of the potentialities of the European situation that existed before the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

421
Wren, Christopher S. REVOLT OF THE ARAB REFUGEES: "WE'LL MEET IN TEL AVIV!" Look, v. 33, May 13, 1969: 27-36. illus.
AP2.L79, v. 33

Are the Palestinian guerrillas terrorists or freedom fighters? The guerrillas, who contend that the Arabs have been made to pay for Western mis-

treatment of the Jews, vow to liberate Palestine from Zionist control. There are four principal guerrilla organizations--Fatah, the Popular Liberation Army, Al Saiqa, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine--which total from 3,000 to 10,000 men. Fatah leaders foresee a protracted war that will prove too costly for Israel to continue. Their goal is the creation of a secular state in which Jews and Arabs can work together with equal rights. The Popular Front forces, which concentrate on penetrations deep within Israeli territory in contrast to Fatah's strategy of border skirmishes, contend that El Al airliners are legitimate targets since they serve a military function. They emphasize the importance of political education in addition to guerrilla training.

Disengagement, neutralization, etc.

422
AROUND THE WORLD: QUIET CUTBACK BY U.S. U.S. news & world report, v. 67, Aug. 4, 1969: 47-48. illus.
JK1.U65, v. 67

Cites evidence to prove that "a U.S. pull-back from foreign military bases, now being sought by many in Congress, . . . is already in progress--with a faster rate of withdrawal in sight." The major item in the list of force reductions since 1966 is military bases, which have been reduced in number from a high of 2,660 just a few years ago to the present 2,270.

423
Cheng, Peter P. TAIWAN AND THE "TWO CHINAS." Current history, v. 57, Sept. 1969: 168-174, 177.
D410.C82, v. 57

Both Communist and Nationalist China contend that Taiwan, whose status remains undetermined, is a province of China. The Nationalists, who have retained effective control of Taiwan only by virtue of the U.S. commitment to the island's defense, cannot carry out their announced intention of invading the mainland without the U.S. support that has been repeatedly denied. The Communists, who have sought unsuccessfully to "liberate" Taiwan through an extensive diplomatic campaign, insist that American withdrawal from the island is a precondition for establishing friendly relations with the United States. The dilemma in which the United States thus finds itself can be resolved only by the merger of the Nationalist Chinese with the Taiwanese majority. Instead of favoring such a development, however, the dictatorial and totalitarian regime of Chiang Kai-shek has consistently opposed any movement in this direction. The U.N. votes on various "two-China" proposals suggest that "the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations apparently cannot be solved without a prior resolution of the status of Taiwan" because these proposals ignore the wishes of the Taiwanese, who constitute the great majority of Taiwan's population. What is needed is a policy that enables the Taiwanese--not the Nationalists or Communists--to determine their own government. Regrettably the United States has thus far refused to support self-determination for Taiwan. While it is certain that both the Nationalists and Communists would oppose self-determination, the United States can overcome this opposition if it is willing to take the initiative, and, if necessary, a U.N. trusteeship could be arranged pending a plebiscite. Taiwan has the population and the resources to "become an outpost of democracy in the Far East." In addition, American support for self-determination and independence for Taiwan could pave the way for eventual reconciliation with Communist China.

424
FINAL COMMUNIQUE OF CONSULTATIVE MEETING OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES. Yugoslav facts and views, July 16, 1969: 1-5.
DR370.Y75, 1969

Reports on the meeting of nonalined countries held in Belgrade, July 8-12, 1969. The participants discussed the role of the nonalinement policy in the present world situation, particularly in relation to the problems of peace, and the independence and development of the nonalined countries. The possibilities of intensified consultations, cooperation, and joint activities in various fields were examined. The participants agreed on the need for the countries' adherence to the U.N. Charter and the concentration of their efforts within the framework of the United Nations and stressed the desirability of another conference of the chiefs of the nonalined countries to continue the work of the Belgrade and Cairo conferences.

425
Nikezic, Marko. [ADDRESS BEFORE] THE XXIII SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON OCTOBER 14, 1968. Yugoslav facts and views, no. 46, Oct. 16, 1969: 1-5.
DR370.Y75, 1969

Presents the position of Yugoslavia as a nonalined power. Nikezic asserts that the Yugoslavs "are neither protagonists of economic autarchy nor advocates of isolation in the field of political and social relations" but seek to foster peace and good-neighbor relations.

426
THE NON-ALIGNED STATES: THE END OF A MYTH. Intelligence digest, v. 31, Aug. 1969: 14-16.
D410.R47, v. 31

The failure of the Belgrade consultative assembly of 51 nonalined countries to reach an agreement on another summit is an event of international significance. It means the end of the myth that these countries were really nonalined. In reality nonalinement was a "mobilisation of what has become a majority at the United Nations into a solid 'anti-imperialist,' that is, anti-West front." Tito, as the leader of this nonalined

XUM

world, was responsible for this "peculiar reasoning," which suited Moscow as well as Peking despite their rivalry in bidding for the allegiance of the nonalined countries. However, shortly after the 1968 events in Eastern Europe Tito changed his mind and began to feel that either nonalinement must mean what it says, or the countries must disclose where they stand. If they fight against imperialism, they must fight against all its manifestations in East and West. Many of the countries represented at the Belgrade meeting did not agree and wanted to accept the Moscow reasoning that terrorist "liberation" movements must be allowed to ally themselves with Moscow and then claim to be nonalined neutralists between East and West. The Belgrade conference served a good purpose because it forced many countries, such as India, Egypt, and Algeria, to declare their true colors. Although the bloc will probably be dead after the Moscow anti-imperialist conference planned for next year, a handful of genuinely nonalined countries may appear on the world arena.

427
POLAND'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS REMILITARIZATION IN G.F.R. Contemporary Poland, v. 3, Apr. 1969: 13-17.
P&GP RR

Considers West Germany's refusal to discontinue its armaments buildup and to accept a nuclear-free zone in central Europe as the basic threats to European peace and security. The real reason for the German Federal Republic's rejection of Polish and other disarmament proposals for Europe is its desire to strengthen its political and military position vis-a-vis Eastern Europe. The author concludes that the renunciation of nuclear weapons by both Germanys is the main requirement of European security.

428
Schoenbrun, David. VIETNAM; HOW WE GOT IN, HOW TO GET OUT. New York, Atheneum, 1968. 214 p.
DS557.A63S28 1968

Contents.--The view from the rostrum.--How did we get in?--How can we get out?--Questions and answers.--Appendices: French-Viet Minh Convention of 1946. Final declaration of the Geneva Conference, 1954. ICC report on violations of the Geneva agreements, 1957. SEATO Treaty, 1954. Hanoi's four points, 1965. Washington's fourteen points, 1966. NLF political program, 1967. Johnson-Ho Chi Minh letters, 1967. "Eyewitness in Hanoi," 1967.

Reviews the origins of the Vietnam War and the history of U.S. involvement in Vietnam since World War II. Schoenbrun examines the arguments in justification of U.S. intervention in Vietnam and points to some of the major obstacles to a settlement.

429
Zhukov, Iurii. THE UNITED STATES AND ASIA. Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 21, Sept. 3, 1969: 19.
D839.C87, v. 21

Translated and condensed from Pravda, Aug. 12, 1969.
Slav Rm

The announcement by President Nixon of a new Asian policy--Asia for Asians and the Vietnamization of the war--has not caused a significant change in U.S. policy in that area. In fact, during his Asian tour the President made several contradictory statements concerning de-Americanization in South Vietnam. Further, his announcement of the withdrawal of 25,000 American troops from that country did not appear as "historic" to most Americans as it did to Secretary Laird and Senator Mansfield. Deeper investigation of the troop withdrawal reveals that despite the pullout the number of American troops in South Vietnam had increased as of July 31. It is no wonder that the new U.S.-Asian policy has been met with acute distrust by many Asian states.

OUTER SPACE

430
Fawcett, J. E. S. THE POLITICS OF THE MOON. World today, v. 25, Aug. 1969: 357-362.
D410.W63, v. 25

Competition for control over the uses of the moon is a new factor in the Soviet-U.S. power struggle. The justifications for the moon programs, that they contribute to pure scientific knowledge and enhance the national image of power, are just window dressing for other objectives; viz, the use of the moon for national defense and the technological spinoffs from space projects. It might seem that the first of these objectives would violate the outer space treaty, but this is not so. Owing to serious ambiguities in the text, some intentional, the treaty does not preclude the moon's being used as a location for certain kinds of defensive systems. The moon, in short, has been only partially demilitarized. The major technological spinoff will be experience in the design and operation of manned spacecraft, which have great advantages for surveillance, the control of weapons systems, and the neutralization of enemy satellites. All signs indicate that the superpowers' space projects aim chiefly to develop the military potential of manned space vehicles.

431
MacDonald, Gordon J. F. SPACE. In Foreign Policy Association. Toward the year 2018. New York, Cowles Education Corp. [c1968] p. 23-34.
CB161.T6

Progress in space technology is to both the United States and the Soviet Union a means to build international prestige and gather military intelligence. The information on each other's military capabilities that their satellites obtain may slow the arms race by reducing uncertainties about capabilities or accelerate it by permitting a quick reaction upon the recognition of new capabilities. However, the two countries also cooperate in space research, and there will be numerous opportunities for this

XUM

in the future. Other countries are not now directly affected by U.S.-Soviet relations in space technology, but future applications in fields like communications, navigation, traffic, and weather will have worldwide effects. Earth-resource evaluation by satellites, which can assess total national capabilities, threatens national privacy. Space-related weapons are already a major strategic element in the military power of both the United States and the Soviet Union, and secret-warfare techniques should be available by the year 2018. Space technology on a global scale "will profoundly alter the classical concepts of the nation-state system."

VIOLATION OF AGREEMENTS AND RESPONSES

Violation, inspection, verification

432
Burns, Richard D. INSPECTION OF THE MANDATES, 1919-1941. Pacific historical review, v. 37, Nov. 1968: 445-462.
F851.P18, v. 37

In none of the three agreements by which Japan obligated itself not to fortify its mandates in the Marianas, Carolines, and Marshalls was there provision for onsite verification of compliance. Nevertheless, throughout the twenties and thirties the United States was influenced by rumors that Japan was constructing military installations in the islands and tried to use its "visitation" rights, which it claimed were given to it by the U.S.-Japanese Convention of 1922, to carry out inspections in the supposedly demilitarized areas. Every such attempt by it and the League of Nations Mandates Commission was frustrated, sometimes by Japan's outright refusal to permit entry, more often by bureaucratic procrastination. Whether the Japanese actually violated their treaty commitments has never been fully determined, but apparently they made no attempt to militarize the islands before 1934. Between 1934 and 1939, when they did construct new facilities, their efforts were halfhearted. Students of this controversy have argued that the record supports the current U.S. contention that arms control agreements must include provisions for international inspection, for, had there been such an arrangement in the mandates' case, Western apprehensions about Japanese activities in the islands could have been laid to rest and tension between the United States and Japan reduced. It is doubtful, however, that onsite inspectors could have determined whether the facilities the Japanese were constructing were for military, not commercial, use. Their true significance could have been determined only by examining the political intent of the Japanese Government in constructing them. This being so, onsite inspection might have exacerbated tensions rather than relieved them. Since it is a "very human tendency to pay attention to the signals that support current expectations about enemy behavior," the physical evidence, interpreted by both sides in the light of longstanding apprehensions, would only have confirmed each future antagonist in his distrust of the other.

433
Burns, Richard D. INTERNATIONAL ARMS INSPECTION POLICIES BETWEEN WORLD WARS, 1919-1934. Historian, Phi alpha theta, v. 31, Aug. 1969: 583-603.
D1.H22, v. 31

A study of the great power policies on the question of the international inspection and supervision of armaments between the World Wars reaches several conclusions. Controls were introduced to deter any "cheating" and reassure anxious signatories of a general disarmament pact that potential adversaries had honored their pledges. Moreover, the issue of international arms inspection between the World Wars centered on the conflict between the "internationalist" and "nationalist" approach to the problem. For France, which had been ravaged by Germany during World War I, national security would have to be guaranteed by political and technical means before the realization of disarmament. For the United States and Great Britain, however, disarmament would bring increased national security and eliminate the need for international inspection and verification. Although the United States, Great Britain, Italy, and Germany eventually accepted some concessions in 1932 and 1933, which brought about agreement, in principle, on the necessity of international verification and inspection measures, France's fear of Germany, the eastern "menace," and its persistent search for security thwarted any negotiations on the international control of arms. France continued to escalate its demands for equality and security despite the increasing number of concessions from its Western allies, which, however, were inspired more by a desire to enhance their political position within the shifting international power structure than by abstract or moral principles.

434
Loosch, Reinhard. [NUCLEAR ENERGY AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION] Kernenergie und internationale Zusammenarbeit. Aussenpolitik, v. 20, July 1969: 394-401. D839.A885, v. 20

Points out the failure of the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) to develop adequately international cooperation within Euratom in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The implications of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty for Euratom's safeguards system, Euratom's relations with the International Atomic Energy Agency in regard to inspection and verification measures provided by the treaty, France's position within Euratom, and German-British-Dutch cooperation in extracting enriched uranium through the centrifuge process are discussed.

435
Oldham, G., and D. W. Poxon. A NEW METHOD FOR THE DETECTION OF RADIATION DAMAGE AT LOW DOSAGE. Nuclear energy, July/Aug. 1969: 102-105. illus.
TK9001.N73, 1969

XUM

A new chromatographic method of detecting the presence and nature of radiation damage at low dosages is described. Using this technique, detection becomes possible in a region where all other standard techniques fail. Use is made of the fact that certain dyes, containing surface active groups, profoundly affect the shape of a chromatographic band in a manner related to the composition of the material undergoing chromatography. Taking length of outline per unit area as a measure of the band on paper impregnated with such dyes, a method of chromatography has been evolved having a completely standardised development technique for all mixtures which does not require the separation of the components of the mixture. It is thus possible to construct a three dimensional diagram having as axes, temperature, concentration and index. The diagram obtained is absolutely characteristic of the composition of a given mixture. (Abstract supplied, modified)

Enforcement

436
Barclay, C. N. ["FIRST LOOK" EXERCISE IN ARMS CONTROL] Die Rüstungskontrollübung "First Look." Wehrkunde, v. 18, Aug. 1969: 418-419.
U3.W396, v. 18

Evaluates the 3-month British-American test of arms control techniques and systems that took place during summer 1968 in southern England. Barclay describes the equipment used in the exercises and the organization of the tests and points to a need for periodic exercises of this sort. Lessons drawn from such tests can help the perfection of arms control methods and techniques on which future peace will rely.

CONSEQUENCES OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT MEASURES

437
Kaplan, Morton A. THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY: ITS RATIONALE, PROSPECTS AND POSSIBLE IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL LAW. Journal of public law, v. 18, no. 1, 1969: 1-20.
LL

Includes the resolution on the nonproliferation treaty adopted by the U.N. General Assembly, June 12, 1968, as well as the full text of the treaty.

Interest in nuclear arms control is largely an outgrowth of the fear that has resulted from a misconception about the nuclear arms race; namely, the belief that it is inherently unstable. Several important factors have contributed to the stability of the nuclear arms race since its earliest years, but recent innovations--multiple independent reentry vehicles, fractional orbital bombardment systems, and ABM's--threaten to reintroduce an element of instability. The desire of France and other West European nations for their own nuclear forces is understandable in view of American reluctance to offer a firm guarantee of nuclear support--not to mention the necessity to defend against a conventional attack such as the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Proliferation does not pose an immediate threat as long as it is confined to countries with stable decisionmaking processes--for example, the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Japan, West Germany, France, and Great Britain--but it would constitute a danger in nations subject to severe and recurrent internal crises. To the extent that the nonproliferation treaty (NPT) depends for its effectiveness on Soviet-American cooperation, its chances of success are poor since Soviet-American interests are not likely to coincide over an extended period of time. Nor is it clear that the signature of a potential nuclear power will have the desired effect in every case; in West Germany it might even have the opposite effect by providing extreme nationalists with a popular cause. The NPT "is being adopted too late in the process of nuclear expansion to have an even chance of success. It attempts to exclude too many nations from the acquisition of nuclear weapons, a decision that will make it even more difficult to halt proliferation because it is more likely to produce an early violation of the treaty." The NPT raises serious problems of enforcement: There are no provisions for challenging the unilateral withdrawal of a signatory; the possibility of U.N. enforcement is doubtful; and an attempt by the superpowers either individually or together to enforce the treaty would be unjustified. A nonenforceable treaty that conflicts with the national interests of several major powers is certainly questionable, and its inherent capriciousness and arbitrariness make it "a bad precedent for international law."

438
National Planning Association. COMMUNITY READJUSTMENT TO REDUCED DEFENSE SPENDING; CASE STUDIES OF POTENTIAL IMPACT ON SEATTLE-TACOMA, BALTIMORE AND NEW LONDON-GROTON-NORWICH. Washington, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency [For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off.] 1965 [i.e. 1966] 1 v. (various pagings) (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency publication 33)
JX1974.A1U52, no. 33

Contents.--Preface.--Purposes, assumptions and organization of study.--The national economic setting.--The subnational setting.--Employment dislocation in three metropolitan areas under several arms reduction assumptions.--Review of selected past economic readjustment experiences.--Policies, programs and administrative machinery for meeting regional readjustment problems at the subnational level.--Community perspective on impact problems and solutions.--Policies and programs for meeting community dislocation problems caused by defense cutbacks.--General policy guidelines for regional readjustment to arms reduction.--Appendices I, II, and III.

Studies the impact of defense cutbacks on three metropolitan areas that have relatively high rates

XUM

of employment in defense industries. In addition to assessing the economic effects of reduced defense spending, the study attempts to determine the extent and practicability of existing plans of Government and industry to cope with such a contingency and proposes new policies and guidelines of its own. Three categories of arms reduction are contemplated: a strategic delivery vehicle freeze, an across-the-board cut, and a gradual reduction in defense expenditures. The principal conclusion of the study is that the problems that would be created by reduced defense spending "would be manageable but would aggravate the national task of promoting a desirable rate of economic growth."

439
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. Hearings, Ninety-first Congress, first session. February 27 and 28, 1969. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1969. 141 p. illus. KF26.A7 1969

Includes statements and testimony by Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg, and Gerard C. Smith on the military implications of the nonproliferation treaty (NPT). Wheeler argues that the NPT meets all the stipulations proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and does not adversely affect the security of the United States or its allies. Foster maintains that the NPT will not in any way restrict nuclear research and development essential to the Nation's security, a view that Seaborg supports with his statement that the NPT does not impose any restrictions on nuclear weapons programs or activities that are not already in effect in the United States. Smith adds the endorsement of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

OTHER PROBLEMS AND MEASURES

440
AUGUST SESSION OF U.N. SEABED COMMITTEE HELD AT NEW YORK. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 61, Sept. 29, 1969: 285-294.
JX232.A33, v. 61

Statements by U.S. Representative Christopher H. Phillips and Alternate U.S. Representative Vincent E. McKelvey before the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction.

Contents.--Statement by Ambassador Phillips, plenary meeting, August 11.--Economic and Technical Subcommittee: Statement by Ambassador Phillips, August 15. Statement by Mr. McKelvey, August 15. Statement by Mr. McKelvey, August 20.--Statement by Ambassador Phillips, plenary meeting, August 29.

Explains U.S. policy with respect to the work of the U.N. Seabed Committee and its Legal and Economic and Technical Subcommittees on the problem of creating international machinery to promote the exploration and exploitation of the seabed outside the limits of national jurisdictions. The U.S. Representatives stress the tentative and exploratory character of U.S. policy on this matter. They reject suggestions "that seabed exploration and exploitation ought to be undertaken by an international operating organization, that production of subsea resources should be controlled in order to stabilize prices for land producers, and that the number of claims or the total acreage to be held by a given country should be limited" on the ground that these measures would only discourage progress in exploiting seabed resources. The United States believes that the interests of the international community would best be served "by machinery, as a part of an international regime, that would include an international registry of claims governed by agreed criteria and supplemented by appropriate procedures."

441
Dempsey, Edward J. THE WORLD OCEAN: A PLAN FOR INTERNATIONAL ACTION. Catholic University law review, v. 18, summer 1969: 491-523.
LL

Reviews various proposals to regulate use of the seabed, particularly those set forth by the Presidential Commission on Marine Science, Engineering, and Resources. Dempsey urges that the United States act quickly to ensure that potential disputes over the seabed can be solved satisfactorily through international negotiation.

442
Hill, Gladwin. ABOUT 355 OF 'THOSE THINGS' HAVE EXPLODED IN NEVADA. New York times magazine, July 27, 1969: 6-7, 27, 29, 31-32, 34, 36, 38. illus. AP2.N6575, 1969

Investigates the circumstances surrounding the controversy over the testing of nuclear devices at the Nevada Test Site near Las Vegas, Nev. Hill discusses the positions of critics and proponents of the tests, giving particular attention to the role played in the dispute by Howard Hughes. The author predicts that the controversy will die out once high-yield tests are transferred to other test sites being prepared in the Aleutians and the remoter regions of Nevada.

443
Hoelscher, H. E. TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIAL CHANGE. Science, v. 166, Oct. 3, 1969: 68-72.
Q1.S35, v. 166

Adapted from an address to the Engineering Foundation Research Conference on Industrialization in Developing Countries, Milwaukee, Aug. 4, 1969.

Assistance programs to underdeveloped countries have not been wholly successful because of failure to appreciate the needs of areas that lack of electricity, power, technical education, skilled labor, newspapers, and radios; strongly adhere to tradition; and have an oversupply of unskilled labor. The gap between developed and developing countries is widening, "clearly a situation which

XUM

can only lead to world chaos." In the underdeveloped areas demand is increasing more rapidly than resources. It seems wise to help a country industrialize, but this must be done so as to help the people of that country construct a foundation upon which an industrial structure suited to their special needs can grow. An industrial complex is an individual matter for each country and must fit into the country's social, political, economic, and legal situation. If developed nations are to continue to provide necessary development assistance to the underdeveloped, they must educate young people adequately for the task. Since the graduates of our universities do not receive such an education in our present technology-dominated world, changes are needed.

444
JAPAN: REAFFIRMATION OF CLAIM TO KURILE ISLANDS. Asian almanac, v. 7, Aug. 9, 1969: 3476-3477.
DS1.A4752, v. 7

Summarizes the Soviet, Japanese Government, and Japanese Communist Party positions on the Kurile Islands, with a chronology of claims to the islands from the 17th century to January 1959.

445
Johnson, Ural Alexis. DEPARTMENT REVIEWS HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS GOVERNING ACTIVITIES ON THE SEABED. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 61, Sept. 1, 1969: 191-194.
JX232.A33, v. 61

Testimony on proposed Senate Resolutions 33 and 92 "made before the Subcommittee on Ocean Space of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on July 30," 1969.

Promulgates the U.S. approach to the problems of determining the boundaries of national jurisdiction over the seabed and establishing a legal regime to govern the use of those parts of the seabed that lie outside all national jurisdictions. Johnson reviews the record of international efforts to deal with these problems since the subject was first broached to the United Nations in 1967. He informs the Subcommittee that "we [the Dept. of State] are encouraging identification and discussion of the relevant issues and encouraging all nations to keep an open mind on these issues. We fully intend to exercise an appropriate role of leadership in this international process and intend to set an example by avoiding the premature adoption of definitive conclusions ourselves."

446
Pfeiffer, Gerhard. [THE QUESTION OF AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT TO LIMIT SEABED ARMAMENTS] Zur Frage eines internationalen Abkommens über die Begrenzung der Meeresbodenrüstung. Europa-Archiv, v. 24, Aug. 25, 1969: 581-588.
D839.E86, v. 24

The growing tendency to place ever larger parts of the seabed and ocean floor under national economic or military administration prompted Malta to submit to the United Nations in 1967 a proposal for an international agreement to secure, among other things, the peaceful use of the seabed outside national boundaries to protect it from being appropriated. However, the ad hoc U.N. committee could not precisely demarcate the Continental Shelf from the seabed and ocean floor, given the differing interests of states and the fact that most nations wanted the interpretation of the peaceful use of the seabed not to restrict the military use allowed so far by international law. In December 1968 the U.N. General Assembly resolved to establish a permanent commission to define legal principles for international cooperation in the exploration and economic use of the seabed and ocean floor. The commission was told to consider pertinent work done by the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC), although the resolution did not mention the ENDC by name. Since early 1969 the ENDC has dealt almost exclusively with arms control on the seabed. On March 18 and May 22, respectively, the Soviet and American delegations each submitted a draft treaty on the subject. The main difference between the two proposals is that the first provides for disarmament of the seabed, and the latter, more realistically, for nonarmament. The Soviet treaty would put the U.S.S.R. in an advantageous negotiating position vis-a-vis the sea powers who have far greater possibilities for the military use of the seabed. Because the American proposal leaves out conventional offensive weapon systems, inclusion of some Canadian suggestions in the American draft treaty could facilitate a compromise with the Soviet proposal on arms control of the seabed and ocean floor.

447
Power, Jonathan. NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE. Listener, v. 82, Aug. 21, 1969: 241-242. illus.
AP4.L4165, v. 82

Nonviolent resistance never occurred on such a scale or so effectively under military occupation as when Czechoslovakia was invaded by other Warsaw Pact forces. The demonstrations and road obstructions were spontaneous and widespread; radio broadcasts not only were a link to the outside world but spectacularly aided the coordination of passive resistance. Although the backbone of Czech resistance was finally broken, the inability of an occupying power to deal with nonviolent resistance was demonstrated. However, Liddell Hart has argued that wholly indirect resistance rather than strikes, demonstrations, and refusals to obey orders would have been even more effective, since concealed noncompliance is more baffling than open resistance.

448
THE PUSH FOR PLOWSHARE. Nuclear news, v. 12, Sept. 1969: 26-27.
QC770.N75, v. 12

Reports on recent developments in the Plowshare program. The most important of these are the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy's summer hearings on legislation to authorize the Atomic Energy Commission

XUM

(AEC) to make Plowshare services available to domestic and foreign users, the Interior Department's unexpected bid for a share in control of the program, and the AEC's release of new information on the costs, liabilities, environmental effects, and administration of projected Plowshare commercial applications.

449
[SELECTED PAPERS FROM THE EMERGENCY CONFERENCE ON VIETNAM HELD AT STOCKHOLM, MAY 1969] London bulletin, no. 11, Aug. 1969: [1]-38.
P&GP RR

Contents.--Editorial notes.--The Vietnam War and diplomacy, by Gabriel Kolko.--Inside the American turmoil, by Noam Chomsky.--Unacceptable help, by Günther Anders.

Three views on the Vietnam War. According to Kolko, the United States can gain neither a military nor political victory, and the Vietnamese know that their survival depends on rallying to the National Liberation Front. Chomsky comments on U.S. policies and the possibilities of ending the war through civil protests. Anders asserts that, since the Russell War Crimes Tribunal and international investigating committees established the facts of U.S. aggression and genocide in Vietnam, U.S. economic aid for reconstruction should be accepted only if the "reparation" is organized by a war crimes tribunal.

450
Sollie, Finn. ARCTIC AND ANTARCTIC--CURRENT PROBLEMS IN THE POLAR REGIONS. Cooperation and conflict, no. 2, 1969: 124-144.
P&GP RR

The absence of accepted legal or political norms for the polar regions invites difficulties now that substantial penetrations have been made into those areas. Overlapping claims to sovereignty, the chief point of contention, set one national claimant against another and all claimants against those who would prefer permanent internationalization. Obviously the situations in the north and south are somewhat different. As an air route, a potential sea route, and an area of major strategic value, the Arctic is already involved in the economic and military concerns of several nations. Unfortunately international cooperation in the region has been stifled by the cold war, with the consequence that the legal and political problems remain untouched. The Antarctic, on the other hand, still is of little real economic or military value, and, perhaps for this very reason, the cold war has not prevented the establishment of cooperative relations here. The Antarctic Treaty has imposed a moratorium on sovereignty claims, reserved the region for peaceful purposes, and may yet serve as a model for a more permanent settlement. The problems raised by man's access to the polar regions are similar to those raised by his pending access to the seabed; conceivably then, solutions worked out for the oceans of the world will be applicable to the Arctic and Antarctic as well. More information is needed if men are to guide future developments most beneficially. Norway, whose involvement in the polar regions is long standing, must actively defend its claims, but it must also be prepared to compromise in the interest of an equitable solution.

451
Wooster, Warren S. THE OCEAN AND MAN. Scientific American, v. 221, Sept. 1969: 218-220, 224-226, 228, 230, 232, 234. illus.
T1.S5, v. 221

Because of the immensity and unity of the ocean, international relations in oceanic activities, particularly organizing, financing, and carrying out worldwide exploration, are matters requiring the exchange of information and the integration of research programs. Legal, organizational, social, and economic problems are more complex than the scientific ones. For example, the 1958 Geneva Convention statement that the consent of a coastal state is needed for research on the Continental Shelf, which is imprecisely defined, raises problems, as does the statement that coastal states exercise sovereign rights to explore and exploit the coastal shelf. "Agreement on principles and workable rules . . . will require international cooperation of the highest degree." The ocean's potential cannot be exploited today. Only the most technically advanced nations can attempt prospecting and pilot explorations in the foreseeable future, but underdeveloped nations feel that ocean resources should benefit those with the greatest need. Many efforts have been made to establish an international regime, but difficulties lie in the way. There are now a bewildering number of intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations concerned with ocean science and resources. Their strengthening, simplification, and consolidation would aid progress toward use of the ocean.

371-992 O - 70 - 7

XUM

AUTHOR INDEX

[Numbers refer to entries.]

A

Abu-Jaber, Faiz S., 28
Acheson, Dean, 365
Adelson, Alan M., 376
Afanas'ev, Viktor G., 347
Alcock, Norman Z., 370
Alexander, Archibald S., 269
Alia, Josette, 391
Anders, Günther, 449
Andrade, Ernest, 342
Anton, Paul, 136
Ashworth, George W., 147
Astor, Gerald, 295
Atomic Industrial Forum. Committee on the Nuclear Space Program, 112
Avnery, Uri, 356

B

Badeau, John S., 404
Bailey, Charles W., 295
Bailey, E. F., 390
Balta, Paul, 392
Baly, Denis, 404
Bamberg, Hans-Dieter, 271
Barclay, C. N., 436
Barr, Stringfellow, 314
Barrea, Jean, 343
Barrett, Raymond J., 30
Barry, Thomas, 295
Barth, Herbert, 322
Bauer, E., 113
Beasley, Robert D., 114
Beaufre, André, 323
Beaumont, Roger A., 296
Bebler, Ales, 377
Beck, Harold L., 253
Beckmann, Joachim, 325
Bednareck, Horst, 270
Beilenson, Laurence W., 306
Bell, Coral, 148
Beloff, Max, 31
Bennett, Burton G., 253
Berger, Elmer, 404
Bessmenov, A., 32
Binder, Frederick A., 33
Biriukov, A., 378
Bismarck, Klaus von, 325
Blaney, Harry C., 34
Bleyer, Wolfgang, 270
Blumenfeld, Yorick, 393
Boettiger, John R., 35
Boll, Michael M., 149
Bollinger, Klaus, 348
Bowles, Chester, 297
Brandt, Willy, 36
Brecher, Michael, 394
Brennan, Donald G., 115
Breyer, Siegfried, 116
Brezarić, Dr., 37
Brittain, Victoria, 151
Brodie, Bernard, 152
Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 320
Brown, Neville, 153, 371
Buchan, Alastair, 154
Buksch, Heinrich, 233
Bundy, William P., 35
Burns, Richard D., 432-433
Buttinger, Joseph, 35
Butz, J. S., 117

C

Calvert, Peter, 344
Canstein, Raban, Freiherr von, 155
Cardinale, Hyginus E., 324
Carmoy, Guy de, 38
Carr, William K., 39
Chen, Shao-hsien, 357
Cheng, Peter P., 423
Cherniavskii, V., 156
Chilton, A. B., 157
Chomsky, Noam, 449
Church, Frank, 41
Cippico, Aldo, 158
Clare, Anthony W., 1
Cleveland, Harlan, 159
Cobb, Stephen A., 272
Collis, Maurice, 364
Commager, Henry S., 29
Conolly, Violet, 273
Conquest, Robert, 365
Conrad, Thomas M., 379
Cordtz, Dan, 404
Cousins, Norman, 358
Craig, Gordon A., 365
Croker, F. P., 118
Crook, David, 93

D

Davidov, Iurii, 45
Davidson, Eugene, 46
Davis, John E., 162
Dayan, Moshe, 163
Dean, Arthur H., 364-365
DeLamater, John, 2
DeLong, V. R., 390
Dempsey, Edward J., 441
Dennon, A. R., 47
Deutscher Evangelischer Kirchentag, 13th, Hanover (1967), 325-326
Dirks, Walter, 326
Douglass, James W., 288
Drobisch, Klaus, 270
Du Bois, Victor D., 299
Dubrovin, B., 255, 359
Dudley, H. G., 395
Dulac, André, 233
Duscha, Julius, 274

E

Eckhardt, William, 3, 289
Eichholtz, Dietrich, 270
Eichstädt, Ulrich, 165
Ekvall, Robert B., 364
Elbrick, C. Burke, 4
Ellsworth, Robert, 166
Engelien, Fritz, 167
Enloe, Cynthia H., 19
Eppler, Erhard, 326
Erdmann, Karl D., 325
Estes, Howell M., 120
Eto, Shinkichi, 93

F

F., U. G., 396
Falk, Richard A., 307-308
Fant, Joseph L., 168
Fawcett, J. E. S., 430
Fejtö, François, 5
Feldman, Herbert, 397
Fetov, V., 169
Findley, Paul, 49
Fisher, Roger, 50
Fitzpatrick, Francis J., 390
Fourquet, Michel, 170
Freel, William F., 275
Freund, Ludwig, 172
Fried, Edward R., 276

G

Galbraith, John Kenneth, 35
Gallois, Pierre M., 349
Garder, Michel, 233, 398
Geis, Robert R., 326
Geisenheyner, Stefan, 121
Genda, Minoru, 173
Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. Center for Strategic and International Studies, 174
Gerasimov, G., 300
Geyelin, Philip, 35
Gierschke, H., 277
Giese, Fritz E., 399
Girling, J. L. S., 51, 102
Gittings, John, 52-53, 93
Glaubitz, Joachim, 54, 175

Glubb, Sir John B., 404
Görlich, Joachim G., 176
Goldman, Ralph M., 350
Goldschmidt, Dietrich, 326
Golob, Ignac, 55
Goodman, Elliot R., 351
Gordon, R. W., 177
Gouré, Leon, 178
Graf, Rudolf, 346
Greene, Felix, 93
Gretton, Peter, 179
Grieves, Forest L., 309
Griffith, William E., 56
Gromyko, Andrei A., 345
Gronouski, John, 364
Guitton, Jean, 180
Gunston, W. T., 123
Gurtov, Melvin, 35, 364
Gutteridge, William F., 181

H

Hacker, Jens, 32, 328
Hackett, Sir John, 182
Häfele, Wolf, 325
Hankey, Maurice Pascal Alers Hankey, baron, 108
Harbottle, Michael N., 321
Hargrave, James R., 124
Harkness, D. D., 257
Harriman, W. Averell, 295
Harrison, Stanley L., 183-184
Hartley, Christopher, 125
Hass, Gerhart, 270
Hassner, Pierre, 6
Haviland, Henry Field, 320
Healey, Denis W., 185
Heilbroner, Robert L., 35
Heiman, Grover, 186
Heiman, Leo, 187
Hero, Alfred O., 57
Herold, Detlef, 278
Herrington, Arthur C., 188
Hersh, Seymour M., 126, 258
Hilborn, Kenneth, 189
Hill, Gladwin, 442
Hillringhaus, F. Herbert, 58
Hilsman, Roger, 35
Hinterhoff, Eugène, 190, 401
Hoelscher, H. E., 443
Hoffman, Hallock, 329
Holliday, Sam C., 103
Holloway, Bruce K., 191
Holyoake, Keith, 192
Hosmer, Craig, 193
Hourani, Albert, 404
Howard, Henry N., 404
Hsieh, Alice Langley, 364
Hubbell, John G., 195
Hudson, Geoffrey, 196
Hudson, Michael, 402
Hurewitz, Jacob C., 301

I

Iklé, Fred Charles, 365
Ilfeld, Frederic W., 7
Inge, William R., 108
Ishida, Takeshi, 331
Isnard, Jacques, 198
Israelian, V. L., 365
Ito, Shigeru, 59
Ivanov, O., 9

J

Jahn, Hans E., 10
James, Francis, 128
Jewett, Pauline, 199
Johnson, Ural Alexis, 445
Joy, C. Turner, 364
Juergens, Rolf, 325

K

Kabermann, Heinz, 361
Kaiser, Karl, 60
Kaplan, Morton A., 437
Kapur, Ashok, 200
Kapur, Harish, 61
Katz, Daniel, 2
Kaufman, Richard F., 279
Kelman, Herbert C., 2
Kemp, Geoffrey, 403
Kennan, George F., 365
Kettle, John, 332
Khadduri, Majdia D., 404
Khvoinik, P., 315
Kielmansegg, Johann A., Graf, 201, 233
Kintner, William R., 306, 352
Kirk, John G., 29
Kirk, Russell, 29
Knöller, Werner, 99
Koestler, Arthur, 11
Kolko, Gabriel, 449
Kolodkin, A., 310
Kotsch, William, 62
Kovalev, A., 365
Kozhevnikov, F. I., 316
Kraus, Hans-Joachim, 326
Kremnev, M., 405
Kröger, Herbert, 311
Kuby, Heinz, 333
Kuznetsov, Nikolai, 334

L

Lacouture, Jean, 404
Langer, Elinor, 259
Lavrov, K., 63
Leites, Nathan, 365
Liadov, I., 64
Lin, Piao, 364
Lindsay, Michael, 93
Lindsey, George R., 202
Linowitz, Sol M., 65
London. Institute for Strategic Studies, 203
Loosbrock, John F., 214
Loosch, Reinhard, 434
Lowe, George E., 204
Lowe, Keith, 370
Lubojanski, Jozef, 406
Lucey, Dan, 335
Lucey, Rose, 335
Luhmann, Niklas, 353

M

MacAvoy, Paul W., 280
McCarthy, Richard D., 260
MacDonald, Gordon J. F., 431
McGovern, George S., 29, 205
McGovern, Raymond L., 35
McKelvey, Vincent E., 440
Mackintosh, Malcolm, 206
Maddox, John, 380
Malinin, Sergei A., 381
Maretzki, Hans, 348
Markmann, Heinz, 325
Marshall, Charles Burton, 93
Marsot, Alain Gérard, 372
Martindale, Don, 66
Mason, John F., 129
Mates, Leo, 93
Mattis, T. J., 390
Matveev, V., 207
Maxey, David R., 295
Maxwell, Neville, 407
Mazov, V. A., 316
Meier, Christian, 67
Meier, Viktor E., 12
Meissner, Boris, 68
Mendelsohn, John, 93
Merchant, Livingston T., 174
Merzyn, Gerhard, 69
Meyer, Charles A., 373
Meyer-Detring, Wilhelm, 208
Michael, Franz, 70
Miksche, Ferdinand O., 13, 71
Miller, J. D. B., 14
Mochalov, V., 209
Möller, Dietrich, 72
Montagu, Ivor, 336
Moore, William C., 210
Moorer, Thomas H., 211
Moran, Theodore, 374
Morison, Robert S., 302
Morse, Wayne L., 212
Mosely, Philip E., 365
Moss, Norman, 130
Mozingo, David P., 35, 93
Müller, Hans Gerhard, 346
Mukerjee, Hirendranath, 93
Mustafa, Zubeida, 362
Mutius, Albrecht von, 325
Myrdal, Gunnar, 92

N

National Planning Association, 438
Neuhold, Hanspeter, 312
Newcombe, Alan G., 289
Nguyen-thi Binh, 92
Nieburg, H. L., 15
Nikezic, Marko, 425
Nilson, Sten S., 16
Ninčić, Djura, 73
Niu, Sien-chong, 408-409
Nixon, Richard M., Pres. U.S., 74
Nogee, Joseph L., 365
Norman, F. J., 105
Novick, Sheldon, 261
Nutting, Anthony, 404

371-992 O - 70 - 8

O

Oboler, Eli M., 355
O'Brien, William V., 106
Oldham, G., 435
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. European Nuclear Energy Agency, 383
Osgood, Robert E., 107
Oxtoby, Willard G., 404

P

Palmer, J. M., 215
Palsokar, R. D., 216
Pan, Stephen C. Y., 75
Paschall, Lee M., 390
Paterson, William E., 17
Peng, Teh-huai, 364
Pentzlin, Kurt, 325
Pergent, J. See Perret-Gentil, Jacques
Perret-Gentil, Jacques, 132, 218
Petrov, M., 262
Pfaff, William, 29
Pfeiffer, Gerhard, 446
Phillips, Christopher H., 440
Pickett, George E., 390
Pietrasik, Jerome, 375
Pike, Douglas, 35
Pittet, O., 133
Ploger, Robert R., 219
Polskoi, G., 134
Poppy, John, 295
Porter, H. J., 177
Powell, Craig, 135
Power, Jonathan, 447
Poxon, D. W., 435
Prasad, S. P., 136
Prina, L. Edgar, 282
Pye, Lucian W., 35

Q

Quester, George H., 384

R

Rakhmaninov, I., 354
Rapoport, Anatol, 18
Rarick, John R., 80
Regala, Roberto, 313
Reichmann, Eva G., 326
Rejai, Mostafa, 19
Rice, Berkeley, 295
Rifkin, Susan B., 138
Roberts, Adam, 98
Robson, John M., 93
Rohleder, Claus D., 81
Romulo, Carlos P., 313
Ronning, Chester, 93
Roschmann, Hans, 222
Rosenau, James N., 82
Rostow, Walt W., 35
Rothaus, Paul, 26
Rubtsov, O., 223
Rusk, Dean, 345
Ryall, Alan, 304
Ryan, John D., 214

S

Sadler, Jack R., 290
Safran, Nadav, 410
Salisbury, Harrison E., 411
Sanakoev, Sh. P., 365
Sartori, Leo, 139
Savage, William U., 304
Sawhny, Rathy, 224
Scalapino, Robert A., 35
Schlesinger, Arthur M., 35
Schmidt, Helmut, 83, 225
Schmückle, Gerd, 233
Schnez, Albert, 226
Schoenbrun, David, 428
Schrader, Rudolf, 227
Schram, Stuart, 93
Schreiterer, Manfred, 84
Schriever, Bernard A., 140
Schröter, Martin, 325
Schumann, Wolfgang, 270
Schurmann, Franz, 92
Seaborg, Glenn T., 385
Seamans, Robert C., 214
Sekely, M. C., 85
Selle, Otto, 228
Seton-Watson, Hugh, 86
Sevareid, Eric, 295
Shepherd, Jack, 295
Shepherd, Naomi, 412
Shinn, Roger L., 413
Shirk, Paul R., 87
Sinai, I. Robert, 20
Sisco, Joseph J., 88
Sisson, Elbert R., 283
Smoker, Paul, 89
Snow, Edgar, 90
Sollie, Finn, 450
Soward, F. H., 230
Spencer, Daniel L., 284
Spinelli, Altiero, 317
Staar, Richard F., 231
Stahnke, Paul K., 21
Starke, Joseph G., 338
Stassen, John H., 232
Stehlin, Paul, 233
Stennis, John C., 285
Sternglass, Ernest J., 265
Stiller, Ernst A., 291
Stoltenberg, Gerhard, 325
Stübner, Siegfried, 346
Subrahmanyam, K., 234-235
Suyin, Han, 93
Symington, William Stuart, 318

T

Tate, Gordon, 416
Taubinger, L. M., 236
Taylor, Charles, 364
Taylor, John W. R., 237
Teplinskii, Boris, 22
Thomas, Stephan G., 238
Toronto International Teach-In, 2d (1966), 93
Toynbee, Arnold J., 404
Trager, Frank N., 29
Triplett, George W., 94
Trudeau, Pierre E., 95

U

Ulsamer, Edgar E., 142, 214
United States
  Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 387
  Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services, 141
  Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services, 439
    Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, 239
  Congress. Senate. Committee on Commerce. Subcommittee on Communications, 23
  Congress. Senate. Committee on Government Operations. Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, 364-365
  Dept. of State, 417
  Library of Congress. Legislative Reference Service. Science Policy Research Division, 267

V

Váli, Ferenc A., 418
Van Buskirk, Lawrence E., 292
Van der Kroef, Justus M., 96
Vargas, Jesus, 419
Vasil'ev, Gennadii, 268
Vasil'ev, P., 241
Veale, Frederick J. P., 108
Vernant, Jacques, 242, 339, 366-367
Vernon, Walter M., 24
Visscher, Maurice B., 293
Voevodsky, John, 109
Volskii, D., 368
Vukadinović, Radovan, 25

W

Wagner, Raimund, 270
Wallace, Donnel, 26
Walsh, John, 286
Walton, A., 257
Watter, Pierre, 27
Waugh, Alec, 404
Wehner, Herbert, 97, 325
Weisbrod, Hanno, 243
Weisl, Wolfgang von, 110
Weithas, Curt, 244
Weizsäcker, Carl F., Freiherr von, 341
Wells, Robert D., 143
Westmoreland, William C., 245
Whetten, Lawrence L., 246
Windsor, Philip, 98, 420

XUM

Winkelmann, Egon, 99
Witze, Claude, 214
Wohlstetter, Albert, 145
Wolfe, Thomas W., 365
Woollacott, Martin, 369
Wooster, Warren S., 451
Woroniak, Alexander, 284
Wren, Christopher S., 421
Wright, Frank, 295
Wright, Quincy, 404

Y

Yahuda, Michael B., 247
Yodfat, A. Y., 100
York, Herbert F., 248
Yost, Charles W., 319, 404
Young, Elizabeth, 389
Young, Kenneth T., 101, 364
Yudkin, Richard A., 249

Z

Zhukov, Iurii, 250-251, 429
Zorin, Valerian A., 365

SUBJECT INDEX

[Numbers refer to entries.]

A

ABM. See Antimissile defense systems
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE U.S.S.R., 137
AFRICA, role of the military, 181, 290
AGGRESSION
  human nature, 11
  See also Conflict; Violence
AGREEMENTS. See Treaties, agreements, etc.
AILLERET, CHARLES, 170
AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS
  North America, 202
  United States, 111
AIRCRAFT
  air defense systems, 111, 165
  C-5, 120
  C-5A, 124
  F-106X interceptor, 111
  future role, 125
  Great Britain, 117-118, 150, 237
  Hawker Siddeley H. S., 117, 135, 150
  LIT V/STOL, 142
  Near East, 114
  S-3A, 129
  Sweden, SAAB 105, 121
  United States, 111, 117, 120, 129, 135, 142, 214
ALBANIA, nationalism, 12
ALCOCK, NORMAN Z., 332
ALLIANCES
  role in U.S. strategy, 22
  Southeast Asia, 96
ANTARCTIC REGIONS, 450
ANTARCTIC TREATY, 450
ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS
  Canadian policy, 189
  deployment
    effects, 265, 369
      U.S. controversy, 214, 248
        Soviet view, 300
  U.S. programs, 123, 189
ANTIPROLIFERATION TREATY (PROPOSED). See Proliferation of nuclear weapons--nonproliferation treaty (proposed)
ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE, S-3A aircraft, 129
ARAB COUNTRIES
  armed forces, 375, 410
  interstate relations, 394
  relations with the U.S.S.R., 28
ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE, 392, 394, 403-404, 413
  and the Sino-Soviet dispute, 396
  Chinese Communist policy, 76
  history, 410
  Israeli view, 163
  role of Arab guerrillas, 110, 402, 421
  settlement, 356
    four-power talks, 88
  U.S. role, 94
ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (1967)
  history, 410
  settlement, Soviet view, 405
  strategy, 403
ARCTIC REGIONS, 450
ARMAMENTS INDUSTRY. See Defense industry
ARMED FORCES
  Africa, 181, 290
  Arab countries, 375, 410
  Communist China, 169, 217
  comparative statistics, 203
  Israel, 375, 410
  Japan, 236
  Poland, 176
  U.S.S.R. See specific branches under U.S.S.R.
  United States. See specific branches under United States (Government)
  West Germany, 223, 225
  See also Peacekeeping and security forces
ARMS AND ARMAMENTS
  Army weapons guide (1969), 213
  Japan, 236
  reduction or elimination, 340-341, 377
    and political integration, 350
    Arab-Israeli dispute, 403
    East German view, 346
    economic effects, 438
    history, 345
    seabed, 446
    U.S.-U.S.S.R. discussions, 74, 361, 363, 366-367, 369
  research and development, 115
  tanks, 133
    United States, 141
  trade and dissemination
    Great Britain, 371
    Libya, 371
    Near East, 301
    United States, 301, 371, 373-374
  West Germany, 226
  See also Chemical and biological weapons; Military balance; Missiles; Nuclear weapons
ARMS RACE
  comparison with escalation in Vietnam War, 370
  Soviet-U.S. competition, regulation, 369
ARMS TRAFFIC. See Arms and armaments--trade and dissemination
ASIA
  balance of power, 148
  Chinese Communist policy, 416
  regional military alliances, 91
  security in, 64, 96, 146, 419
  tension, 416
  U.S. policy, 58, 101, 419
    Soviet view, 64, 429
  See also Near East; Southeast Asia; specific countries

ASIAN AND PACIFIC COUNCIL, Ministerial Conference, 146
ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ATOMIC. See entries beginning with Nuclear
AUSTRALIA
  and Asian security, 96
  defense policies and programs, 243
  foreign policy, 96
AVNERY, URI, 336

B

BALANCE OF POWER
  and European security, 6
  Asia, 148
  East-West, naval, 215
  Europe, West German view, 225
  theory of, 353
BALKAN STATES, cooperation, 12
BERLIN AIRLIFT, 124
BIAFRA, diplomatic recognition, 48
BIBLIOGRAPHIES
  arms control and disarmament, 355
  nuclear-powered space vehicles, 112
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. See Chemical and biological weapons
BOSPORUS, Turkish sovereignty, 399
BREZHNEV, LEONID I., 68, 83
BRITISH ARMS AND STRATEGY 1970-1980 [NEVILLE BROWN], 182
BROWN, NEVILLE, 182
BULGARIA, nationalism, 12

C

CAMBODIA, Chinese Communist military aid, 372
CANADA
  defense policies and programs, 406
    criticism, 199
  diplomatic recognition of Communist China, 85
  foreign policy, 95, 230
  NATO policy, 199, 230
  peaceful uses of nuclear energy, 298
  view of U.S. ABM proposal, 189
CANADIAN PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, 332
CAPITALISM
  and imperialism, 27
  and World War II, 270
CENTRAL TREATY ORGANIZATION, 222
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, 264
  ban on biological weapons, 260
  British policy, 255-256
  defoliants, 266
  nonlethal, 266
  Soviet policy, 262
  Soviet view, 137, 255
  U.N. policy, 256, 259
  U.S. policy, 258, 267
    beneficial effects, 252
    criticism, 254, 260
    Soviet view, 268
  West Germany, Soviet view, 134
CHINA, COMMUNIST
  and status of Taiwan, 423
  Chinese Nationalist view, 164
  civil-military relations, 42, 161, 169
  cultural revolution, 93
CHINA, COMMUNIST--Continued
  defense policies and programs, 175, 196, 247
    arms buildup, 411
    strategic weapons systems, 239
  diplomatic recognition by Canada, 85
  foreign policy, 39, 55, 90, 93, 364
    Near East, 396
    U.S.S.R., 52, 70
    United States, 52
  foreign relations
    India, 61
    Pakistan, 61
    Southeast Asia, 75
    Syria, 76
    U.S.S.R., 43, 53, 71, 77, 229
    United States, 54
  insurgency, 102
  military aid to Cambodia, 372
  negotiation, art of, 364
  nuclear policies and programs, 128
  nuclear research and development, 138
  nuclear war potential, 71
  nuclear weapons development, 196
  nuclear weapons tests, 303
  People's Liberation Army, 217
    internal tension, 169
  role in Asia, 416
  tension, Sinkiang Province, 408
  territorial dispute with the U.S.S.R., 56, 128, 407
  threat to Asian security, 148
  threat to India, 200, 216, 224, 235
  See also Sino-American relations; Sino-Soviet dispute
CHINA, REPUBLIC OF
  and status of Taiwan, 423
  view of Communist China, 164
CIVIL DEFENSE
  Finland, 220
  NATO, 158, 197
  public opinion, 240
  U.S.S.R., 178
  United States, 162, 240
    fallout shelters, 157
  West Germany, 165
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
  Africa, 290
  Communist China, 42, 161, 169
  Near East, 301
  NATO, 158
  United States, 32, 251, 295
  See also Scientific-military relations
COLONIALISM, Portugal, 104
COMMAND AND CONTROL, tactical satellite communications, 390
COMMITTEE FOR THE UNITED STATES OF EUROPE, 334
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS, MILITARY, tactical satellite communications, 390
COMMUNISM
  ideology, 347
  polycentrism, 5
  strategy, 8
COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
  Brezhnev doctrine, 68, 83
  Soviet relations with, 79
  See also Eastern Europe; Sino-Soviet dispute; Warsaw Treaty Organization; specific countries

COMMUNIST PARTIES
China, 175, 217
Japan, 59
meeting in Moscow (1969), 9, 43
U.S.S.R., 78
COMPUTERS, defense application, 177
CONFERENCES
Asian and Pacific Council (1969), 146
Committee for the United States of Europe, 334
conference of all European countries (proposed), 322, 327
conference of nonalined countries, Belgrade (1969), 424, 426
conference of nonnuclear-weapon countries, 377
Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. See Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament
International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow (1969), 9, 43
Inter-Parliamentary Conference, Vienna (1969), 340
North Atlantic Assembly, 14th, Brussels (1969), 171
symposium of the Nederlands Atoomforum, Utrecht (1969), 386
symposium on Eastern Europe, Bruges (1969), 25
World Assembly of Scientific Workers, 9th General Assembly, Paris (1969), 388
See also Negotiations
CONFLICT
game study, 26
theory of, 353
See also Aggression; Violence; War
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION, selective, 294
CONVERSION. See economic conversion under Defense industry
COOPERATION, INTERNATIONAL
Balkan States, 12
Great Britain-France (proposed), 153
ocean, 451
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, 385
U.S.S.R.-France, 63
CYPRUS, U.N. peacekeeping operations, 321
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
relations with Danube countries, 72
Soviet invasion, 62, 79, 187
effects, 98, 184
on European security, 420
on NATO, 174
on Warsaw Treaty Organization, 149
on West German foreign policy, 69
nonviolent resistance, 447

D

DARDANELLES, Turkish sovereignty, 399
DECISIONMAKING
military, 249
valuation, 16
DEFENSE BUDGETS AND EXPENDITURES
effect on technical manpower, 284
India, 234
reductions. See Defense cutbacks
United States, 188, 214, 272, 274, 279
economic effects, 287, 295
world statistics, 269
DEFENSE CUTBACKS
Great Britain, 237
United States, 245, 275, 281-282, 285
422, 438
economic effects, 287
DEFENSE INDUSTRY
economic conversion, United States, 286
Germany, World War II, 270
Poland, 176
See also Military-industrial complex; Nuclear energy industry
DEFENSE POLICIES AND PROGRAMS. See Civil defense; Strategy; also under North Atlantic Treaty Organization; specific countries
DEFENSE PROCUREMENT, United States, 131, 279
DEFENSE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, 227
and international diplomacy, 115
antisubmarine warfare, 129
United States, 140, 286
criticism, 302
multiple independent reentry vehicles, 139
nuclear reactors, 280
participation of scientists, 293
DENMARK, NATO policy, 241
DÉTENTE
East-West
effect of Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, 98
role of NATO, 159
Europe, 333, 351, 420
Soviet-U.S., 13, 49, 351, 420
effect on European security, 323
DETERRENCE
and flexible response, 210
French view, 242
role of nuclear weapons, 180
role of U.S. Strategic Air Command, 186, 191
stable deterrence, 231
See also Strategy
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Chinese Communist policy, 416
economic aid, 27, 443
role of U.S. Army, 292
U.S. policy, 47, 74
DIPLOMACY, 50
and military technology, 115
Philippines, 313

E

ENDC. See Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament
EAST-WEST RELATIONS
convergence theory, 348
effect of Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, 62
See also Soviet-U.S. relations
EASTERN EUROPE, 25
foreign relations
U.S.S.R., 86, 393
United States, 45
nationalism, 4
role in Warsaw Treaty Organization, 149
West German policy, 69
See also East-West relations; specific countries

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Latin America, 65
Third World, 14, 315
U.S.S.R., 273
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF DEFENSE EXPENDITURES, United States, 287, 295
ECONOMIC POLICIES AND PROGRAMS, West Germany, 277
EGYPT. See United Arab Republic
EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT
arms limitation on the seabed, 446
1969 session, 359
EL SALVADOR, relations with Honduras, 360
ELLUL, JACQUES, 329
ENGLAND. See Great Britain
ESCALATION, Vietnam War, 370
EURATOM. See European Atomic Energy Community
EUROPE
balance of power, West German view, 225
détente, 333, 351, 420
nuclear fuels, enrichment facilities, 386
peace in, 325, 333, 346
security in, 6, 13, 49, 69, 83, 99, 184, 233, 242, 322-323, 333, 351, 401, 420
East German view, 311, 348
European conference (proposed), 327
French view, 198
North Atlantic, 395
Polish view, 406, 427
role of NATO, 154, 159, 183, 201
Soviet view, 207, 250, 328, 354
tension, 86
unification, 317, 325, 339
British view, 31
Franco-British rivalry, 343
role of West Germany, 238
Soviet view, 334
U.S. policy, 46, 73
See also East-West relations; Eastern Europe; European-U.S. relations; Western Europe
EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY, safeguards system, 434
EUROPEAN-U.S. RELATIONS
and youth unrest, 34
Soviet view, 156
See also North Atlantic Treaty Organization

F

FALLOUT. See Radioactive fallout
FALLOUT SHELTERS, United States, 157
FINLAND, civil defense, 220
FLEXIBLE RESPONSE, 246
NATO, 201
United States, 210
Soviet view, 209
FOREIGN POLICY, 50
and scientific progress, 84
small states, 17
See also under specific countries
FOSTER, JOHN S., 439
FOURQUET, MICHEL, 198
FRANCE
defense policies and programs, 170, 198, 208
foreign policy, 38
FRANCE--Continued
foreign relations
Great Britain, 343
U.S.S.R., 63
nuclear policies and programs, 132, 242
collaboration with Great Britain, 153
role in NATO, 228
FRELIMO. See Frente de Libertação de Moçambique
FRENTE DE LIBERTAÇÃO DE MOÇAMBIQUE, 104

G

GCD. See General and complete disarmament
GAME THEORY
conflict research, 26
peace research, 18
GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT
bibliography, 355
See also Arms and armaments--reduction or elimination; Nuclear weapons--reduction or elimination
GENEVA DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE. See Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, D.C. CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, 204
GERMANY
and European security, 6
defense industry, World War II, 270
division, 400
East German view, 346
West German view, 97
reunification, 325, 401, 418
Soviet policy, 328
GERMANY, EAST
foreign policy, 346
and international law, 311
German reunification, 418
international recognition, Soviet efforts, 67
militarism, 291
relations with the U.S.S.R., 400
relations with West Germany, 36
view of West Germany, 223, 271, 346
GERMANY (FEDERAL REPUBLIC)
and peace, 325-326
Armed Forces, 223, 225
arms and armaments, 226
defense policies and programs
and economic policies, 277
chemical and biological weapons, 134
civil defense, 165
East German view, 223
Polish view, 427
Strategy, 167, 225
defense potential, 278
foreign policy, 36, 60, 84, 97, 99
East German view, 348
Eastern Europe, 69
foreign relations
Eastern Europe, 346
U.S.S.R., 238
United States, 172
German reunification, 418
NATO policy, 225
peace research, 337
rearmament, East German view, 271, 346
relations with East Germany, 36
role in European unification, 238

GREAT BRITAIN
Air Force, 237
aircraft, 117-118, 237
arms trade and dissemination, 371
defense policies and programs, 182, 221, 237
logistics, 177
disarmament policies and proposals
chemical and biological weapons, 255-256
troop inspection experiment, 436
foreign policy, 31
Navy, 150
NATO policy, 185, 221
nuclear policies and programs, collaboration with France, 153
relations with France, 343
withdrawal East of Suez, 182
GREECE, nationalism, 12
GROMYKO, ANDREI A., 382
GUERRILLA WARFARE
Near East, 110, 402, 421
See also Insurgency

H

HONDURAS, relations with El Salvador, 360
HUGHES, CHARLES EVANS, 342
HUGHES, HOWARD R., 442

I

IMPERIALISM, 27
INDIA
Chinese Communist threat, 200, 216, 224, 235
defense budget and expenditures, 234
defense policies and programs, 200, 224, 234-235
foreign relations
Communist China, 61
Pakistan, 397
minority separatist movements, 397
nuclear weapons acquisition, 216, 235
INDIAN OCEAN, strategic situation, 179, 222
THE INEQUALITY OF STATES [DAVID VITAL], 17
INSPECTION AND VERIFICATION
IAEA and Euratom safeguards, 434
problems of, 432-433
INSURGENCY
China and Southeast Asia, 102
U.S. policy, 103
See also Guerrilla warfare
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
nonproliferation treaty (proposed), 385
safeguards system, 434
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMUNIST AND WORKERS' PARTIES, MOSCOW (1969), 9, 43
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 309
and civil wars, 312
and diplomacy, 313
East German view, 311
effects of nonproliferation treaty (proposed), 437
intervention. See Intervention
right to national self-determination, 312
role in U.S. foreign policy, 307
seabed, 441
Soviet view, 83
territorial waters, 310
treaties, 306
Vietnam War, 308
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, 309
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
effects of technology, 145
role of diplomacy, 313
small states, 17
INTERNATIONAL RELIEF, Vietnam, 320
INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION, 340
INTERVENTION
and the prevention of nuclear war, 105
conceptual analysis, 82
Czechoslovakia. See Czechoslovakia--Soviet invasion
U.S. policy, 41
IRAQ, relations with the U.S.S.R., 100
ISRAEL
and Zionism, 336
Arab terrorist activities, 110, 402, 421
Armed Forces, 375, 410
defense policies and programs, 403
military occupation of Arab countries, 163
relations with Arab countries, 394
view of nonproliferation treaty (proposed), 384
See also Arab-Israeli dispute; Arab-Israeli War (1967)
ISRAEL WITHOUT ZIONISTS [URI AVNERY], 336
IVORY COAST, relations with Upper Volta, 299

J

JAPAN
Armed Forces, 236
bilateral defense treaty (Japan-U.S.), 59, 415
claim to Okinawa, 415
defense policies and programs, 173, 194
foreign policy, 331
nonproliferation treaty (proposed), 378
Pacific mandates, 432
territorial dispute, Kurile Islands, 444
JOANNES XXIII, POPE, 288

K

KIERANS, ERIC, 199
KISSINGER, HENRY A., 45
KOREA, tension, 409
KURILE ISLANDS, territorial dispute, 444

L

LAIRD, MELVIN R., 147
LATIN AMERICA
history, 344
Soviet policy, 80
U.S. aid, 65, 373
U.S. policy, 80
LAW, relationship to violence, 15
LEAGUE OF NATIONS, and Japanese Pacific mandates, 432
LEMNITZER, LYMAN L., 207
LIBYA, defense ties with the West, 371
LIMITED WAR
analysis, 107
classification, 209
See also Vietnam War
LOGISTICS, 177
LORENZ, KONRAD, 1

M

MIRV. See Multiple independent reentry vehicles
MAO, TSE-TUNG, foreign policy, 90
MAX-PLANCK-INSTITUT ZUR ERFORSCHUNG DER LEBENSBEDINGUNGEN DER WISSENSCHAFTLICH-TECHNISCHEN WELT, 337
MEDITERRANEAN AREA, 399
  NATO policy, 155
  Soviet Navy, 190, 218
  Soviet policy, 244, 414
  strategic situation, 399
MIDDLE EAST. See Near East
MILITARISM
  behavioral analysis, 3
  East Germany, 291
  Japan, Soviet view, 378
  sociological aspects, 289
  United States, 92, 212, 249, 283, 295
    Soviet view, 32
  west Africa, 290
MILITARY AID
  Communist China, to Cambodia, 372
  social effects, 292
  United States, to Latin America, 373
MILITARY BALANCE, 203
  U.S.-U.S.S.R., 168
MILITARY BASES, U.S., reduction, 422
MILITARY BUDGETS AND EXPENDITURES. See Defense budgets and expenditures
MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
  United States, 212, 272, 279
    Soviet view, 251, 300
MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. See Defense research and development
MILITARY SERVICE, COMPULSORY, United States, 294
MILITARY TECHNOLOGY
  and U.S. security policy, 248
  effects, 145
MILITARY STRATEGY. See Strategy
MISSILES
  United States, 139
  See also Antimissile defense systems
MODERNIZATION, Third World, 20
MONTREUX CONVENTION (1936), 399
MOON, strategic use, 430
MORALITY, of war, 106
MOZAMBIQUE, Portuguese policy, 104
MULTIPLE INDEPENDENT REENTRY VEHICLES
  deployment, effects, 369
  testing, effects on arms race, 139

N

NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NATION, relationship to state, 19
NATIONALISM
  Balkan States, 12
  behavioral analysis, 2
  comparative study, 19
  Eastern Europe, 4
NAVIES. See under specific countries
NEAR EAST
  air forces, 114
  Arab-Israeli dispute. See Arab-Israeli dispute
NEAR EAST--Continued
  Communist Chinese policy, 396
  NATO policy, 155
  role of Great Powers, 417
  role of the military, 301
  Soviet policy, 169, 396
  subordinate state system, 394
  tension, 375, 391-392, 412-413, 417
  U.S. policy, 88, 94, 301, 417
NEDERLANDS ATOOMFORUM, symposium, Utrecht (1969), 386
NEGOTIATION, ART OF, Communist China, 364
NEGOTIATIONS
  El Salvador-Honduras dispute, 360
  problems and prospects, 37
  Soviet policy, 365
  U.S.-U.S.S.R., 357
    strategic arms limitation talks, 74, 361, 363, 366-367, 369
  Vietnam War, 358, 362, 368
  See also Conferences; Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament
NEGROES, attitudes toward U.S. foreign policy, 57
NEW ZEALAND, foreign and defense policies, 192
NIGERIA
  civil war, 48
    and international law, 312
NONALINED COUNTRIES
  Chinese Communist military aid, 372
  role in world politics, 424, 426
NONALINEMENT, Yugoslavia, 425
NONLETHAL WEAPONS. See Chemical and biological weapons
NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (PROPOSED). See under Proliferation of nuclear weapons
NONVIOLENCE, 288
  Czechoslovakia, 447
  Japan, 331
  See also Violence
NORAD. See North American Air Defense Command
NORTH AMERICAN AIR DEFENSE COMMAND, Canadian policy, 199
NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY, 14TH, BRUSSELS (1969), 171
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION, 73
  and European security, 154, 159, 183, 185, 201
    Soviet view, 250
  British policies and programs, 185
  British view, 221
  Canadian policy, 199, 230
  casus foederis, 172
  defense policies and programs, 13, 185
    civil defense, 158, 197
    effects of Soviet defense policies and programs, 155
    importance of seapower, 395
    naval, 215
      Indian Ocean, 179
      Mediterranean Sea, 218
    Soviet view, 207
    strategy, 233
      flexible response, 201
      forward, 167
    West Germany, 225
  East German view, 322
  financing, 276

XUM

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION--Continued
problems and prospects, 154, 174
role
changing, 166, 184
in East-West détente, 159
of France, 228
of Scandinavian countries, 241
Soviet view, 354
tanks, 113
U.S. policy, 183, 276
view of the European conference (proposed), 327
West Germany, 238
See also Europe--security in; European-U.S. relations; also NATO policy under specific countries
NORWAY, NATO policy, 241
NUCLEAR ENERGY
peaceful uses
Canada, 298
Project Plowshare, 448
United States, 261, 385
use in space, 112
NUCLEAR ENERGY INDUSTRY
United States, 261
uranium enrichment facilities, 119, 144
NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS
Bikini Atoll, 263
Project Plowshare, 305, 448
See also Nuclear weapons tests; Radiation; Radioactive fallout
NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS, UNDERGROUND
effects
seismic, 304
radiation leakage, 305
Project Plowshare, 305
NUCLEAR FORCES, Anglo-French (proposed), 153
NUCLEAR FUELS
enrichment facilities
Europe, 386
United States, 119, 144
NUCLEAR MATERIALS, protection against theft, 376
NUCLEAR RADIATION. See Radiation
NUCLEAR REACTORS
economic benefits, 280
peaceful uses, 261
NUCLEAR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
centrifuge enrichment methods, 380
Communist China, 138
Europe, 386
United States, 127, 442
NUCLEAR STRATEGY, United States, 195, 219
NUCLEAR WAR
prevention, 105
See also Civil defense; War
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
development, 130
Communist China, 196
France, 132
India, 216, 235
Israel, 384
dissemination. See Proliferation of nuclear weapons
effects, 130
on the nature of war, 105, 349
laser trigger, 380
proliferation. See Proliferation of nuclear weapons
reduction or elimination, 388
technological causes, 296
NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS
Communist China, 303
United States, 263, 303
controversy, 442
See also Nuclear explosions; Nuclear explosions, underground; Radiation; Radioactive fallout
NUREMBERG TRIALS, criticism, 108

O

OCEAN
arms limitation, 446
international cooperation, 451
military uses
proposed ban, 359
United States, 126
peaceful uses
international control over the seabed, 441, 445
U.S. policy, 440
OCEANOGRAPHY, United States, 126
ODER-NEISSE LINE, Polish view, 406
ON AGGRESSION [KONRAD LORENZ], 1
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, negotiation of El Salvador-Honduras dispute, 360
ORGANIZATIONS
Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., 137
Canadian Peace Research Institute, 332
Central Treaty Organization, 222
European Atomic Energy Community, 434
Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, 104
International Atomic Energy Agency, 385, 434
Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung der Lebensbedingungen der wissenschaftlich-technischen Welt, 337
Organization of American States, 360
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, 222, 419
Soviet Peace Committee, 137
Western European Union, 414

P

PACEM IN TERRIS [JOANNES XXIII, POPE], 288
PAKISTAN
foreign relations
Communist China, 61
India, 397
separatist movements, 397
threat to India, 224
PEACE, 325
approaches
moral and religious, 324, 326
nonviolence, 288
political, 341
United States, 335
concept of, 331
Europe, 333
science of, 338
See also War
PEACE RESEARCH, 338
game simulations, 18
West Germany, 337

PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE, Soviet view, 78
PEACEKEEPING AND SECURITY FORCES, United Nations, 321
PEACEKEEPING AND SECURITY OPERATIONS, United Nations, 316
PEACEKEEPING AND SECURITY OPERATIONS (PROPOSED), Vietnam, 320
PHILIPPINES, diplomacy, 313
PLOWSHARE, PROJECT, 305, 448
POLAND
  Armed Forces, 176
  defense industry, 176
  disarmament policies and proposals, 427
  Oder-Neisse Line, 406
  view of European security, 406
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, research methods, 47
POLITICAL INTEGRATION, and arms control, 350
PORTUGAL, colonial policy, Mozambique, 104
POWER (CONCEPT), 353
PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
  effects
    of centrifuge and laser technology, 380
    on international security, 379
  nonnuclear powers' view, 377
  nonproliferation treaty (proposed), 377, 434
    criticism, 389
    effects on
      international law, 437
      U.S. security, 439
    history, 387
    IAEA control, 385
    Israeli view, 384
    Japanese view, 378
    Soviet view, 381-382
  prevention, 376
PUBLIC OPINION, United States, 240, 302
PUEBLO, U.S.S., seizure by North Koreans, 50

R

RADIATION
  Bikini Atoll, 253, 263
  biological effects, 265
  detection and measurement, 435
  Project Plowshare, 305
RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT
  Bikini Atoll, 253
  carbon-14, 257
RAMEY, JAMES T., 144
RELIGION, role in achieving peace, 324, 326
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. See Defense research and development; Nuclear research and development
REVOLUTIONS
  China and Southeast Asia, 102
  Mozambique, 104
  Third World, 20
  U.S. policy, 41
RUMANIA
  foreign relations
    Danube countries, 72
    U.S.S.R., 81
  nationalism, 12
RUSSIA. See Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

S

SALT. See Negotiations--strategic arms limitation talks
SAFEGUARDS SYSTEMS, 434
SATELLITES, military uses, 390, 431
SCANDINAVIA, security in, Soviet view, 241
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
  and foreign policy, 84
  effect on strategy, 152
  future, 115, 431
  research and development, 302
  technology gap, 136, 443
SCIENTIFIC-MILITARY RELATIONS, 293
SCIENTISTS, role in chemical and biological weapons development, 137
SEABED. See Ocean
SEABORG, GLENN T., 119, 439
SEAPOWER
  Indian Ocean, 179
  Soviet-U.S. competition, 211
  U.S.S.R., 204, 395
SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL, effect of nuclear proliferation, 379
SECURITY, REGIONAL
  Asia, 96, 146, 419
    Southeast Asia, 192
    Soviet view, 64
  Europe
    Scandinavia, Soviet view, 241
    See also Europe--security in
SENGER UND ETTERLIN, FERDINAND MARIA VON, 113
SHIPS
  U.S.S.R., 143
  United States
    aircraft carriers, 211
    new construction, 131, 275
SIMULATION, in peace research, 18
SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 54
  and status of Taiwan, 423
  Chinese policy, 39
  prognosis, 90
  U.S. policy, 49
SINO-INDIAN DISPUTE, time series analysis, 89
SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE, 39, 42-43, 91, 128, 196
  and the Near East crisis, 396
  Chinese Communist territorial claims, 407
  Communist Chinese view, 175
  effect on Soviet economic development, 273
  French view, 398
  history, 53, 70
  possibility of war, 229, 411
  Sinkiang Province, 40, 408
  Soviet view, 78
  U.S. view, 56
SMITH, GERARD C., 439
SOUTH VIETNAM NATIONAL FRONT FOR LIBERATION, peace proposals, 92
SOUTHEAST ASIA
  Communist threat, 222
  defense alliances, 96
  effects of Chinese cultural revolution, 75
  insurgency, 102
  security in, role of New Zealand, 192
  See also Asia; specific countries
SOUTHEAST ASIA TREATY ORGANIZATION, 222, 419
SOVIET PEACE COMMITTEE, 137

SOVIET SEA POWER [GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, D.C. CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES], 204
SOVIET UNION. See Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
SOVIET-U.S. RELATIONS
  détente, 13, 323, 351, 420
    U.S. policy, 49, 74
  disarmament policies and proposals, 352
  European settlement, 86
  military balance, 168
  negotiations, 37, 357
    strategic arms limitation, 74, 361, 363, 366-367, 369
SPACE
  military uses, 430-431
  peaceful uses, U.S. policy, 74
  U.S. programs, 122
SPACE VEHICLES, nuclear-powered, 112
SPYKMAN, NICHOLAS J., rimlands theory, 172
STAATS, ELMER B., 119
STATE, relationship to nation, 19
STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS. See under Negotiations
STRATEGY
  Communist, 8
  Communist China, 196, 247
  concept of, 180
  effect of technology, 152
  flexible response, 201, 209-210, 246
  France, 170, 193, 208
  NATO, 13, 167, 201, 233
    naval, 215
  role of manned aircraft, 125
  U.S.S.R., 196, 244
    naval, 215, 395
  United States, 239, 245, 249
    Asia, 148
    criticism, 168
    Europe, 156
    maintenance of superiority, 352
    naval, 193, 204
    nuclear, 195
    role of military alliances, 22
    Soviet view, 209
  West Germany, 167, 225
  Western Europe, 233
  See also Deterrence
SUBMARINES, United States, 126, 275
SUSLOV, MIKHAIL A., 382
SWEDEN, Air Force, 121
SWITZERLAND, defense policies and programs, 113
SYRIA, relations with Communist China, 76

T

TAIWAN, resolution of status, 423
TANKS
  antitank weapons, 133
  NATO vs. U.S.S.R., 113
  United States, 141
TASCHENBUCH DER PANZER [FERDINAND MARIA VON SENGER UND ETTERLIN], 113
TECHNOLOGY GAP, 136, 443
TENSION
  Asia, 416
    Korea, 409
TENSION--Continued
  Europe, 86
  Latin America, 65, 344
  Near East, 375, 391-392, 412-413, 417
TERRITORIAL DISPUTES
  Kurile Islands, 444
  See also Sino-Soviet dispute
TERRITORIAL WATERS, definition, 310
THAILAND
  foreign policy, 51
  relations with the U.S.S.R., 87
THIRD WORLD, 10
  economic development, 14, 315
  modernization, 20
  See also Developing countries
TITO, JOSIP BROZ, 426
TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, ETC.
  Antarctic Treaty, 450
  Geneva Red Cross Conventions (1948), 312
  history, 306
  Montreux Convention (1936), 399
  Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security (Japan-United States), 59, 415
  Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 430
  U.S.-Japanese Convention (February 11, 1922), 432
  Washington naval treaty (1922), 342, 432
  See also North Atlantic Treaty Organization; Warsaw Treaty Organization
TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, ETC. (PROPOSED)
  U.S., Soviet, and Canadian draft treaties on arms limitation on the seabed and ocean floor, 446
  nonproliferation treaty. See under Proliferation of nuclear weapons
TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY (JAPAN-UNITED STATES), 59, 415
TREATY ON PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF STATES IN THE EXPLORATION AND USE OF OUTER SPACE INCLUDING THE MOON AND OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES, 430
TURKEY, nationalism, 12

U

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE
  Europe, Soviet view, 156
  See also Guerrilla warfare; Insurgency
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
  and German reunification, 418
  defense policies and programs, 13, 155, 206, 231, 352
    arms buildup, Chinese border, 411
    civil defense, 178
    Mediterranean Sea, 218, 244
    strategic weapons systems, 239
    strategy, 196, 244
      naval, 215, 395
  disarmament policies and proposals, 345, 351-352
    chemical and biological weapons, 262
  draft treaty on arms limitation on the seabed and ocean floor, 446
  economic development, 273

XUM

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS--Continued
foreign policy, 10, 78
Asia, 64
Brezhnev doctrine, 68, 83
Communist China, 52
East Germany, 67
Europe, 69, 328
France, 63
Latin America, 80
Mediterranean area, 414
Near East, 28, 396
United States, 37
foreign relations
Communist China, 43, 53, 70-71, 77, 229
Communist countries, 68, 83
East Germany, 400
Eastern Europe, 86, 149, 393
Iraq, 100
Near East, 28
Rumania, 81
Thailand, 87
West Germany, 238
invasion of Czechoslovakia. See Czechoslovakia--Soviet invasion
Navy, 116, 143, 204, 215
Indian Ocean, 179
Mediterranean area, 190, 218
U.S. view, 211
negotiation, art of, 365
negotiations with the U.S., 74, 357, 361, 363, 366-367, 369
nonproliferation treaty (proposed), 381-382
nuclear policies and programs, 231, 349
nuclear weapons development, 186
relations with other Communist countries, 79
role in Eastern Europe, 45
seapower 204, 395
space programs, 430
tanks, 113
territorial disputes
Kurile Islands, 444
with Communist China, 56, 128, 407
view of
Arab-Israeli War, 405
chemical and biological weapons, 137, 255
European unification, 334
NATO, 207, 241, 250, 354
territorial waters, 310
United Nations, 315-316
U.S. foreign policy, 32, 156, 429
U.S. military alliances, 22
U.S. military-industrial complex, 251
Vietnam War, 64, 368
West German chemical and biological weapons program, 134
See also East-West relations; Sino-Soviet dispute; Soviet-U.S. relations
UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC
Army, 391
defense policies and programs, 403
See also Arab-Israeli dispute; Arab-Israeli War
UNITED KINGDOM. See Great Britain
UNITED NATIONS
admission of new members, 319
disarmament policies and proposals, 345
chemical and biological weapons, 255-256, 259
UNITED NATIONS--Continued
General Assembly, 23rd session, 318
ocean, control of the seabed, 440
peacekeeping and security forces, 321
peacekeeping and security operations, 316
role
in Arab-Israeli dispute, 88
in economic and social development, 315
of nonalined countries, 424
U.S. policies and proposals, 314
UNITED STATES
antimissile defense systems. See Antimissile defense systems
Armed Forces. See specific branches under United States (Government)
arms trade and dissemination, 374
Latin America, 373
Libya, 371
Near East, 301
defense budget and expenditures, 188, 214, 272, 274, 279
economic effects, 287, 295
Presidential impounding of Congressional appropriations, 232
defense cutbacks, 245, 275, 281, 285, 422, 438
economic effects, 287
Navy, 282
defense policies and programs, 147, 186, 214, 245, 352
air defense system, 111, 202
aircraft carriers, 211
Asia, 58, 64, 101, 419, 429
chemical and biological weapons, 252, 254, 258, 260, 266-268
civil defense, 157, 162, 240
criticism, 160, 168, 274
Europe, 46, 156
flexible response, 209-210
foreign military bases, 422
insurgency, 103
military airlift, 120
military alliances, Soviet view, 22
military commitments, 44
nuclear war, 219
Strategic Air Command, 191
strategic weapons systems, 239
strategy. See Strategy--United States
tactical satellite communications, 390
undersea warfare, 126
Western Europe, 233
defense research and development, 140, 286, 293
criticism, 293, 302
multiple independent reentry vehicles, 139
nuclear reactors, 280
disarmament policies and proposals, 345, 352
seabed, 440, 445-446
troop inspection experiment, 436
economic aid to Latin America, 65
foreign policy, 29-30, 33, 50, 74, 308
and the Sino-Soviet dispute, 56
Asia, 58, 64, 101, 419, 429
attitudes of Negroes, 57
Communist China, 52
criticism, 41, 49, 66, 297
developing countries, 47, 74
East German view, 348

UNITED STATES--Continued
foreign policy--Continued
Eastern Europe, 45
Europe, 34
influence of the "new left," 21
Latin America, 80
Near East, 88, 94, 301, 417
role of international law, 307
role of military-industrial complex, 272
Soviet view, 32, 156, 429
U.S.S.R., 37, 86
Vietnam. See Vietnam War--U.S. policy
Western Europe, 73
foreign relations
Australia, 96
Communist China. See Sino-American relations
West Germany, 172
militarism, 92, 212, 249, 283, 295
Soviet view, 32
military-industrial complex, 212, 272, 279
Soviet view, 251, 300
national security policies, 249
criticism, 205, 297
reliance on military technology, 248
NATO policy, 183, 276
negotiations with the U.S.S.R., 74, 357, 361, 363, 366-367, 369
nonproliferation treaty (proposed), 439
nuclear energy industry, 119, 144, 261
nuclear policies and programs, 127, 385
criticism, 349
nuclear research and development, 127, 442
nuclear weapons tests, 263, 303, 442
peace policies and proposals, 335
role in Asia, 148
space policies and programs, 122, 430
submarines, 126, 275
U.N. policy, 314, 319
uranium enrichment facilities, 119, 144
See also East-West relations; United States (Government)
UNITED STATES (GOVERNMENT)
Air Force, 214
airborne warning and control system, 111
aircraft, 142
Military Airlift Command, 120
Strategic Air Command, 186, 191
Army, 245
role in developing countries, 292
role in Vietnam, 213
status report (1969), 213
tank program, 141
Atomic Energy Commission, FY 1970 budget, 127
Congress
antimilitarism, 151
defense cutbacks, 281
House Armed Services Committee, 141
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 119, 144
military appropriations, 232
military commitments, 44
power to declare war, 205
Senate hearings on nonproliferation treaty, 439
Dept. of Defense
conventional arms transfers, 374
defense spending criticism, 151
Office of Civil Defense, 162
UNITED STATES (GOVERNMENT)--Continued
Department of Defense--Continued
Secretary, 147
Marine Corps, aircraft, 117, 135
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 122
Navy
antisubmarine warfare, 129
carrier role, 193
comparison to Soviet Navy, 211
cutbacks, 282
Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory, 286
Office of Strategic Offensive and Defensive Systems, 195
policy, 188
ship construction, 131, 275
undersea long-range missile system, 126
Washington naval treaty (1922), 342, 432
President, authority to impound defense appropriations, 232
Presidential Commission on Marine Science, Engineering, and Resources, 441
U.S.-JAPANESE CONVENTION (FEBRUARY 11, 1922), 432
UPPER VOLTA, foreign relations, 299
URANIUM
enrichment facilities, 119, 144
resources, 383

V

VIETNAM, peacekeeping and security operations (proposed), 320
VIETNAM WAR
chemical and biological weapons, 266-267
effects
on U.S. economy, 287
on U.S. foreign policy, 30
escalation, 370
international law, 308
settlement, 449
negotiated, 362
proposals, 92
Soviet view, 64
tactical lessons, 245
U.S. policy, 35, 74, 358, 368
criticism, 92, 107, 152, 160, 210, 428
Soviet view, 429
VIOLENCE, 329
causes, 1, 7, 23-24
human nature, 11, 330
role in society, 15
VIOLENCE: REFLECTIONS FROM A CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE [JACQUES ELLUL], 329
VITAL, DAVID, 17

W

WAR
Catholic view, 106
causes, 7, 11
changing nature of, 108, 349
cybernetic analysis, 109
future, 103
legal aspects, 308
moral and ethical aspects, 106
strategy. See Strategy
Vietnam. See Vietnam War

XUM

WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION, 206, 328
  defense policies and programs, 149
  European conference (proposed), 322, 327
WEAPONS. See Arms and armaments; also specific types of weapons; e.g., Missiles; Nuclear weapons
WESTERN EUROPE
  defense policies and programs, 233
  technology gap, 136
  U.S. policy, 73
  See also specific countries
WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION, 414
WHEELER, EARLE G., 439
WORLD FEDERATION OF SCIENTIFIC WORKERS, 9th General Assembly, Paris (1969), 388
WORLD LAW. See International law
WORLD POLITICS. See International relations
WORLD WAR II, causes, 270

Y

YUGOSLAVIA
  cooperation with Danube countries, 72
  foreign policy, 425
  nationalism, 12
  nonalinement, 425
  NATO policy, 155

Z

ZIONISM, effect on Israeli politics, 336

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XUM

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